Abstract
This chapter gives an overview of Dworkinian approaches to global law, suggesting that this strategy consists in a dynamic understanding of the legal process coupled with a perspective on values as output legitimacy. It illustrates that a reliance on a community of principle and moral realism facilitates some ways of thinking about legal plurality, while rendering others more difficult. On the one hand, taking substantive concerns of morality into account makes it easier to bridge those gaps and overlaps in the law that occur as a result of legal plurality. On the other hand, a moral interpretation of the law that is released from the institutional framework of a domestic legal system risks falling prey to decisionism resulting from the limited focus on rules.
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Notes
- 1.
For a short introduction to Dworkin’s legal philosophy, see Liam Murphy, What Makes Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 45f.
- 2.
See Ronald Dworkin, “A New Philosophy for International Law,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 41, no. 1 (2013): 22.
- 3.
See, in detail, Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1986), 45f.
- 4.
This position is set out most clearly in Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 17f.
- 5.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 22f.
- 6.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 24.
- 7.
Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 201–24.
- 8.
Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 195f.
- 9.
Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 65f.
- 10.
See Nicos Stavropoulos, “Legal Interpretivism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (last revised April 2014), sections 3–4, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-interpretivist
- 11.
Stavropoulos, “Legal Interpretivism,” section 3, for critique and further references.
- 12.
For general criticism and in particular for the first objection, see Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 222–26.
- 13.
See Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 400–15.
- 14.
Raz argues that Dworkin takes a position between realism and constructivism. See Joseph Raz “A Hedgehogs Unity on Value,” in The Legacy of Ronald Dworkin, eds. Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 17–19.
- 15.
Ronald Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 25, no. 2 (1996): 136.
- 16.
Dworkin distinguishes between internal and external skepticists. While internal skepticists use standards stemming from morality to distinguish true from false legal claims, external skepticists discard the objectivity of morality altogether. The latter are already caught in the discursive context of moral argument, so that they cannot escape from holding some fundamental beliefs about the structure of morality. See Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth,” 87–91. This argument is similar to the Habermasian classification of moral discourse.
- 17.
Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 10.
- 18.
Here, one could think that Dworkin takes a constructivist position. But as Raz notes, his argument contains elements of both theoretical positions. He asks “[I]s the interpretation in question an epistemic activity, namely one aimed at discovering what is there, what is the truth, independently of it? Or is it an innovative interpretation that constitutes [the] object through the activity of interpretation when correctly done?” See Raz, “A Hedgehog’s Unity,” 21–22. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 116–17.
- 19.
See Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 91f.
- 20.
Note that it is a philosophy “for” international law not “of” it. Philosophy and theory appear here as a purposive activity right from the start of the inquiry.
- 21.
Dworkin, “New Philosophy,” 5, in n 6.
- 22.
Dworkin, “New Philosophy,” 9–10.
- 23.
Dworkin, “New Philosophy,” 9.
- 24.
Dworkin, “New Philosophy,” 5. See also Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 165–66.
- 25.
Dworkin, “New Philosophy,” 11.
- 26.
Dworkin, “New Philosophy,” 12.
- 27.
Dworkin, “New Philosophy,” 17.
- 28.
Dworkin, “New Philosophy,” 19–20.
- 29.
Dworkin, “New Philosophy,” 19.
- 30.
Dworkin, “New Philosophy,” 30.
- 31.
See, for example, Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 3: “Why do powerful nations obey powerless rules?”
- 32.
In the 1930s there was a debate between two of realism’s popular proponents. Quite frequently, debates on today’s realism are traced back to this debate. See Karl N. Llewellyn, “A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step,” Columbia Law Review 30, no. 4 (1930): 431; Roscoe Pound, “The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence,” Harvard Law Review 44, no. 5 (1931): 697; Karl N. Llewellyn, “Some Realism about Realism – A Reply to Dean Pound,” Harvard Law Review 44, no. 8 (1931): 1222. See, for a comprehensive collection of texts, American Legal Realism, eds. William W. Fisher, Morton J. Horwitz and Thomas A. Reed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
- 33.
Koh fused Jessup’s transnational law with Chayes et al.’s international legal process. See, respectively, Philip Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956) and Abraham Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich and Andreas W. Lowenfeld, International Legal Process – Materials for an Introductory Course (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968). See Harold H. Koh, “Transnational Legal Process,” Nebraska Law Review 75 (1996): 186.
- 34.
Koh, “Transnational Legal Process,” 184.
- 35.
Harold H. Koh, “Bringing International Law Home,” Houston Law Review 35 (1998–99), 641.
- 36.
Koh, “Bringing International Law Home,” 641–42.
- 37.
