Setting the Stage for Reflecting on a Universal Morality

Cliquet, Robert; Avramov, Dragana

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-73090-5_1

Robert Cliquet^3,4 &
Dragana Avramov⁵

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Abstract

Dealing with the ethical challenges of humankind at the turn of the twenty-first century, and safely guiding the human species through new subsequent stages of biological evolution and adaptation and cultural development, requires rethinking of our values and norms in a longer-term perspective and at the planetary level. Therefore, this chapter starts by discussing the meaning of evolution and presenting an overview of the major stages of the development of evolution science—the Darwinian revolution, the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, the molecular-genetic revolution and the Second Darwinian Revolution. Next, the two major developmental processes, the hominisation process and the modernisation process, are addressed, which are considered by the authors to be of pivotal importance for the future of human morality. Finally, by confronting the hominisation and modernisation processes, this chapter sets the stage for revealing the necessary changes in values and norms in view of adapting to further progressing modernisation and evolving toward higher levels of hominisation.

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Notes

1.
Sproul (1979), Leeming (2009).
2.
Bowler (1984), Larson (2006).
3.
Mayr (1978).
4.
Gingerich (1993).
5.
Stewart (2008).
6.
Ontogeny: the development of an organism within its own lifetime from conception to death.
7.
Phylogeny: the evolutionary development and history of a species or larger groups of related organisms as they change through time.
8.
Huxley and Flew, quoted in Oldroyd (1980, 118–119).
9.
GRI: geometrical ratio of increase; LR: limited resources; SE: struggle for existence; V: variation; NS: natural selection; T: time; BI: biological improvement.
10.
Morgan (1903), De Vries (1904).
11.
Genetic drift: change of allele frequencies of monogenes as a result of the accumulation of random fluctuations in the intergenerational transmission of alleles in small populations (Wright 1929); see also Chap. 2, Sect. 2.1.4.
12.
Genetic migration: transfer of genes from one population to a genetically different one; see also Chap. 2, Sect. 2.1.3.
13.
Assortative mating: deviation of partner choice from a random mating pattern (Fisher 1918; Wright 1921, 1922); see also Chap. 2, Sect. 2.1.5.
14.
Mendel (1865), Correns (1900), De Vries (1900).
15.
Biometrical or quantitative genetics: a branch of genetics that deals with biological characteristics that show a continuous variation (Galton 1889; Pearson 1896; Kearsey and Pooni 1998).
16.
Hardy (1908), Weinberg (1908).
17.
Chetverikov (1927), Fisher (1930), Wright (1931), Haldane (1932).
18.
Dobzhansky (1937), Mayr (1942), Huxley (1942), Simpson (1944).
19.
Prigogine and Stengers (1984), Kauffman (1993, 1995).
20.
Depew and Weber (1995).
21.
Gould (1977), Gilbert et al. (1996).
22.
Newman and Muller (2001), Jablonka and Lamb (2005).
23.
Quayle and Bullock (2006), Wray (2010).
24.
Pigliucci (2001), West-Eberhard (2003).
25.
Wagner and Altenberg (1996), Kirschner and Gerhart (1998).
26.
Kauffman (1993), Johnson and Lam (2010).
27.
Gavrilets (1997), Svensson and Calsbeek (2012).
28.
Rutherford and Lindquist (1998), Bergman and Siegal (2003).
29.
Odling-Smee (2003), Abouheif et al. (2014).
30.
Wilson (2010), Gardner (2015).
31.
Watson and Crick (1953).
32.
Strachan and Read (2010).
33.
Venter (2013).
34.
Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), Relethford (2001), DeSalle and Ian Tattersall (2008), Fairbanks (2010).
35.
For instance Benjamin et al. (2002), Noblett and Coccaro (2005), Canli (2008).
36.
Inclusive fitness: the sum of the number of offspring an individual produces and the number of offspring of his relatives that results from his altruistic behaviour (Hamilton 1964); see also Chap. 2, Sect. 2.1.2.5.
37.
Kin selection: the evolutionary mechanism through which inclusive fitness of an individual is being achieved (Maynard Smith 1964); see also Chap. 2, Sect. 2.1.2.5.
38.
Reciprocity selection: the evolutionary mechanism through which genes are selected thanks to altruistic behaviour between non-relatives (Trivers 1971; Alexander 1987; Nowak and Sigmund 1998; 2005); see also Chap. 2, Sect. 2.1.2.6.
39.
Group selection: the evolutionary mechanism through which natural selection produces differences in reproductive fitness between groups (Maynard Smith 1964; Alexander and Borgia 1978; Sober and Wilson 1998); see also Chap. 2, Sect. 2.1.2.8.
40.
Evolutionary stable strategy: a strategy that cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy in a population (Maynard Smith and Price 1973); see also Chap. 2, Sect. 2.1.2.8.
41.
Red Queen Theory: organisms that live in coevolved interactions with other evolving organisms in a changing environment, must constantly evolve (Van Valen 1973); see also Chap. 5, Sect. 5.3.2.3.
42.
Machiavellian Hypothesis: the increase in brain size during human evolution evolved due to intense social competition in which increasingly sophisticated ‘Machiavellian’ strategies were used as a means to achieve higher social and reproductive success (Alexander 1974; Humphrey 1976; De Waal 1982; Byrne and Whiten 1988); see also this Chap., Sect. 1.2.
43.
Selfish gene theory: evolution occurs through the differential reproduction of competing genes, the more successful forms of which survive at the detriment of alternative ones. Richard Dawkins (1976) coined in this respect the term ‘selfish gene’; see also Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2.4.4.
44.
Ghiselin (1974), Maynard Smith (1978), Daly and Wilson (1978).
45.
Evolutionary game theory: application of game theory to the evolution of living organisms (Maynard Smith and Price 1973; Maynard Smith 1982; Gintis 2000; Barash 2003); see also Chap. 2, Sect. 2.1.2.6.
46.
The handicap principle: living beings display their biological superiority through costly morphological or behavioural signals, showing their ability to squander wastefully some of their natural resources. (Zahavi and Zahavi 1997).
47.
Biocultural co-evolution: the feedback-causal relationship between biological evolution and cultural change, resulting in an acceleration of both processes (For instance, Washburn 1959, 1960; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Lumsden and Wilson 1981; Durham 1991; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Gintis 2011); see also this Chap., Sect. 1.2 and Chap. 2, Sect. 2.1.
48.
Gangestad and Simpson (2007, 435).
49.
Wright (1994), Horgan (1995), Machalek and Martin (2004).
50.
See also Gardner (2013, 104).
51.
Ghiselin (1974).
52.
Wilson (1975).
53.
Ethology: the study of (comparative) animal behaviour, usually with a focus on behaviour as an evolutionarily adaptive phenomenon.
54.
For instance, Gregory et al. (1978), Chagnon and Irons (1979), Bowles and Gintis (2011), Voland (2013).
55.
Alexander (1975, 1979, 1987).
56.
Wilson (1978), see also Wilson’s recent book on ‘The Social Conquest of Earth’ (2012).
57.
For instance, prisoner dilemma game (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1986); public goods game (Yamagishi 1986; Fehr and Gächter 2000; 2002); dictator game (Kahneman et al. 1986); gift exchange game (Fehr et al. 1993); trust game (Berg et al. 1995); ultimatum game (Henrich 2000).
58.
For overviews of evolutionary game experiments see, amongst others, Maynard Smith (1982), Gintis (2000), Barash (2003), Bowles and Gintis (2011).
59.
Bowles and Gintis (2011, 39ff).
60.
For instance, nepotism (Alexander 1979; Bellow 2004); dominance (Omark et al. 1980); jealousy (Daly et al. 1982); cheating behaviour (Trivers 1974); cheating detection (Cosmides and Tooby 1992); self-deception (Trivers 2000; 2011); suicide (Mascaro et al. 2001); menopause (Peccei 1995); senescence (Hamilton 1966).
61.
For instance, mating behaviour (Daly and Wilson 1978; Buss 1994; 2007; Miller 2000); kinship systems (Van den Berghe 1979); monogamy (Melotti 1980; Fisher 1992; De La Croix and Mariani 2015); incest avoidance and incest taboo (Van den Berghe 1980; Wolf 1995); cuckoldry and mate guarding (Hiatt 1989); polygyny (Borgerhoff Mulder 1990); sexual attractiveness (Gangestad and Thornhill 1997).
62.
For instance, parental investment and sexual selection (Trivers 1972); sex ratio and male surmortality (Trivers and Willard 1973); parent-offspring conflict (Trivers 1974); sexual dimorphism and reproductive strategies (Daly and Wilson 1978); paternal confidence (Gaulin and Schlegel 1980); paternity security and avunculate (Greene 1980); infanticide (Dickemann 1979); child abuse (Lenington 1981); hidden ovulation (Daniels 1983); birth spacing (Blurton Jones 1987); adoption (Silk 1990); rape (Thornhill and Palmer 2000); demographic transition (Borgerhoff Mulder 1998).
63.
For instance, biopolitics (Somit 1976); food sharing (Isaac 1978); evolution of cooperation (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981); cooperation and international politics (Axelrod 1984); ostracism (Gruter and Masters 1986); in-group/out-group relations, xenophobia and racism (Reynolds et al. 1987); aggression and war (Shaw and Wong 1989; Van der Dennen 1995); life history theory (Hill 1993); wary cooperation theory (Alford and Hibbing 2004).
64.
For instance, Campbell (1975), Stent (1980), Alexander (1987), Wilson (1993), Wright (1994), Hauser (2006), Krebs (2011), Boehm (2012).
65.
For instance, Washburn (1959), Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), Lumsden and Wilson (1981), Durham (1991), Boyd and Richerson (1985), Gintis (2011).
66.
Hominins: the various human-like species that evolved in the course of the hominisation process, ultimately resulting in the emergence of the present species Homo sapiens sapiens.
67.
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), Boyd and Richerson (1985), Cziko (1995), Mesoudi (2011; 2016).
68.
In many quarters, the terminological shift from sociobiology to evolutionary psychology has probably more to do with political correctness than scientific scrupulousness, such as the desire to avoid association with a field that has been accused of biological determinism and reductionism, racism, sexism, etc. (Silverman 2003; Webster 2007) or the fact that, particularly in the United States, the more individual-oriented psychology is politically more fashionable than the more socially oriented sociobiology.
69.
Tooby and Cosmides (1990), Wright (1994), Gangestad and Simpson (2007).
70.
Buss (1999), Barrett et al. (2002).
71.
Dunbar (2007).
72.
Bechara (2002).
73.
Borgerhoff Mulder and Schacht (2012).
74.
For instance, Ducros (1981), Crippen (1994), Niedenzu et al. (2008), Turner et al. (2015).
75.
For instance, Koslowsky (1999), Landa and Ghiselin (1999), Hodgson (2007).
76.
For instance, Rancour-Laferriere (1985), Stevens and Price (1996), McGuire and Troisi (1998).
77.
For instance, Rubin (2002), Alford and Hibbing (2004), Fowler and Schreiber (2008).
78.
Campbell (1979), Alexander (1987), Nitecki and Nitecki (1993), Farber (1994), Katz (2000), Hinde (2002), Boniolo and De Anna (2006), Høgh-Olesen (2010), Krebs (2011), Boehm (2012).
79.
Laland and Brown (2002, 317).
80.
It appears more and more clearly that each major stage of the hominisation process, and in particular the earliest stage, was characterised by the development of several variants. For instance, the Australopithecus/Paranthropus stage included variants such as the Sahelanthropus Tchadensis, Adripithecus ramidus, A. anamensis, A. afarensis, A. bahrelghazali, A. africanus, A. garhi, A. sediba, A. deyiremeda, A. prometheus, A. naledi, Kenyanthropus platyops, P. aethiopicus, P. boisei, and P. robustus (Stringer 2012; Stringer and Andrews 2012; Tattersall 2012; Berger et al. 2015).
81.
Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995).
82.
Flinn and Coe (2007, 340), Antón and Snodgrass (2012), Isler et al. (2012).
83.
Hrdy (2011).
84.
For instance, Washburn (1959), Lumsden and Wilson (1981), Boyd and Richerson (1985), Durham (1991).
85.
Euculture: specifically human culture, showing high complexity, depending on intentional and symbolic behaviour.
86.
Protoculture: rudimentary and non-symbolic forms of intergenerationally transmitting learned behaviour among non-human primates.
87.
Adaptation is a concept that may have two different meanings, namely (phylo)genetic adaptation and ontogenetic adaptation. The first refers to a process through which a genetically determined or influenced feature spreads in a population by means of natural selection and thanks to which this feature succeeds in contributing to the survival and reproduction of its carriers; the second relates to physiological or behavioural changes during the ontogenetic development of individuals as adjustment to environmental living conditions, but are not genetically transmitted to subsequent generations. The concept of adaptation is applicable to biological as well as cultural traits. Whereas (phylo)genetic adaptations are intergenerationally transmitted through genes, vertically from parents to children, cultural adaptations can, vertically as well as horizontally, be spread through cultural learning processes. G.G. Williams (1966, 159) called an adaptation a “design for survival”.
