Research on Differential Pricing and Coordination Mechanism of Second-Class Supply Chain of New Products and Remanufactured Products

  • Hubiao Li
Conference paper
Part of the Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics book series (SPBE)

Abstract

Based on the price sensitivity of consumer products and the degree of substitutability of products, this paper analyzes the optimal pricing strategy of manufacturer, manufacturer and retailer. By comparing the total profit of decentralized decision and centralized decision supply chain, it is found that the decentralized decision can lead to the “marginal effect”, which leads to the loss of supply chain efficiency. Therefore, the Shapley value method is used to study the coordination of supply chain. Finally, through the numerical simulation analysis of two kinds of consumer decision mode of unit product price sensitivity and the product can replace the influence on the sales price and the profit of the supply chain members profit changes.

Keywords

Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) Remanufacturer Two echelon supply chain Shapley value method 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hubiao Li
    • 1
  1. 1.School of business, Zhengzhou UniversityZhengzhouChina

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