Harold H. Koh, “Transnational Legal Process after September 11,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 22 (2004): 338.
- 38.
Koh, “Bringing International Law Home,” 635.
- 39.
Koh, “Bringing International Law Home,” 642.
- 40.
Harold H. Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” Yale Law Journal 106 (1996–97): 2599.
- 41.
Koh, “Bringing International Law Home,” 629.
- 42.
- 43.
Koh, “Transnational Legal Process,” 207.
- 44.
Koh, “Transnational Legal Process,” 205. One possible explanation for this might be that in the context of the resistance of US-American courts to take norms of international law into account, any norm internalization could be regarded as a progress. Yet, as TLP retains a general focus, this explanation cannot be generalized.
- 45.
See, in detail, Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, Volume I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992).
- 46.
Lasswell and McDougal, Jurisprudence, 249f.
- 47.
W. Michael Reisman, one of the main proponents of the school, describes its goals as follows: “The New Haven School defines law as a process of decision that is both authoritative and controlling; it places past such decisions in the illuminating light of their conditioning factors; both environmental and predispositional, and appraises decision trends for their compatibility with clarified goals; it forecasts, to the extent possible, alternative future decisions and their consequences; and it provides conceptual tools for those using it to invent and appraise alternative decisions, constitutive arrangements, and courses of action using the guiding light of a preferred future world public order of human dignity.” W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner and Andrew R. Willard, “The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction,” Yale Journal of International Law 32 (2007): 575.
- 48.
W. Michael Reisman, “The View from the New Haven School of International Law,” American Society of International Law Proceedings 86 (1992): 118.
- 49.
Reisman, Wiessner and Willard, “New Haven School,” 577.
- 50.
Reisman, Wiessner and Willard, “New Haven School,” 581. The passage refers to an article by Paul Schiff Berman.
- 51.
Reisman, Wiessner and Willard, “New Haven School,” 576.
- 52.
Richard A. Falk, “Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law,” Yale Journal of International Law 104, no. 7 (1994–95): 2000.
- 53.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law in a World of Liberal States,” European Journal of International Law 6 (1995): 523.
- 54.
Slaughter, “World of Liberal States,” 534.
- 55.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 5.
- 56.
Slaughter, New World Order, 263.
- 57.
Slaughter, New World Order, 7.
- 58.
Slaughter, New World Order, 4.
- 59.
Slaughter, New World Order, 265.
- 60.
Slaughter, New World Order, 67–68.
- 61.
Slaughter, New World Order, 68–69. The rhetorical similarity to the radical democratic principles in Sect. 4.4.3 is striking.
- 62.
Slaughter, New World Order, 86.
- 63.
Slaughter, New World Order, 102.
- 64.
Slaughter, New World Order, 88f.
- 65.
Nicole Roughan, Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation and Transnational Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- 66.
Roughan invokes Raz’ service conception as a major example. See, in detail, Joseph Raz, “The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception,” Minnesota Law Review 90, no. 4 (2006): 1003.
- 67.
See, in detail, Roughan, Authorities, 87–122.
- 68.
Roughan, Authorities, 105f.
- 69.
According to the Razian conception, for example, the “service” of authority is that the subject that is supposed to take a specific course of action can replace its own considerations by the command of a legitimate authority. Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 148.
- 70.
Nicole Roughan, “The Relative Authority of Law: A Contribution to Pluralist Jurisprudence,” in New Waves in the Philosophy of Law, ed. Maks del Mar (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 258.
- 71.
Roughan, Authorities, 136f.
- 72.
This boils down to the following suggestion: “Authority is justified if: (1) there is an undefeated reason to have authority rather than private decision-making; (2) a particular person or body has the standing of authority conferred upon it through a justified procedure; (3) that authority is supported by or is consistent with the balance of governance reasons; (4) that authority is supported by or is consistent with the balance of side-effect reasons; and (5) its exercise would better enable subjects to conform to the reasons for action that apply to them, including both primary and secondary reasons to follow or exclude the directives of other relevant authorities.” See, Roughan, Authorities, 134.
- 73.
“Working that out would require a full-blown moral theory about value, a theory of the person and their practical reasoning that explains the value of autonomy, a theory of the determinants and value of the political community, a political theory that explains how autonomy can be applied to generate political legitimacy, and sensitivity to any other restrictions imposed upon autonomy and legitimacy that are required by theories of justice. These are the core questions of liberal political philosophy, and I cannot recount the work that has been done on them or offer any original alternative to the contending approaches.” Roughan, Authorities, 128.
- 74.
Roughan, Authorities, 128, n 8.
- 75.
Here, it is also helpful to consider that Dworkin’s jurisprudential views are equally skeptical about the Razian concept of authority.
- 76.
Roughan, Authorities, 134.
- 77.
See Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations – The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), chapter 6. See further, David Roth-Isigkeit, “The Blinkered Discipline?! Martti Koskenniemi and Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Law,” International Theory 9, no. 3 (2017): 410.
- 78.
See, for example, Martti Koskenniemi, “Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law,” European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 3 (2009): 395.
- 79.
Kenneth W. Abbott, “Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus,” Yale Journal of International Law 14 (1989): 335.
- 80.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,” American Journal of International Law 87, no. 2 (1993): 209.
- 81.
Slaughter, “Dual Agenda,” 209.
- 82.
Slaughter, “Dual Agenda,” 206.
- 83.
Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Hard Law and Soft Law in International Governance,” International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 421. See also, Judith Goldstein et al., “Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,” International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 388.
- 84.
Goldstein et al., “Introduction,” 399.
- 85.
Goldstein et al., “Introduction,” 399.
- 86.
Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 15.
- 87.
See Nicholas Onuf, “Do Rules Say what they Do? From Ordinary Language to International Law,” Harvard International Law Journal 26, no. 2 (1985): 385; Nicholas Onuf, World of our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations, reissue (London: Routledge, 2013). Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- 88.
Kratochwil, Rules, 205.
- 89.
Onuf, World of Our Making, 138.
- 90.
Onuf, World of Our Making, 155.
- 91.
For an illustration of these two dimensions, see Chap. 3.5.
- 92.
See, Nicholas Onuf, “The Constitution of International Society,” European Journal of International Law 5 (1994): 13.
- 93.
Onuf, “Constitution,” 18–19.
- 94.
A recent restatement and discussion of these claims in Friedrich V. Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
- 95.
Kratochwil, Rules, 70.
- 96.
Kratochwil, Rules, 11.
- 97.
See, for example, his discussion of Hart and Kelsen. Kratochwil, Rules, 187–93.
- 98.
Kratochwil, Rules, 192.
- 99.
Herbert L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 110.
- 100.
Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 119, 127.
- 101.
Brunnée and Toope refer to approaches from Hurd, Risse, Sikkink, and Finnemore. See Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, “Constructivism and International Law,” in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, eds. Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 128.
- 102.
Brunnée and Toope, “Constructivism,” 130.
- 103.
Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, 20f. See also Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
- 104.
For the criteria of legality, see Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, 28f.
- 105.
Obligation is thus connected to compliance. Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, 94f.
- 106.
Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, chapter 6.
- 107.
For similar perspectives, see Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Volume I, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 311; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 66.
- 108.
Hart, Concept of Law, 56.
- 109.
For further discussion and explanations, see Scott J. Shapiro, “What is the Internal Point of View?” Fordham Law Review 75 (2006): 1157.
- 110.
Hart, Concept of Law, 89–90.
- 111.
Hart, Concept of Law, 89–90.
- 112.
Hart, Concept of Law, 98 and 137–38.
- 113.
See, for a similar claim, Philipp Allott, “Language, Method and the Nature of International Law,” British Yearbook of International Law 45 (1971): 124–6.
- 114.
See e.g., Neil Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism,” Modern Law Review 65, no. 3 (2002): 317; Miguel P. Maduro, “Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism,” in Ruling The World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance, eds. Joel P. Trachtman and Jeffrey L. Dunoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 356; Alec Stone Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 16, no. 2 (2009): 621.
- 115.
Alec Stone Sweet, “A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe,” Journal of Global Constitutionalism 1, no. 1 (2012): 53.
- 116.
Stone Sweet, “Cosmopolitan Legal Order,” 57.
- 117.
Stone Sweet, “Cosmopolitan Legal Order,” 62.
- 118.
Kai Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
- 119.
Möller, Global Model, 85.
- 120.
See Stefan Kadelbach and Thomas Kleinlein, “International Law – A Constitution for Mankind? An Attempt at a Re-appraisal with an Analysis of Constitutional Principles,” German Yearbook of International Law 50 (2007): 303, 338.
- 121.
Kadelbach and Kleinlein, “Constitutional Principles,” 338.
- 122.
See Chap. 3.1.
- 123.
Stefan Kadelbach, “The Territoriality and Migration of Fundamental Rights,” in Beyond Territoriality – Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization, eds. Günther Handl, Joachim Zekoll and Peer Zumbansen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 295.
- 124.
Kadelbach, “Territoriality and Migration,” 297.
- 125.
Kadelbach, “Territoriality and Migration,” 316.
- 126.
Kadelbach, “Territoriality and Migration,” 323.
- 127.
