Taming Plurality Through Formal Legal Rationality: Habermasian Approaches to Global Law

Roth-Isigkeit, David

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-72856-8_3

Taming Plurality Through Formal Legal Rationality: Habermasian Approaches to Global Law

David Roth-Isigkeit³

Chapter
First Online: 14 February 2018

270 Accesses

Part of the book series: Philosophy, Public Policy, and Transnational Law ((PPPTL))

Abstract

This chapter gives an overview of Habermasian approaches to global law. It suggests that this strategy includes highlighting the value of formal legal rationality coupled with input legitimacy. Whether this turns out to be a plea for global democracy as in the Habermasian formulation of constitutionalism, just a protection of discursive rationality on the basis of a horizontal relationship between legal orders, or even merely a romantic restatement of legal formalism as in the case of Martti Koskenniemi, all unite in the belief that law has a role to play in the formation of global order as self-government.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter: USD 29.95; Price excludes VAT (USA)

eBook: USD 79.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Softcover Book: USD 99.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Hardcover Book: USD 129.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

1.
Jürgen Habermas, “Why Europe Needs a Constitution,” New Left Review 11, no. 5 (2001): 5.
2.
See, in particular, Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), Chapter 3.
3.
See e.g., Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker, eds., The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
4.
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 123.
5.
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 121–23.
6.
See also Jürgen Habermas, “Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have a Chance?” in The Divided West, ed. and trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), 123–25. Habermas understands his reconstruction of co-originality of popular sovereignty and the rule of law as a combination of Kant’s and Rousseau’s political theory.
7.
Habermas, “Constitutionalization,” 127.
8.
Habermas, “Constitutionalization,” 124.
9.
Jürgen Habermas, The Lure of Technocracy, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity, 2015), 54.
10.
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 228.
11.
Habermas, Lure of Technocracy, 55.
12.
Habermas, Lure of Technocracy, 55.
13.
Habermas, Lure of Technocracy, 56.
14.
Habermas, Lure of Technocracy, 56.
15.
Jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity, 2014), 64–65.
16.
Habermas, Crisis of the European Union, 63.
17.
Habermas’ institutional visions have developed significantly since he started theorizing about world order. In order to present his thoughts in the best version, this reconstruction refers to his latest works that were published in 2011 and 2013.
18.
Habermas, Crisis of the European Union, 59.
19.
Habermas, Crisis of the European Union, 60–61.
20.
Habermas, Crisis of the European Union, 61.
21.
Habermas, Crisis of the European Union, 61.
22.
Habermas, Crisis of the European Union, 63–64.
23.
See, for the linkage of ius cogens to a discourse-theoretical view, Stefan Kadelbach, Zwingendes Völkerrecht (Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1992), 160f.
24.
Habermas, Crisis of the European Union, 68.
25.
Habermas, Crisis of the European Union, 65–66.
26.
See, for this argument, Patrizia Nanz and Jens Steffek, “Global Governance, Participation and the Public Sphere,” Government and Opposition 39, no. 2 (2004): 314.
27.
Habermas, Crisis of the European Union, 68.
28.
Habermas, Crisis of the European Union, 69.
29.
See, for an introduction to the discussion, Markus Patberg, “Constituent Power beyond the State: An Emerging Debate in International Political Theory,” Millennium – Journal of International Studies 42, no.1 (2013): 224.
30.
For references to global constitutionalism, see Sect. 2.4.2.
31.
See e.g., Nicole Deitelhoff, Überzeugung in der Politik – Grundzüge einer Diskurstheorie Internationalen Regierens (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2006).
32.
Paul Schiff Berman, “Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism – Procedural Principles for Managing Global Legal Pluralism,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 20, no. 2 (2013): 673.
33.
Berman, “Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism,” 673.
34.
Berman, “Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism,” 669.
35.
Berman, “Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism,” 680f.
36.
One of the main problems of Berman’s account seems to be a combination of more radical ideas of Chantal Mouffe and Robert Cover in the Habermasian framework. The incorporation of these radical critiques on the Habermasian discourse model constrains him not to tackle the issue of down-to-case legal argumentation as a precondition to recognize “otherness.” This, however, would be required in the mapping of procedural principles.
37.
Klaus Günther, “Legal Pluralism or Uniform Concept of Law – Globalization as a Problem of Legal Theory,” No Foundations – Journal of Extreme Legal Positivism 5 (2008): 16f.
