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The Plurality Trilemma pp 1–30Cite as

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Introduction: Theory, Practice, and Meta-Theory

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Part of the book series: Philosophy, Public Policy, and Transnational Law ((PPPTL))

Abstract

This introducing chapter argues that legal thought is a powerful instrument that influences the contours of our legal practices. As a result of the continuous search for answers to persisting questions, legal thought shapes our background understanding of legality. Even though legal thought has a prominent political role to play because it has the capacity to influence practice, the discourse continues to fail to engage in a common search for concepts and meaning. In order to overcome the fragmentation of legal thought, this book suggests that meta-theories of law may lead back the discourse to common themes and promote consciousness about the different choices contained in models of law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    William Shakespeare, Hamlet (London: John Miller, 1814), Act 2 and Act 3. See also, Gerhard Fischer and Bernhard Greiner, “The Play Within a Play: Scholarly Perspectives,” in The Play Within the Play: The Performance of Meta-theatre and Self-reflection, eds. Gerhard Fischer and Bernhard Greiner (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2007), xi.

  2. 2.

    Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 2, 44.

  3. 3.

    E.g., Jules L. Coleman, “Legal Theory and Practice,” Georgetown Law Journal 83. (1995): 2579. Cass R. Sunstein, “On Legal Theory and Legal Practice,” Nomos 37 (1995): 267. Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally – Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989). See also, Matthias Jestaedt, Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein… – Vom Nutzen der Theorie für die Rechtswissenschaft (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006).

  4. 4.

    See, among others, Andrea Bianchi, “Reflexive Butterfly Catching: Insights from a Situated Catcher,” in Informal International Law-Making, eds. Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses Wessel and Jan Wouters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 200. Iain Scobbie, “A View from Delft: Some Thoughts about Thinking about International Law,” in International Law, 4th edn., ed. Malcolm Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 53. Jochen von Bernstorff, “The Relationship of Theory and Practice in International Law,” in International Law as a Profession, ed. Jean d’Aspremont et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 222.

  5. 5.

    Immanuel Kant, “On the common Saying: ‘This may be true in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’” in Kant – Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). Kant’s distinctions on theory and practice are curiously popular among international legal theorists. See Scobbie, “A View from Delft,” 63. Anne Peters “There is nothing more Practical than a Good Theory: An Overview of Contemporary Approaches to International Law,” German Yearbook of International Law 44 (2001): 25.

  6. 6.

    Cp. Herbert L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 110. See, for the argument of legal theory as source, Iain Scobbie, “Legal Theory as a Source: Institutional Facts and the Identification of International Law” in The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law, eds. Jean d’Aspremont and Samantha Besson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 493.

  7. 7.

    Andrea Bianchi, “The Game of Interpretation in International Law,” in Interpretation in International Law, eds. Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat, and Matthew Windsor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). See also Bianchi, “Reflexive Butterfly Catching,” 215 and Peters, “There is nothing more Practical,” 25–26.

  8. 8.

    See David Roth-Isigkeit, “The Grammar(s) of Global Law,” Critical Quarterly for Legislation and Law 99, no. 3 (2016): 175. Here I have distinguished two ways to think about this grammar. The first way of thinking appeals to grammar as a stabilizing factor. The second way of thinking highlights the asymmetries of power within this structure and perceives the legal grammar as the medium carrying the ideological commitments of the law.

  9. 9.

    Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 45f. For further detail, see Sect. 5.1.

  10. 10.

    See Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther, “Die Herausbildung Normativer Ordnungen: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven,” in Die Herausbildung Normativer Ordnungen: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven, eds. Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2011), 11.

  11. 11.

    Forst and Günther, “Die Herausbildung Normativer Ordnungen,” 11.

  12. 12.

    In detail, Rainer Forst, “Noumenal Power,” Journal of Political Philosophy 23, no. 2 (2015): 111.

  13. 13.

    Jeremy Waldron “Kant’s Legal Positivism,” Harvard Law Review 109 (1995–96): 1539.

  14. 14.

    Sunstein, “Theory and Practice,” 269.

  15. 15.

    Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 595.

  16. 16.

    Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 591.

  17. 17.

    See for this political dimension, Scobbie, “A View from Delft,” 58.

  18. 18.