Stefan Kadelbach and David Roth-Isigkeit, “The Right to Invoke Rights as a Limit to Sovereignty – Security Interests, State of Emergency and Review of UN Sanctions by Domestic Courts under the European Convention of Human Rights,” Nordic Journal of International Law 86, no. 3 (2017): 275.
- 128.
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
- 129.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
- 130.
Rawls, Law of Peoples, 37. The principles are that peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples; peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings; peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them; peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention; peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense; peoples are to honor human rights; peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war; peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.
- 131.
Rawls, Law of Peoples, 14.
- 132.
Rawls, Law of Peoples, 67.
- 133.
See also Charles R. Beitz, “Rawls’ Law of Peoples,” Ethics 110, no. 4 (2000): 676.
- 134.
Rawls, Law of Peoples, 89.
- 135.
Mattias Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism – An Integrated Conception of Public Law,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 20, no. 2 (2013): 605f. For an Introduction, see also Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 80–81.
- 136.
Mattias Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism – On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State,” in Ruling The World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance, eds. Joel P. Trachtman and Jeffrey L. Dunoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 263.
- 137.
Kumm, “Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State,” 268.
- 138.
Kumm, “Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State,” 269.
- 139.
In this idea rests a risk of circularity. Whether interests are legitimate depends on the public reason test.
- 140.
Kumm, “Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State,” 290.
- 141.
Kumm, “Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State,” 298f.
- 142.
Kumm, “Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State,” 301.
- 143.
Kumm, “Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State,” 274.
- 144.
See Sect. 5.3.3 above.
- 145.
See, most clearly, in Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, “In Whose Name? An Investigation of International Courts Democratic Authority and its Justification,” European Journal of International Law 23, no. 1 (2012): 7.
- 146.
Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 146.
- 147.
Von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name, 135f.
- 148.
Von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name, 157f.
- 149.
Von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name, 147.
- 150.
See the discussion in Chap. 3.3.
- 151.
Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law,” European Journal of International Law 20, no. 1 (2009): 32–33.
- 152.
See Sect. 3.3.1.
- 153.
Kingsbury, “Concept of Law,” 26.
- 154.
Walker, Intimations, 104.
- 155.
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 211f.
- 156.
For a discussion of this theme, see Nehal Bhuta, “State Theory, State Order, State System – Ius Gentium and the Constitution of Public Power,” in System, Order and International Law – The Early History of International Legal Thought, eds. Stefan Kadelbach, Thomas Kleinlein, and David Roth-Isigkeit (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017), 398.
- 157.
Hauke Brunkhorst, Legitimationskrisen – Verfassungsprobleme der Weltgesellschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012), 100 calls this the etatist principle of non-intervention.
- 158.
Michael Stolleis, Öffentliches Recht in Deutschland – Eine Einführung in seine Geschichte (München: C.H. Beck, 2014), 55–60.
- 159.
Dieter Grimm, Die Zukunft der Verfassung (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1991), 266.
- 160.
Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, 2nd ed. (Aalen: Scientia, 1963), 12f. Kelsen equally differentiates between idealistic and realistic conceptions of this identity, 18. See also, Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 10th ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010), 234.
- 161.
Kelsen, Wesen und Wert, 23f.
- 162.
As Brunkhorst shows, this does not only stand in contrast to Rousseau’s conception, but also leads to a complete dissolution of the concept of popular sovereignty. Brunkhorst, Legitimationskrisen, 114.
- 163.
Section 5.4.3 in detail
- 164.
Kumm, “Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State,” 274.
- 165.
Cp. von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name, 135f.
- 166.
See, in further detail, Sect. 4.1.3.
- 167.
Rawls, Law of Peoples, 65.
- 168.
See further, Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights – The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 408f.
- 169.
For a discussion of this aspect in Rawls, see Beitz, “Law of Peoples,” 681.
- 170.
Jeremy Waldron, “Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?” European Journal of International Law 22, no. 2 (2011): 315.
- 171.
Waldron, “Sovereigns,” 323.
- 172.
Waldron, “Sovereigns,” 325.
- 173.
Waldron, “Sovereigns,” 328.
- 174.
Waldron, “Sovereigns,” 337.
- 175.
Rafael Domingo, The New Global Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- 176.
For illustration, see Stefan Kadelbach, Thomas Kleinlein, and David Roth-Isigkeit “Introduction,” in System, Order, and International Law – The Early History of International Legal Thought, eds. Stefan Kadelbach, Thomas Kleinlein, and David Roth-Isigkeit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1.
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Roth-Isigkeit, D. (2018). Process and Harmonizing Principles: Dworkinian Approaches to Global Law. In: The Plurality Trilemma. Philosophy, Public Policy, and Transnational Law. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72856-8_5
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