38.
Günther, “Uniform Concept of Law,” 16.
39.
Günther, “Uniform Concept of Law,” 16.
40.
Günther, “Uniform Concept of Law,” 18.
41.
Günther, “Uniform Concept of Law,” 16. For further discussion, see David Roth-Isigkeit, “The Grammar(s) of Global Law,” Critical Quarterly for Legislation and Law 99, no. 3 (2016): 175.
42.
Günther, “Uniform Concept of Law,” 19.
43.
Günther, “Uniform Concept of Law,” 19.
44.
Günther, “Uniform Concept of Law,” 20.
45.
Günther, “Uniform Concept of Law,” 16.
46.
Dirk Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), 238f.
47.
Pulkowski, Regime Conflict, 238–39.
48.
This seems to be largely in line with the suggestions made in the ILC report on fragmentation. See the report of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, 13 April 2006, UN Doc. A/CN4/L.682 (2006). See also Chap. 2.1.
49.
Pulkowski, Regime Conflict, 243.
50.
Pulkowski, Regime Conflict, 244f.
51.
Pulkowski, Regime Conflict, 255.
52.
Pulkowski discusses this as reference to the lifeworld. Pulkowski, Regime Conflict, 258.
53.
Pulkowski, Regime Conflict, 261.
54.
Pulkowski, Regime Conflict, 265.
55.
Pulkowski, Regime Conflict, 270.
56.
Pulkowski, Regime Conflict, 287–98.
57.
Pulkowski, Regime Conflict, 319f.
58.
International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law, 23.
59.
Günther, “Uniform Concept of Law,” 17.
60.
Initially, Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,” Law and Contemporary Problems 68 (2005): 15. Sabino Cassese, “Administrative Law without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 37 (2005): 663. See further Benedict Kingsbury and Nico Krisch, “Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order,” European Journal of International Law 17, no. 1 (2006): 1.
61.
See, in particular, Sect. 2.1.1.
62.
Kingsbury and Krisch, “Global Governance,” 1.
63.
GAL distinguishes between two general types of administrative action, constitutive and substantive. Sometimes the category of procedural law is added. See Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law,” European Journal of International Law 20, no. 1 (2009): 34. The first type, constitutive administrative law, concerns the delegation of power to administrative bodies and their internal structure. GAL counts these constitutive rules, that in most jurisdiction would classify as constitutional law in the narrow sense, to a body of emerging administrative law. The primary advantage of GAL is the capacity to address the second type of global administrative action, which they define as substantive. This type refers to the output of global administration, which can be understood in general terms as producing norms and decisions. Both types have external effects on other global administrative entities, states, or individuals, which have to be legitimated through the administrative process.
64.
Kingsbury and Krisch, “Global Governance,” 4f.
65.
Kingsbury and Krisch, “Global Governance,” 4f.
66.
Kingsbury, “Concept of Law,” 32–33.
67.
Kingsbury, “Concept of Law,” 30.
68.
Kingsbury, “Concept of Law,” 26.
69.
Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). See also Matthias Goldmann, Internationale öffentliche Gewalt. Handlungsformen internationaler Institutionen im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (Heidelberg: Springer, 2015).
70.
Von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name?, 9f.
71.
Von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name?, 112.
72.
See, for example, Horatia Muir Watt, “Private International Law Beyond the Schism” 2(3) Transnational Legal Theory 2, no. 3 (2011): 347.
73.
See, Armin von Bogdandy, Philip Dann and Matthias Goldmann, “Developing the Publicness of Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework of Global Governance Activities,” German Law Journal 9, no. 11 (2008): 1383.
74.
Von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name?, 135f.
75.
Von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name?, 157f.
76.
Von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name?, 147.
77.
Von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name?, 146.
78.
Von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name?, 19.
79.
Kingsbury, “Concept of Law,” 35.
80.
Kingsbury, “Concept of Law,” 36.
81.
Nico Krisch, “Global Administrative Law and the Constitutional Ambition,” in The Twilight of Constitutionalism, eds. Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 245.
82.
Von Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name?, 5.
83.
There are Luhmannian and Dworkinian models, as well as Habermasian models competing for the dominant methodology of the branch. For reasons of space and convenience, the discussion is concentrated in this chapter.
84.
For an initial overview, see Moritz Renner and Andreas Maurer, “Kollisionsrechtliches Denken in der Rechtstheorie,” Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 125, Beiheft (2010): 207.
85.