    For international law, see initially Hersch Lauterpacht, “The so-called Anglo-American and Continental Schools of Thought in International Law,” British Yearbook of International Law 12 (1931): 31. See also, Bardo Fassbender, “Denkschulen im Völkerrecht,” in Paradigmen im Internationalen Recht, ed. Bardo Fassbender et al. (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2012), 1.

  19. 19.

    See, Martti Koskenniemi, “Vitoria and Us – Thoughts on Critical Histories of International Law,” Rechtsgeschichte – Legal History 22 (2014): 119. Kirstin Bunge, “Francisco de Vitoria: A Redesign of Global Order on the Threshold of the Middle Ages to Modern Times,” in System, Order, and International Law – The Early History of International Legal Thought, eds. Stefan Kadelbach, Thomas Kleinlein and David Roth-Isigkeit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 46. For a differentiated view, see Stefan Kadelbach. “Mission und Eroberung bei Vitoria. Über die Entstehung des Völkerrechts aus der Theologie,” in Die Normativität des Rechts bei Francisco de Vitoria, eds. Kirstin Bunge, Anselm Spindler and Andreas Wagner (Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog, 2011), 289. Scobbie, “A View from Delft,” 58 refers to Vitoria in order to illustrate the relationship of theory and practice.

  20. 20.

    Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis, section 2, title 1, 410–31.

  21. 21.

    As Stefan Kadelbach highlights, Vitoria’s normative perspective to colonization remains ambivalent. Kadelbach, “Mission und Eroberung,” 301–303.

  22. 22.

    See, Mark Bevir, “The Contextual Approach,” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy, ed. George Klosko (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 11. For an application to the intellectual history of international law, see Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann, “State of Nature versus Commercial Sociability as the Basis of International Law. Reflections on the Roman Foundations and Current Interpretations of the International Political Legal Thought of Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf,” in The Philosophy of International Law, eds. Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 51.

  23. 23.

    See, in further detail, David Roth-Isigkeit, “Was ist Rechtsdenken? – Beobachtungen des Rechts der multipolaren Gesellschaft zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik,” Ad Legendum No.4 (2017): 265–272.

  24. 24.

    Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. Max Knight (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 1.

  25. 25.

    Hart , Concept of Law, v.

  26. 26.

    See, for an overview of the historical genesis of realism, Ashley J. Tellis, “Reconstructing Political Realism – The Long March to Scientific Theory,” Security Studies 5, no. 2 (1995), 3. For a differentiated view, see Noel Malcolm, “Hobbes’s Theory of International Relations,” in Aspects of Hobbes, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 432.

  27. 27.

    In fact, there are so many approaches working with the idea of legal thought or legal thinking to describe theoretical approaches that they can hardly be enumerated in this frame.

  28. 28.

    See, e.g., Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Hans J. Morgenthau , “Positivism, Functionalism and International Law,” American Journal of International Law 34, no. 2 (1940): 260, Martti Koskenniemi, “ Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau, and the Image of Law in International Relations,” in The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law, ed. Michael Byers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17. Richard A. Falk, “The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law – Gaps in Legal Thinking,” Virginia Law Review 50, no. 2 (1964), 231.

  29. 29.

    Stefan Kadelbach, Thomas Kleinlein and David Roth-Isigkeit, “Introduction,” in System, Order, and International Law – The Early History of International Legal Thought, eds. Stefan Kadelbach, Thomas Kleinlein and David Roth-Isigkeit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 11–12.

  30. 30.

    Kadelbach, Kleinlein and Roth-Isigkeit, “Introduction,” 11, note 41.

  31. 31.

    David Roth-Isigkeit, “ Niccolò Machiavelli’s International Legal Thought – Culture, Contingency, Construction,” in System, Order, and International Law – The Early History of International Legal Thought, eds. Stefan Kadelbach, Thomas Kleinlein, and David Roth-Isigkeit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 24–27.

  32. 32.

    See, e.g., Nicholas G. Onuf, The Republican Legacy of International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 12–13.

  33. 33.

    Kadelbach, Kleinlein and Roth-Isigkeit, “Introduction,” 3.

  34. 34.

    Kadelbach, Kleinlein, and Roth-Isigkeit, “Introduction,” 3. See also Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” in The Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1–2. See further, Thomas Kleinlein, “International Legal Thought – Creation of a Tradition and the Potential of Disciplinary Self-Reflection,” in The Global Community – Yearbook of International Law, ed. Giuliana Zaccardi Capaldo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 811.

