Abstract
J. E. Peterson examines the complex narratives, historic culture, and decisionmaking processes inside Saudi Arabia to formulate his assessment of a low probability that the kingdom will act to acquire nuclear arms in the near term. Peterson identifies triggers within the security threat matrix that may flare Saudi motivation to acquire nuclear capability, including concern over regional disintegration, Israeli provocation, continued Iranian belligerence, and deterioration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or evidence of direct Iranian interference in Gulf States’ domestic affairs; he also argues that the ultimate Saudi reaction will likely hinge on perceptions of the United States as a reliable security partner and its valuation of this relationship. Using his intimate understanding of the royal decisionmaking process and internal operation of policy-building in Saudi Arabia, Peterson offers tailored recommendations to US policymakers concerning the vector points which hold most promise for influence with the Saudis on the nuclear issue.
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Notes
- 1.
Sunday Times, 24 and 31 July, 7 Aug. 1994; International Herald Tribune, 8 Aug. 1994.
- 2.
New York Times, 10 July 1999.
- 3.
Guardian, 18 Sept. 2003. The report was categorically denied by KSA’s London embassy and dismissed by the IAEA. Reuters, 18 Sept. 2003.
- 4.
Arnaud de Borchgrave, in the Washington Times, 22 Oct. 2003; VOA News, 22 Oct. 2003. A few months later in early 2004, KSA refuted another report that it was interested in Chinese missiles and bankrolling Pakistan’s nuclear program. Reuters, 16 Feb. 2004.
- 5.
Reuters, 1 and 16 June 2005; AP, 1 June 2015. The German magazine Cicero alleged in March 2006 that Pakistani scientists were employed in Saudi Arabia to help develop a secret nuclear program. AFP, 29 March 2006.
- 6.
Reuters, 4 Nov. 2006; http://www.kacst.edu.sa/en/about/institutes/Pages/ae.aspx
- 7.
AFP, 21 Sept. 2007; White House, Office of the Spokesman, “Media Note,” 16 May 2008.
- 8.
The Peninsula (Doha), 21 Aug. 2009. A further hint of Saudi intentions came in 2011 when a consultant for the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (established 2010) said that the KSA intended to build 16 nuclear reactors by 2030. Gulf News, 30 Sept. 2011.
- 9.
“Gulf and the Globe” Conference, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, hosted by the Institute of Diplomatic Studies and the Gulf Research Center, 5 Dec. 2011.
- 10.
The Times, 10 Feb. 2012.
- 11.
BBC News, 6–7 Nov. 2013.
- 12.
Independent (London), 14 May 2015.
- 13.
Reuters, 22 July 2015.
- 14.
Reuters, 19 June 2015.
- 15.
AFP and AP, 25 June 2015. The deal followed a series of nuclear-related accords between the two countries between 2011 and 2014. World Nuclear News, 26 June 2015.
- 16.
Times of Israel blog, 25 Aug. 2015.
- 17.
Cited in a Tristan Volpe blog for The Hill, “Calling Out the Saudi Nuclear Bluff,” 25 Aug. 2015, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=61095
- 18.
Reuters, 22 July 2015.
- 19.
Gulf News (Dubai), 7 Sept. 2015.
- 20.
Mohammed Fahad al-Harthi in Arab News (Jiddah), 2 Sept. 2015.
- 21.
US Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Media Note, “Joint Statement of the US-GCC Foreign Ministers Meeting,” 3 Aug. 2015.
- 22.
Quoted in Volpe, “Calling Out the Saudi Nuclear Bluff,” 25 Aug. 2015.
- 23.
Washington Post, 11 June 2015. Zakaria’s arguments were thoroughly and comprehensively skewered by Jeffrey Lewis on ForeignPolicy.com Voice, “Sorry, Fareed: Saudi Arabia Can Build a Bomb Any Damn Time It Wants To,”12 June 2015, available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/12/sorry-fareed-saudi-arabia-can-build-a-bomb-any-damn-time-it-wants-to/
- 24.
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement,” 4 Sept. 2015. For analysis of the meeting, see the Financial Times, 4 Sept. 2015, and the New York Times, 4 and 5 Sept. 2015, as well as the reaction of the Gulf analyst Abdullah Al Shayji, Gulf News, 7 Sept. 2015.
- 25.
The development is discussed by former Israeli ambassador Uri Savir on Al-Monitor, ”Why it’s time for Saudi Arabia to take the lead on Israeli-Palestinian peace process,” 6 Sept. 2015, available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2015/09/palestinian-statehood-iran-agreement-regional-alliance.html
- 26.
It should be noted that the proxy war was largely a construct of Saudi perceptions as material Iranian assistance to the Huthi rebels and their allies was minimal.
- 27.
No systematic scientific opinion polling has ever been carried out in Saudi Arabia and the kingdom’s media closely follows government positions. Consequently, many of the observations made in the following pages rely heavily upon material gathered during the author’s numerous trips to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf over more than 40 years, diverse conversations with Saudis in the kingdom and outside, and close monitoring of Saudi media and government policy pronouncements, as well as the body of relevant scholarly literature.
- 28.
The writing of this chapter was completed before the extensive arrests and detentions of members of the royal family, ministers, and prominent merchants in November 2017.
- 29.
The classic example is the government’s decision in the 1960s to enact compulsory education for girls. The trade-off involved the creation of a General Presidency for Girls’ Education that was placed under the supervision of the ulama .
- 30.
A pertinent example dates from 1986 when a royal decree imposed an income tax on expatriates working in the kingdom. There was a general outcry among merchants who complained in the majlises of provincial governors, government ministers, and royal family members, contending that either expatriates would leave in droves or their employers would end up paying the tax through higher salaries. Less than 24 hours later, another royal decree suspended the first and no personal income taxes have ever been imposed in the KSA.
- 31.
In recent years, the kingdom has sent around 100,000 Saudi students to the United States each year. The fact that all return home after the education may in part reflect economic opportunities in the KSA but it also validates the closeness of Saudi society.
- 32.
Of course not all Saudi citizens have benefitted equally. Discrimination against the Shi‘ah creates resentment but it does not seem to have mobilized a majority of the population into seeking an uprising. Similarly, the segregation of women has disenfranchised them from many aspects of public life, yet it is not clear that most Saudi women are willing to take to the streets to demand equal rights.
- 33.
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and Against Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2010), pp. 23–24. Mowatt-Larssen adds that Islamist extremists attempt to justify nuclear action as legitimate when used in retaliation. Ibid., pp. 25–26.
- 34.
Ibid.; Faiqa Mahmood, “Islam and the Bomb,” Arms Control Wonk website, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1200516/islamand the bomb/, 25 Nov. 2015.
- 35.
Norman Cigar , Saudi Arabia and Nuclear Weapons (London: Routledge, 2016); UCLA Center for Middle East Development Series, pp. 87–88. Cigar also notes that “Quite apart from the justification for acquiring nuclear weapons based on security concerns, the Saudis also routinely have raised the issues of justice and effectiveness in thinking on proliferation.” Ibid., p. 220.
- 36.
https://archive.org/stream/NasirAlFahd/NasirAl-fahd-TheRulingOnUsingWeaponsOfMassDestructionAgainstTheInfidels_djvu.txt. It should be noted that neither of these two clerics, A’id al-Qarni and Nasir al-Fahd, is representative of the country’s religious establishment and that the latter apparently remains under detention and may have indicated his support for the so-called Islamic State.
- 37.
A comprehensive analysis of the strategic factors in Saudi Arabia’s nuclear thinking, including discussion of Saudi reaction to the JCPOA , appeared after this chapter was written. See Op. cit. Cigar , Saudi Arabia and Nuclear Weapons.
- 38.
Scott D. Sagan , “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 54–86, quotations from p. 55.
- 39.
Sagan , “Why Do States Build,” p. 55.
- 40.
Jacques E.C. Hymans , “No Cause for Panic: Key Lessons from the Political Science Literature on Nuclear Proliferation,” International Journal, Vol. 69, No. 1 (2014), pp. 85–93; quotation from p. 87.
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Peterson, J.E. (2018). Prospects for Proliferation in Saudi Arabia. In: Johnson, J., Kartchner, K., Maines, M. (eds) Crossing Nuclear Thresholds. Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72670-0_4
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