Christian Joerges, Poul F. Kjaer, and Tommi Ralli, “A New Type of Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the Postnational Constellation,” Transnational Legal Theory 2, no. 2 (2011): 153; Christian Joerges and Michelle Everson, “Reconfiguring the Politics-Law Relationship in the Integration Project through Conflicts-Law Constitutionalism,” European Law Journal 18, no. 5 (2012): 644; Christian Joerges, “The Idea of a Three-Dimensional Conflicts-Law as Constitutional Form,” Recon Online Working Paper 5 (2010), available at http://www.europeanrights.eu/public/commenti/jeorges_testo.pdf
86.
Joerges, “Three-Dimensional Conflicts-Law,” 15–16.
87.
Joerges, “Three-Dimensional Conflicts-Law,” 24.
88.
Joerges, “Three-Dimensional Conflicts-Law,” 15–23.
89.
Christian Joerges, “Conflicts-Law Constitutionalism: Ambitions and Problems,” in Reflections on the Constitutionalization of International Economic Law, ed. Marise Cremona et al. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2014): 114.
90.
Joerges, “Conflicts-Law Constitutionalism,” 116.
91.
Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli, “A New Type of Conflicts Law,” 158.
92.
Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli, “A New Type of Conflicts Law,” 159.
93.
Joerges, “Conflicts-Law Constitutionalism,” 119.
94.
Christian Joerges and Michelle Everson, “Re-Conceptualising Europeanisation as a Public Law of Collisions: Comitology, Agencies and an Interactive Public Adjudication,” in EU Administrative Governance, ed. Herwig Hofmann and Andreas Türk (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), 512. Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer, “From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes,” European Law Journal 3, no. 3 (1997): 273.
95.
Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli, “A New Type of Conflicts Law,” 160.
96.
Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli, “A New Type of Conflicts Law,” 155.
97.
See e.g., Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli, “A New Type of Conflicts Law,” 158.
98.
Joerges, “Three-Dimensional Conflicts-Law,” 25.
99.
See Joerges, “Three-Dimensional Conflicts-Law,” 5–6. See further, Ralf Michaels, “Post-Critical Private International Law,” in Private International Law and Global Governance, ed. Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P. Fernández Arroyo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 55.
100.
For the aspect of different techniques, see Ralf Michaels and Joost Pauwelyn, “Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of International Law,” in Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law, ed. Yuval Shani and Tomer Broude (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 19. See, for the different schools in conflict-of-laws doctrine, Friedrich K. Juenger, “American and European Conflicts Law,” American Journal of Comparative Law 30, no. 1 (1982): 117.
101.
For an introduction to Savignyan thought, see Frederick C. Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 214f.
102.
Responsible for the paradigm change were mainly Carl Georg Wächter, “Über die Kollision der Privatrechtsgesetze verschiedener Staaten,” Archiv für civilistische Praxis 24 (1841): 230; and Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter, Vol. 5 (Heidelberg: Mohr, 1849). See, Christiane Wendehorst, “Denkschulen im Internationalen Privatrecht,” Berichte der deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 45 (2012): 36.
103.
See Ralf Michaels, “Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private International Law and the Challenge of Europeanization and Globalization” Duke Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series 74 (2005): 15.
104.
Michaels, “Globalizing Savigny.”
105.
For that argument in relation to American approaches to international law, see Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations – The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), Chapter 6.
106.
Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963), 189.
107.
For the case of a false conflict, see Currie, Selected Essays, 189f.
108.
Herma Hill Kay, “Curries Interest Analysis in the 21st Century: Losing the Battle, But Winning the War,” Willamette Law Review 37 (2001): 123.
109.
See Kay, “Curries Interest Analysis,” 123.
110.
Cp. Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution: Past, Present and Future (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006).
111.
Brainerd Currie, “On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum,” Columbia Law Review 58 (1958): 964.
112.
See, for example, Michaels, “Post-Critical Private International Law,” 55–56.
113.
Brainerd Currie, “The Constitution and the Choice of Law,” University of Chicago Law Review 26 (1958): 9.
114.
Kay, “Curries Interest Analysis,” 125.
115.
Currie , Selected Essays, 525.
116.
Muir Watt, “Private International Law,” 347. See also, Robert Wai, “Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 40 (2002): 209.
117.
Muir Watt, “Private International Law,” 359.
118.
Muir Watt, “Private International Law,” 414–15; For disagreement see Michaels, “Post-Critical Private International Law,” 55.
119.
Muir Watt, “Private International Law,” 415.
120.
Hilton v. Guyot 159 U. S. 113, 163–64.
121.
Alex Mills, “The Private History of International Law,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55, no. 1 (2005): 36.