  35. 35.

    For a good introduction, see Mary Hesse, “Habermas’ Consensus Theory of Truth,” Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 2 (1978): 373.

  36. 36.

    Stephen E. Toulmin , The Uses of Argument, rev. edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 97.

  37. 37.

    Jürgen Habermas, “Wahrheitstheorien,” in Wirklichkeit und Reflexion, ed. Helmut Fahrenbach (Pfullingen: Neske, 1973), 244.

  38. 38.

    Michel Foucault, L’Ordre du Discours (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 10–11.

  39. 39.

    Foucault, L’Ordre, 11.

  40. 40.

    Foucault, L’Ordre, 43.

  41. 41.

    See Karl-Otto Apel, “Diskursethik vor der Problematik von Recht und Politik: Können die Rationalitätsdifferenzen zwischen Moralität, Recht und Politik selbst noch durch die Diskursethik normativ-rational gerechtfertigt werden?” in Zur Anwendung der Diskursethik in Politik, Recht und Wissenschaft, eds. Karl-Otto Apel and Matthias Kettner (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), 29. See also Klaus Günther, The Sense of Appropriateness, trans. John Farrell (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993), 67.

  42. 42.

    See, for international law schools, Andrea Bianchi, International Law Theories – An Inquiry into Different Ways of Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

  43. 43.

    See Fassbender, “Denkschulen im Völkerrecht,” 1 who cites the Oxford English Dictionary.

  44. 44.

    This becomes particularly clear in Harold F. Cherniss, The Riddle of the Early Academy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945), 1–30.

  45. 45.

    For a summary, Scott J. Shapiro, “The ‘Hart-Dworkin’ Debate – A Short Guide for the Perplexed,” in Ronald Dworkin, ed. Arthur Ripstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 22; Nicola Lacey, “Philosophy, Political Morality and History: Explaining the Enduring Resonance of the Hart-Fuller Debate,” New York University Law Review 83 (2008): 1059.

  46. 46.

    See for an overview, Razmig Keucheyan, The Left Hemisphere: Mapping Critical Theory Today, trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2013), 90. See also Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 393. Jacques Rancière, Das Unvernehmen – Politik und Philosophie, trans. Richard Steurer (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), 46. This is what I consider in the sixth chapter as action-based normativity.

  47. 47.

    It is the purpose of the ambitious project of Sergio Dellavalle to prove such a structure. Sergio Dellavalle, Paradigms of Order (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming).

  48. 48.

    Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Volume II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 155. To this general theme, see David Roth-Isigkeit, “Konvergenz und Regulative Funktion: Parfit über moralischen Fortschritt,” Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 3, no. 2 (2016), 255.

  49. 49.

    I am particularly grateful to Sergio Dellavalle for a helpful discussion on this topic.

  50. 50.

    Many authors have a conception of reasonable disagreement, though Rawls is the most prominent among them. See Thomas Porter, “Rawls, Reasonableness, and International Toleration,” Politics, Philosophy, & Economics 11 no. 4 (2012): 382. Jonathan Quong, “Public Reason,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/public-reason/.

  51. 51.

    See, in detail, Chap. 6.

  52. 52.

    Immanuel Kant , Critique of Pure Reason, trans. John M. D. Meiklejohn, (New York: Colonial Press, 1900), 397.

  53. 53.

    Kant , Critique, 397.

  54. 54.

    For a similar approach, see Sergio Dellavalle, Paradigms of Order. For the classification of these patterns, see also, Armin von Bogdandy and Sergio Dellavalle, “Universalism and Particularism: A Dichotomy to Read Theories on International Order” in System, Order, and International Law – The Early History of International Legal Thought, eds. Stefan Kadelbach, Thomas Kleinlein and David Roth-Isigkeit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 482.

  55. 55.

    Niklas Luhmann, “Die Weltgesellschaft” in Soziologische Aufklärung 2, ed. Niklas Luhmann (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975), 60 (this quote translated by Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), 94).

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Roth-Isigkeit, D. (2018). Introduction: Theory, Practice, and Meta-Theory. In: The Plurality Trilemma. Philosophy, Public Policy, and Transnational Law. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72856-8_1

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