88.
Richerson and Boyd (2005, 146).
89.
Flinn and Coe (2007).
90.
Encephalisation: the tendency of the human evolutionary lineage toward larger brains through evolutionary time.
91.
Not only the human brain, but several other biological characteristics of the human species are the result of the biocultural co-evolutionary process. The most salient example is the anatomy and physiology of human speech and facial communication (Cliquet and Thienpont 2002, 600; Gintis and Helbing 2015, 17), but also the dexterity of the human hands is a good example. Obviously, the same applies to many essential components of human culture, sociality and morality.
92.
Autopoesis: ‘αύτοποίησις’ = self-creation in Greek.
93.
Corning (2014, 242).
94.
Cliquet and Thienpont (2002, 623).
95.
Clutton-Brock and Harvey (1980).
96.
Oakley (1959), Washburn (1959, 1960).
97.
For instance, Etkin (1963), Dunbar (2003), Gamble et al. (2014), Gintis (2014).
98.
Humphrey (1976).
99.
Whiten and Byrne (1988).
100.
Moll and Tomasello (2007), Brosnan et al. (2010), McNally et al. (2012).
101.
Alexander (1989).
102.
Miller (2000).
103.
Evans et al. (2005), Hawks et al. (2007), Williamson et al. (2007), Hawks (2016).
104.
Armelagos and Harper (2005), Cochran and Harpending (2009), Byars et al. (2010).
105.
For instance, Barash (2012), Weaver (2012).
106.
Bowlby (1969).
107.
Cochran and Harpending (2009).
108.
Newson and Richerson (2009) argue with their ‘kin influence hypothesis’ that the leading causal variable of modernity is a marked change in social network structure leading to a lower ratio of relatives to non-relatives.
109.
Hayek (1979), Richerson and Boyd (2005, 230).
110.
Wilson (1978, 89).
111.
Enlightenment: intellectual movement in Europe in the eighteenth century that emphasized the use of reason and the scientific method. It advanced ideals such as individual liberty, progress, tolerance, fraternity, constitutional government, and separation of church and state (Habermas 1978, 2; Heilbroner 1995, 58; Bruce 2002, 2).
112.
Pinker (2011, 56, 59, 129).
113.
McCloskey (2016).
114.
Monod (1970, 185).
115.
“Modern societies are built on science. They owe their wealth, power and the certainty that, tomorrow, still far greater wealth and power will, if he wants so, be accessible to the Human.”
116.
For instance, Chauchard (1959, 41), Kass (2002), Sandel (2007).
117.
Maryanski and Turner (1992), Veenhoven (2005).
118.
See also Kurzweil (2005, 396, 408).
119.
ABC: atomic, biological and chemical weapons (see, for instance, Croddy et al. 2004).
120.
GNR: advanced technologies of the genetics, nanotechnology and robotics revolution (see Joy 2000; Mulhall 2002; Kurzweil 2005).
121.
Bostrom (2004, 339), see also Richerson and Boyd (2005, 230).
122.
Hauser (2006, 423).
123.
Heilbroner (1995, 95).
124.
However, not only biological evolution and modern cultural development evolve at different speeds, also the technological and social dimensions of modernity evolve asynchronously and unevenly. As Glover (1984, 186) stated: “Our present wave of problems exists because modern physical technology has come too early in our social development.”
125.
Grinde (1996).
126.
Rokeach (1973).
127.
Broom (2004; 2006), Adams (2005).
128.
Futurology: study that deals with future possibilities based on current trends.
129.
Cornish (1977).

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Anthropology and Social Biology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Robert Cliquet
Population and Family Study Centre (CBGS), Flemish Scientific Institute, Brussels, Belgium
Robert Cliquet
Population and Social Policy Consultants (PSPC), Brussels, Belgium
Dragana Avramov

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Cliquet, R., Avramov, D. (2018). Setting the Stage for Reflecting on a Universal Morality. In: Evolution Science and Ethics in the Third Millennium. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73090-5_1

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73090-5_1
Published: 12 January 2018
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-73089-9
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