122.
See, for example, Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 58–59.
123.
Michaels, “Globalizing Savigny,” 15. Mills, “Private History,” 36.
124.
Compare further Habermas’ critique on the Dworkinian method in Sect. 6.3.3.
125.
Michaels, “Post-Critical Private International Law,” 67.
126.
See Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels, and Annelise Riles, “From Multiculturalism to Technique – Feminism, Culture and the Conflicts Of Law Style,” Stanford Law Review 64 (2012): 589.
127.
Michaels, “Post-Critical Private International Law,” 67.
128.
Martti Koskenniemi, “Human Rights, Politics and Love,” in The Politics of International Law, ed. Martti Koskenniemi (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 166.
129.
Martti Koskenniemi, “The Lady Doth Protest Too Much – Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law” Modern Law Review 65, no. 2 (2002): 170.
130.
In any event, Koskenniemi would object to being read in any of these categorical ways.
131.
Koskenniemi agrees and disagrees with the German constitutional tradition and their approach to international law. See Martti Koskenniemi, “Between Coordination and Constitution – International Law as a German Discipline,” Redescriptions 15 (2011): 45.
132.
“International Law is what international lawyers do.” Martti Koskenniemi, “Between Commitment and Cynicism: Outline of a Theory of International Law as Practice,” in Collection of Essays by Legal Advisers of States, Legal Advisers of International Organizations and Practitioners in the Field of International Law, ed. United Nations (1999), 495.
133.
Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Epilogue, 568.
134.
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 589 (emphasis omitted).
135.
For this argument and the related response, Emanuelle Jouannet, “Koskenniemi: A Critical Introduction,” in The Politics of International Law, ed. Martti Koskenniemi (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 26–27.
136.
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 589 (emphasis omitted).
137.
Martti Koskenniemi, “What Is International Law For?,” in The Politics of International Law, ed. Martti Koskenniemi (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 260.
138.
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 576.
139.
See, in detail, Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, Chapter 4.
140.
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 575.
141.
Jouannet, “Koskenniemi,” 27.
142.
Koskenniemi, “What Is International Law For?,” 257.
143.
Koskenniemi, “Turn to Ethics,” 174.
144.
See Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 602. See also, Jochen von Bernstorff, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 268.
145.
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 615.
146.
For this argument, see Chap. 2.3.
147.
See e.g., Günther, “Uniform Concept of Law.”
148.
For environmental adaptation as a capacity of the law, see Chaps. 4 and 5.
149.
Günther, “Uniform Concept of Law,” 19.
150.
Martti Koskenniemi, “Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about International Law and Globalization,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8, no. 1 (2007): 9.
151.
This concept of a procedural understanding of law bears similarities to Max Weber’s concept of proceduralization. To this theme, see Hauke Brunkhorst, Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 146.
152.
See, in particular, the Dworkinian approaches of Chap. 5. For further discussion, see Sect. 6.3.3.
153.
See Mónica García-Salmones, The Project of Positivism in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 126f.
154.
My translation. In German the passage reads “Die Form ist die geschworene Feindin der Willkür, die Zwillingsschwester der Freiheit. Denn die Form hält der Verlockung der Freiheit zur Zügellosigkeit das Gegengewicht, sie lenkt die Freiheitssubstanz in feste Bahnen, daß sie sich nicht zerstreue, verlaufe, sie kräftigt sie nach innen, schützt sie nach außen. […] sie [Formen] lassen sich nur brechen, nicht biegen,” Rudolf von Jhering, Geist des Römischen Rechts auf den Verschiedenen Stufen Seiner Entwicklung (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1869), 455.
155.
Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process – International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 2.
156.
Higgins, Problems and Process, 3.
157.
For Luhmann, however, this relation to time also has an ontological dimension: Time is not something that passes by—not a movement. Rather, all being, all communication is a consequence of time that connects as a historical unity of simultaneous moments. The autopoietic system is not more and not less than the history of its own movement.
158.
See, Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, trans. Klaus A. Ziegert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 54–55 (see also 32 and 310).
159.
Herbert L. A. Hart , The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 86.
160.
Knop, Michaels, and Riles, “From Multiculturalism,” 642f.
161.
Knop, Michaels, and Riles, “From Multiculturalism,” 647.

Bibliography

Beiser, Frederick C. 2011. The German Historicist Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Book Google Scholar
Berman, Paul Schiff. 2013. Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism – Procedural Principles for Managing Global Legal Pluralism. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 20 (2): 665–695.
Article Google Scholar
Brunkhorst, Hauke. 2014. Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
Google Scholar
Cassese, Sabino. 2005. Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 37: 663–694.
Google Scholar
Currie, Brainerd. 1958a. On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum. Columbia Law Review 58: 964–1028.
Article Google Scholar
———. 1958b. The Constitution and the Choice of Law. University of Chicago Law Review 26: 9–84.
Article Google Scholar
———. 1963. Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws. Durham: Duke University Press.
Google Scholar
Deitelhoff, Nicole. 2006. Überzeugung in der Politik – Grundzüge einer Diskurstheorie Internationalen Regierens. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Google Scholar
García-Salmones, Mónica. 2013. The Project of Positivism in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Book Google Scholar
Goldmann, Matthias. 2015. Internationale öffentliche Gewalt. Handlungsformen internationaler Institutionen im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. Heidelberg: Springer.
Google Scholar
Günther, Klaus. 2008. Legal Pluralism or Uniform Concept of Law – Globalization as a Problem of Legal Theory. No Foundations – Journal of Extreme Legal Positivism 5: 5–21.
Google Scholar
Habermas, Jürgen. 1998. Between Facts and Norms. Trans. William Rehg. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Google Scholar
———. 2001. Why Europe Needs a Constitution. New Left Review 11 (5): 5–26.
Google Scholar
———. 2006. Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have a Chance? In The Divided West, ed. and trans. Ciaran Cronin, 115–193. Cambridge: Polity.
Google Scholar
———. 2014. The Crisis of the European Union: A Response. Trans. Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity.
Google Scholar
———. 2015. The Lure of Technocracy. Trans. Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity.
Google Scholar
Hart, Herbert L.A. 1961. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Google Scholar
Higgins, Rosalyn. 1995. Problems and Process – International Law and How We Use It. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Book Google Scholar
Joerges, Christian. 2010. The Idea of a Three-Dimensional Conflicts-Law as Constitutional Form. Recon Online Working Paper 5. http://www.europeanrights.eu/public/commenti/jeorges_testo.pdf
———. 2014. Conflicts-Law Constitutionalism: Ambitions and Problems. In Reflections on the Constitutionalization of International Economic Law, ed. Marise Cremona et al., 111–137. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Google Scholar
Joerges, Christian, and Michelle Everson. 2006. Re-conceptualising Europeanisation as a Public Law of Collisions: Comitology, Agencies and an Interactive Public Adjudication. In EU Administrative Governance, ed. Herwig Hofmann and Andreas Türk, 512–540. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Google Scholar
———. 2012. Reconfiguring the Politics-Law Relationship in the Integration Project Through Conflicts-Law Constitutionalism. European Law Journal 18 (5): 644–666.
Article Google Scholar
Joerges, Christian, and Jürgen Neyer. 1997. From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes. European Law Journal 3 (3): 273–299.
Article Google Scholar
Joerges, Christian, Poul F. Kjaer, and Tommi Ralli. 2011. A New Type of Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the Postnational Constellation. Transnational Legal Theory 2 (2): 153–165.
Article Google Scholar
Jouannet, Emanuelle. 2011. Koskenniemi: A Critical Introduction. In The Politics of International Law, ed. Martti Koskenniemi, 1–32. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Google Scholar
Juenger, Friedrich K. 1982. American and European Conflicts Law. American Journal of Comparative Law 30 (1): 117–133.
Article Google Scholar
Kadelbach, Stefan. 1992. Zwingendes Völkerrecht. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Book Google Scholar
Kay, Herma Hill. 2001. Curries Interest Analysis in the 21st Century: Losing the Battle, But Winning the War. Willamette Law Review 37: 123–132.
Google Scholar
Kingsbury, Benedict. 2009. The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law. European Journal of International Law 20 (1): 23–57.
Article Google Scholar
Kingsbury, Benedict, and Nico Krisch. 2006. Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order. European Journal of International Law 17 (1): 1–13.
Article Google Scholar
Kingsbury, Benedict, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart. 2005. The Emergence of Global Administrative Law. Law and Contemporary Problems 68: 15–61.
Google Scholar
Knop, Karen, Ralf Michaels, and Annelise Riles. 2012. From Multiculturalism to Technique – Feminism, Culture and the Conflicts Of Law Style. Stanford Law Review 64: 589–656.
Google Scholar
Koskenniemi, Martti. 2002. The Lady Doth Protest Too Much – Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law. Modern Law Review 65 (2): 159–175.
Article Google Scholar
———. 2006. From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Book Google Scholar
———. 2007. Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About International Law and Globalization. Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8 (1): 9–36.
Google Scholar
———. 2011a. Between Coordination and Constitution – International Law as a German Discipline. Redescriptions 15: 45–70.
Google Scholar
———. 2011b. Human Rights, Politics and Love. In The Politics of International Law, ed. Martti Koskenniemi, 153–167. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Google Scholar
———. 2011c. What Is International Law For? In The Politics of International Law, ed. Martti Koskenniemi, 241–268. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Google Scholar
———. 2014. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations – The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Google Scholar
Koskenniemi, Martti. 1999. Between Commitment and Cynicism: Outline of a Theory of International Law as Practice. In Collection of Essays by Legal Advisers of States, Legal Advisers of International Organizations and Practitioners in the Field of International Law, ed. United Nations, 495–523. New York: United Nations.
Google Scholar
Krisch, Nico. 2010. Global Administrative Law and the Constitutional Ambition. In The Twilight of Constitutionalism, ed. Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin, 245–266. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chapter Google Scholar
Loughlin, Martin, and Neil Walker, eds. 2007. The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Google Scholar
Luhmann, Niklas. 2004. Law as a Social System. Trans. Klaus A. Ziegert. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Google Scholar
Michaels, Ralf. 2005. Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private International Law and the Challenge of Europeanization and Globalization. Duke Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series 74: 1–28.
Google Scholar
———. 2014. Post-Critical Private International Law. In Private International Law and Global Governance, ed. Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P. Fernández Arroyo, 54–70. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Google Scholar
Michaels, Ralf, and Joost Pauwelyn. 2011. Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of International Law. In Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law, ed. Yuval Shani and Tomer Broude, 19–44. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Google Scholar
Mills, Alex. 2005. The Private History of International Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55 (1): 1–49.
Article Google Scholar
———. 2009. The Confluence of Public and Private International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Book Google Scholar
Muir Watt, Horatia. 2011. Private International Law Beyond the Schism. Transnational Legal Theory 2 (3): 347–428.
Article Google Scholar
Nanz, Patrizia, and Jens Steffek. 2004. Global Governance, Participation and the Public Sphere. Government and Opposition 39 (2): 314–335.
Article Google Scholar
Patberg, Markus. 2013. Constituent Power Beyond the State: An Emerging Debate in International Political Theory. Millennium – Journal of International Studies 42 (1): 224–238.
Article Google Scholar
Pulkowski, Dirk. 2014. The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Book Google Scholar
Renner, Moritz, and Andreas Maurer. 2010. Kollisionsrechtliches Denken in der Rechtstheorie. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 125 (Beiheft): 207–224.
Google Scholar
Roth-Isigkeit, David. 2016. The Grammar(s) of Global Law. Critical Quarterly for Legislation and Law 99 (3): 175–186.
Google Scholar
Symeonides, Symeon C. 2006. The American Choice-of-Law Revolution: Past, Present and Future. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Google Scholar
von Bernstorff, Jochen. 2010. The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen. Trans. Thomas Dunlap. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Google Scholar
von Bogdandy, Armin, and Ingo Venzke. 2014. In Whose Name? A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Google Scholar
von Bogdandy, Armin, Philip Dann, and Matthias Goldmann. 2008. Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework of Global Governance Activities. German Law Journal 9 (11): 1375–1400.
Google Scholar
von Jhering, Rudolf. 1869. Geist des Römischen Rechts auf den Verschiedenen Stufen Seiner Entwicklung. Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel.
Google Scholar
von Savigny, Friedrich Carl. 1849. Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter. Vol. 5. Heidelberg: Mohr.
Google Scholar
Wächter, Carl Georg. 1841. Über die Kollision der Privatrechtsgesetze verschiedener Staaten. Archiv für civilistische Praxis 24: 230–311.
Google Scholar
Wai, Robert. 2002. Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 40: 209–274.
Google Scholar
Wendehorst, Christiane. 2012. Denkschulen im Internationalen Privatrecht. Berichte der deut Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 45: 33–61.
Google Scholar

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Normative Orders, Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany
David Roth-Isigkeit

Authors

David Roth-Isigkeit
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Roth-Isigkeit, D. (2018). Taming Plurality Through Formal Legal Rationality: Habermasian Approaches to Global Law. In: The Plurality Trilemma. Philosophy, Public Policy, and Transnational Law. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72856-8_3

Download citation

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72856-8_3
Published: 14 February 2018
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-72855-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-72856-8
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics