Abstract
Contemporary international law does not prohibit secessions. However, in certain circumstances, an attempt at secession may be illicit because it infringes some norm of general international law, or a lex specialis, as explained in Chap. 3. Thus, effectiveness is not the only requirement for the appearance of a new entity; it is necessary for the creation to be licit through observing the peremptory norms forming international jus cogens, or the requirements in respect of the legal status of the territory set out in a lex specialis. Conformity with international law must be seen as a criterion for statehood alongside the needed effectiveness, so that the latter is a necessary, but not a sufficient requirement.
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Notes
- 1.
See supra, Sect. 3.3.
- 2.
This was the stance taken by Serbia in its ‘Written Statement’. See supra, Sect. 3.1.2.
- 3.
Cfr. Tancredi (2012), p. 83.
- 4.
Cfr. Christakis (2014), p. 749.
- 5.
- 6.
UN Doc. S/RES/541 (1983), of 18 November, at para. 2.
The international community never saw this supposed Republic as a State and it was recognized only by Turkey. See supra, Sect. 3.3.
- 7.
- 8.
See supra, Sect. 4.2.2, notes 86 and 87.
Apart from the authors previously quoted, see also: Cvijić (2007), Francioni (2000), Gray (2001), Greenwood (1999), Hilpold (2009b), Jennings (1999), Kälin (2000), Kessedjian (1999), Krisch (1999), Murase (2002), Nolte (1999), O’Connell (2000), Sofaer (2000), Thürer (2000), Wall (2002), Wippman (2001).
- 9.
- 10.
Cfr. “Final Document of the XIII Conference of Heads of State Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Kuala Lumpur, 24–25 February 2003”, para. 5 http://www.nam.gov.za/media/030227e.htm. Brownlie (1990), p. 744. ‘Letter dated 26 March 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’ Annex: Communiqué issued on 25 March 1999 by the Rio Group, UN Doc. A/53/884, S/1999/347, of 26 March 1999. Krieger (2001), p. 493.
- 11.
Cfr. Orakhelashvili (2011), p. 83.
- 12.
Cfr. Ibid.
- 13.
- 14.
See supra, Sect. 5.2.1.
Article 102(1)(d) grants the Council of the Federation powers for:
d) deciding on the possibility of using the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside the territory of the Russian Federation;
Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted on 12 December 1993, supra, Chap. 5, note 124.
- 15.
Intervention of Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom), UN Doc. S/PV.7125, of 3 March 2014, p. 6. Cfr. Intervention of Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom), UN Doc. S/PV.7124, of 1 March 2014, p. 6; and intervention of Mr. Araud (France), UN Doc. S/PV.7124, of 1 March 2014, p. 7.
Within the Council of Europe (COE), the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 1990 (2014) on 10 April, ‘Reconsideration on Substantive Grounds of the Previously Ratified Credentials of the Russian Delegation’, paragraph 3 stating:
considers that the actions of the Russian Federation leading up to the annexation of Crimea, and in particular the military occupation of the Ukrainian territory and the threat of the use of military force, the recognition of the results of the illegal so-called referendum and subsequent annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation constitute, beyond any doubt, a grave violation of international law, including of the United Nations Charter and the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Helsinki Final Act.
For its part, the NATO view was manifested in the ‘North Atlantic Council statement on the situation in Ukraine’ on 2 March 2014, que la ‘Military Action against Ukraine by Forces of the Russian Federation is a Breach of International Law’ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_107681.htm.
- 16.
- 17.
Cfr. Olson (2014), p. 24.
- 18.
- 19.
Cfr. Intervention of Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation), UN Doc. S/PV.7125, of 3 March 2014, p. 3. In this same speech, Vitaly Churkin noted the request from President Yanukovych:
As the legitimately elected President of Ukraine, I wish to inform you that events in my country and capital have placed Ukraine on the brink of civil war. Chaos and anarchy reign throughout the country. The lives, security and rights of the people, particularly in the south-east and in Crimea, are under threat. Open acts of terror and violence are being committed under the influence of Western countries. People are being persecuted on the basis of their language and political beliefs. I therefore call on President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin of Russia to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation to establish legitimacy, peace, law and order and stability in defence of the people of Ukraine.
- 20.
- 21.
Intervention of Mr. Eliasson (Deputy Secretary-General), UN Doc. S/PV.7124, of 1 March 2014, p. 2.
- 22.
Cfr. Hilpold (2015), p. 251.
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
Cfr. Burke-White (2014), p. 69, note 16.
- 26.
Cfr. Ronzitti (1985), p. 68.
- 27.
Cfr. Hilpold (2015), p. 252.
- 28.
Cfr. Bowett (1986), p. 49.
- 29.
Cfr. Ronzitti (1985), p. 84.
- 30.
- 31.
Cfr. Ronzitti (1985), p. 85. ‘Eighth Report on State Responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur. The Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source of International Responsibility (continued)’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/318 and Add.1-4, of 24 January, 5 February and 15 June 1979, p. 37, para. 74.
- 32.
Cfr. Ronzitti (1985), p. 86. ‘Eighth Report on State Responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur. The Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source of International Responsibility (continued)’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/318 and Add.1-4, of 24 January, 5 February and 15 June 1979, p. 38, para. 75.
- 33.
Waldock (1952), p. 467.
- 34.
- 35.
Cfr. Hilpold (2015), p. 253.
- 36.
- 37.
Cfr. Hilpold (2015), p. 253.
- 38.
Cfr. ‘Address by President of the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014’, supra, Chap. 1, note 1. Intervention of Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation), UN Doc. S/PV.7125, of 3 March 2014, p. 3.
- 39.
Cfr. Gray (2009), pp. 133–151. Green (2014), p. 8. Green (2010), pp. 54–79. Hilpold (2015), pp. 253 and 255. Natoli (2010), pp. 389–417.
The Honorary Professor of the European University Yuri Albertovich Dmitriev commented on President Putin’s arguments that Order No.340-R of the Government of Russia, dated 10 March 2014, submitted to the Duma a draft law ‘On Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On Citizenship of the Russian Federation’ and Particular Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation’ http://asozd2c.duma.gov.ru. This law was passed in 2002 and among its amendments granting of citizenship was made conditional upon the applicant’s knowledge of the Russian language, while authorization of residence was excluded and the deadline for deciding to accept citizenship was cut to three months. Cfr. Dmitriev (2014), p. 26.
- 40.
Cfr. Green (2014), p. 4.
According to the ICJ in its Judgement on the Nottebohm Case, nationality:
is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State. Nottebohm Case (second phase) (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment of April 6th, 1955, I.C.J. Reports 1955, 27, p. 23.
- 41.
- 42.
Cfr. Intervention of Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation), UN Doc. S/PV.7125, of 3 March 2014, p. 17.
- 43.
Cfr. Christakis (2014), p. 751.
- 44.
Cfr. Delahunty (2015), p. 129. Merezhko (2015), p. 192.
On these lines, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, William Hague, stated that ‘international diplomatic mechanisms exist to provide assurance on the situations of national minorities, including within the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe’. ‘The Foreign Secretary William Hague has updated Parliament on the situation in Ukraine and the UK government's response’, 4 March 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uks-response-to-the-situation-in-ukraine.
- 45.
Cfr. Merezhko (2015), p. 192.
In contrast, Anatoly Kapustin referred to the UNHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, of 15 May 2014, at para. 103 and 104, http://www.ohchr.org, and United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine, of September 2014, UN Doc. A/HCR/27/75, at para. 23. Cfr. Kapustin (2015), p. 116, note 44. It must be objected that the violations of human rights related were a long way from constituting serious, massive human rights infringements, as the author recognizes 117, such as to justify an action. Moreover, the cases did not even fall within Sect. ‘VI Particular Human Rights Challenges in Crimea’, paragraphs 117–154, which does look at violations occurring after annexation.
- 46.
See supra, Sect. 5.2.1. Cfr. V. Putin, ‘Vladimir Putin answered journalists’ questions on the situation in Ukraine’, March 4, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20366. Intervention of Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation), UN Doc. S/PV.7125, of 3 March 2014, pp. 3 and 4. Marxsen (2014), p. 374.
- 47.
The ILC’s comments on Art. 29 on Consent, within Chap. V relating to ‘Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness’ of the ‘Draft Articles on State Responsibility’, referring expressly to the entry of foreign troops into a State, says that it ‘is normally considered a serious violation of State sovereignty and often, an act of aggression […] is clear that such action ceases to be so characterized and becomes perfectly lawful if it occurred at the request or with the agreement of the State’. ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-first Session, 14 May–3 August 1979’, UN Doc. A/34/10, of 14 August 1979, 528, p. 294, para. (5).
- 48.
In order to be considered as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, the consent must be (1) valid under the rules of international law, (2) clearly established, (3) really expressed, (4) internationally attributable to the State, (5) must also have been given prior to the commission of the act, and (6) precludes the wrongfulness of a particular act only within the limits which the State expressing the consent intends with respect to its scope and duration. Finally, ‘the conduct of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation imposed by one of the rules of jus cogens must remain an internationally wrongful act, even if the injured State has given its consent to the conduct in question’. ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-first Session, 14 May–3 August 1979’, UN Doc. A/34/10, of 14 August 1979, 528, pp. 300–305, and 307, paragraphs 12–17, and 21.
- 49.
Cfr. Commentary on Art. 20 del ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, 23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001’, UN Doc. A/56/10, 536, p. 175, para. 5.
- 50.
According to the ICJ, if intervention could be requested both by the government and by the opposition this would allow any State to intervene at any time in the internal affairs of any other State:
[…] Indeed, it is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non-intervention in international law if intervention, which is already allowable at the request of the government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition. This would permit any State to intervene at any moment in the internal affairs of another State, whether at the request of the government or at the request of its opposition. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, 12–150, p. 126, para. 246.
On the same lines, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, 165–283, p. 196, para. 45.
- 51.
- 52.
The text of Art. 85(23) of the Ukrainian Constitution, supra, Chap. 5, note 56, runs as follows:
The authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine comprises: […]
(23) approving decisions on providing military assistance to other states, on sending units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to a foreign state, or on admitting units of armed forces of foreign states onto the territory of Ukraine;
- 53.
Cfr. Marxsen (2014), p. 375.
- 54.
Cfr. Ibid. Merezhko (2015), p. 187. Wilson (2015), p. 221.
In contexts of internal conflict, civil war and revolutionary change account has been taken of the criterion of ‘effective control’ over specific parts of the territory. Under this principle, the authority entitled to invite in foreign troops would be the one exercising some effectiveness of a government. The criterion of ‘effective control’ was the exclusive or the main requisite. However, in more recent times this has been questioned, with governments seen as needing not just control but also legitimacy. Cfr. Nolte (2010), para. 17, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1702?prd=EPIL.
- 55.
Cfr. Hilpold (2015), p. 250.
- 56.
Cfr. Marxsen (2014), p. 377.
In Resolution 1988 (2014), adopted on 9 April 2015, the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE declared by 154 votes to 26, with 14 abstentions, that it ‘therefore fully recognises the legitimacy of the new authorities in Kyiv and the legality of their decisions. It regrets attempts to question the legitimacy of the new authorities, which can only serve to destabilise the country’, COE Doc. Resolution 1988 (2014), at para. 3.
- 57.
Cfr. Office of the UNHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine’, 15 April 2014, 28. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_Report_15April2014.doc.
- 58.
Cfr. Fox (2015), p. 829.
- 59.
See Voronin et al. (2015), pp. 11–28. Russian with English summary. According to these authors, the situation of civil war in the Ukraine was a consequence of a coup d’état and the attempts by the new authorities to subject those regions no supporting the new government.
- 60.
- 61.
Among States, the declarations by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, UN Doc. S/PV.7125, of 3 March 2014, 20, p. 7; of Lithuania, Raimonda Murmokaitè, UN Doc S/PV.7134, of 13 March 2014, 19, p. 16; and of France, Gérard Araud, UN Doc. S/PV.7138, of 15 March 2014, 12, p. 5, are of particular note. Also noteworthy were the statements by the representatives of Liechtenstein, Christian Wenaweser, and of Canada, Guillermo Rishchynski, before the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/68/PV.80, of 27 March 2014, 27, pp. 7 and 9.
Within the United Nations, the Security Council debated a draft resolution sponsored by forty-two States, the first paragraph of the Preamble of which read: ‘Recalling the obligation of all States under Art. 2 of the United Nations Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force’ (UN Doc. S/2014/189, of 15 March 2014, supra, Chap. 5, note 92). However, this was not adopted, because of the negative vote of the Russian Federation. Thereafter, the General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/68/262, of 1 April 2014, see supra, Sect. 5.2.3, note 118, the second paragraph of the Preamble of which had this very same wording. For its part, the Special Meeting of the European Council held in Brussels on 30 August 2014, concluded by saying ‘It condemns the increasing inflows of fighters and weapons from the territory of the Russian Federation into Eastern Ukraine as well as the aggression by Russian armed forces on Ukrainian soil’, European Council, Brussels, 30 August 2014, Conclusions, EU Doc. EUCO 163/14, 8, p. 3, para. 8.
Cfr. Bílkovà (2015), p. 32. Christakis (2014), p. 750. Hilpold (2015), p. 245. Sciso (2014), p. 1003. Tancredi (2014b), p. 9. Van den Driest (2015), p. 359. Vidmar (2015), p. 376. Wilson (2015), p. 221.
- 62.
- 63.
Cfr. Arcari (2014), p. 476. Sciso (2014), p. 1005.
The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;. Article 3(e) of the ‘Definition of Aggression’ UN Doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX), Annex, 14 December 1974.
- 64.
Cfr. Tancredi (2014b), p. 20.
- 65.
Intervention of Ms. Power (United States of America), UN Doc. S/PV.7125, of 3 March 2014, 20, p. 5.
- 66.
Cfr. Marxsen (2014), p. 389.
- 67.
- 68.
Cfr. Marxsen (2014), p. 750.
- 69.
See supra, Sect. 3.1.2.
- 70.
- 71.
Cfr. Şen (2015), p. 50.
- 72.
Cfr. Ibid.
- 73.
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, supra, Chap. 2, note 70, p. 32, para. 55.
- 74.
Cfr. Tolstykh (2015), p. 133.
- 75.
On the ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, supra, Chap. 2, note 51.
The text of Art. 25 runs as follows:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
- 76.
The ‘Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, signed in Paris, 20 March 1952, European Treaty Series No. 9, entry into force on 18 May 1954, http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/005, and was amended by Protocol No. 11, signed in Strasbourg, 11 May 1994, European Treaty Series No. 155, and entry into force on 1 November 1998, http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/009.
The text of Art. 3 runs as follows:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.
- 77.
Cfr. Marxsen (2014), p. 381.
- 78.
Cfr. Hilpold (2015), p. 260. Marxsen (2014), p. 381. Tolstykh (2015), p. 133.
The Venice Commission was established in May 1990 by eighteen COE Member States. By 2016, it was composed of sixty-one member states, including fourteen non-European members and Kosovo, with five observer countries and one associate member.
The ‘Code of good practice on Referendums’ was adopted by the Council for Democratic Elections at its nineteenth meeting (Venice, 16 December 2006) and the Venice Commission at its 70th plenary session (Venice, 16–17 March 2007), CDL-AD(2007)008rev http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2007)008rev.aspx.
- 79.
Cfr. Venice Commission, ‘Code of good practice on Referendums’, Strasbourg, 20 January 2009, Study No. 371/2006, CDL-AD(2007)008rev, 24, p. 4, para. 3.
Prior to this, the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE had adopted Recommendation 1704 (2005), on ‘Referendums: Towards Good Practices in Europe’ on 29 April 2005 http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17329&lang=en.
- 80.
- 81.
Cfr. Vidmar (2013), pp. 65–115.
- 82.
Cfr. Id., p. 190.
- 83.
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, supra, Chap. 2, note 70, p. 25, para. 59.
- 84.
- 85.
- 86.
Cfr. Crawford (2012), p. 243.
- 87.
Cfr. Vidmar (2015), p. 379.
- 88.
Cfr. Hilpold (2015), p. 259.
- 89.
Cfr. Tancredi (2014a), p. 484.
When the Government of South Africa proposed holding a referendum in Namibia, the ICJ held that once the mandate had run out the presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and hence ‘its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia are illegal and invalid’, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, supra, Chap. 2, note 70, p. 58, para. 132.
On the same lines, during debates relating to the situation in the Ukraine in the Security Council, the representative of the Russian Federation, Vitaly Churkin, alluded to the referendum held by France in February 1976 on the island of Mayotte, belonging to the recently independent State of the Comoro Islands, as to whether it was to refrain from joining the Comoros and become part of France. The result was a majority for Independence from the Comoros (Cfr. Intervention of Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation), UN Doc S/PV.7134, of 13 March 2014, 19, p. 16). The matter was brought to the Security Council and the representative of the Comoros called the actuation a ‘flagrant aggression’ (‘Telegram dated 28 January 1976 from the Head of State of the Comoros addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Doc. S/11953, of 30 January 1976). The draft resolution, sponsored by Benin, Guyana, Libyan Arab Republic, Panama and the United Republic of Tanzania, claimed that holding the referendum constituted ‘an interference in the internal affairs’, and called for France ‘to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Comorian State’ (UN Doc. S/11967, of 5 February 1976, 2, at 1 paragraphs 1 and 3). The resolution in support of the Comorian position was vetoed by France, as the representative of the Russian Federation remarked in his speech on events in Crimea (Cfr. Intervention of Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation), UN Doc S/PV.7134, of 13 March 2014, 19, p. 16).
The argument put forward by Russia, and supported by an appreciable number of international legal scholars, was linked to the traditional view of Soviet international law according to which an expansion of the territory of the Soviet Union would be possible through the holding of plebiscites addressing the question of territorial accession by a region transferred or a State incorporated. The plebiscite could be used as a way of bringing back into the Soviet Union of former Soviet territories that had been seized by force. Cfr. Pronin (2015), p. 134.
- 90.
See supra, Sect. 5.2.2.
- 91.
Cfr. Merezhko (2015), pp. 182–185.
- 92.
The text of Art. 2 runs:
The sovereignty of Ukraine extends throughout its entire territory.
Ukraine is a unitary state.
The territory of Ukraine within its present border is indivisible and inviolable.
On the Ukrainian Constitution, see supra, Chap. 5, note 56.
- 93.
The text of Art. 134 runs:
The Autonomous Republic of Crimea is an inseparable constituent part of the Ukraine and decides on the issues ascribed to its competence within the limits of authority determined by the Constitution of the Ukraine.
- 94.
Article 138(2) de la Ukrainian Constitution lays down that:
The competence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea comprises:
1) […]
2) organising and conducting local referendums;
- 95.
According to Art. 135(1) of the Ukrainian Constitution ‘The Autonomous Republic of Crimea has the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea that is adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by no less than one-half of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’.
Cfr. Sciso (2014), p. 997.
- 96.
An unofficial text can be found on http://web.archive.org/web/20150510004739/http://www.rada.crimea.ua/en/bases-of-activity/konstituciya-ARK.
- 97.
Venice Commission, ‘Code of Good Practice on Referendums’, Strasbourg, 20 January 2009, Study No. 371/2006, CDL-AD(2007)008rev, 24, p. 12, point III.1.
- 98.
Cfr. Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on ‘Whether the Decision Taken by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine to Organize a Referendum on Becoming a Constituent Territory of the Russian Federation or Restoring Crimea’s 1992 Constitution is Compatible with Constitutional Principles’, 21 March 2014, Opinion 762/2014, CDL-AD(2014)002, 6, p. 3, para. 13.
- 99.
Cfr. Id., p. 3, para. 14.
- 100.
- 101.
White House, ‘Statement by the President on Ukraine’, 6 March 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/06/statement-president-ukraine.
- 102.
‘Address by President of the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014’, supra, Chap. 1, note 1, at para. 59.
- 103.
Cfr. Venice Commission, ‘Code of Good Practice on Referendums’, Strasbourg, 20 January 2009, Study No. 371/2006, CDL-AD(2007)008rev, 24, p. 8, point III.1.c.
- 104.
Cfr. Hilpold (2015), p. 261. Vidmar (2015), p. 381.
The referendum of 16 March 2014 put the following two questions:
Are you in favour of unifying Crimea with Russia as a part of the Russian Federation?
Are you in favour of restoring the 1992 Constitution and the status of Crimea as a part of Ukraine?
For a different wording, see also Dmitriev (2014), p. 22. Marxsen (2014), p. 382.
- 105.
- 106.
Cfr. Venice Commission, Opinion 762/2014, CDL-AD(2014)002, supra, Chap. 6, note 98, p. 5, para. 23.
- 107.
On the outcome of the vote, see supra, Sect. 5.2.2.
- 108.
- 109.
Intervention of Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom), UN Doc. S/PV.7144, of 19 March 2014, 20, p. 15.
- 110.
Cfr. Marxsen (2014), p. 382.
- 111.
UN Doc. S/2014/189, of 15 March 2014, at para. 5.
Cfr. Burke-White (2014), p. 72.
- 112.
Cfr. Douhan (2015), p. 200.
The representative of France, Gérard Araud, stated that ‘the referendum it had instigated in Crimea was illegal and null and void under international law’ (Intervention of Mr. Araud, UN Doc. S/PV.7144, of 19 March 2014, 20, p. 6).
- 113.
- 114.
Cfr. Jia (2009), p. 35.
- 115.
Cfr. Hilpold (2009a), pp. 272 and 273.
- 116.
Cfr. Ibid.
- 117.
See supra, Sect. 4.2.4. UN Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999), of 10 June 1999, at para. 11.
- 118.
Cfr. Ryngaert (2010), p. 493.
- 119.
Cfr. ‘Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma’, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, 467–477, p. 470, para. 11. http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-02-BI.pdf.
- 120.
Cfr. Ryngaert and Griffioen (2009), p. 586.
- 121.
Cfr. Id., p. 586.
- 122.
- 123.
- 124.
- 125.
- 126.
See supra, Sect. 3.2.
- 127.
See supra, Sect. 3.1.2.
- 128.
Cfr. Ryngaert (2010), p. 493.
- 129.
Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, supra, Chap. 1, note 3, p. 426, para. 56.
- 130.
- 131.
- 132.
- 133.
- 134.
- 135.
Cfr. ‘Declaration of Independence of Crimea’, of 11 March 2014, para. 1 and 3.
- 136.
‘Address by President of the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014’, supra, Chap. 1, note 1, at para. 28. On the same lines, intervention of Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation), UN Doc. S/PV.7144, of 19 March 2014, 20, p. 8.
- 137.
Cfr. Van den Driest (2015), p. 331.
- 138.
- 139.
‘Address by President of the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014’, supra, Chap. 1, note 1, at para. 6.
- 140.
- 141.
See supra, Sect. 5.1.1.
Cfr. Luchterhandt (2014), p. 150.
Several Russian authors, such as Anatoly Kapustin, took the opposite view, stating that ‘there is no doubt the people of Crimea may be considered a people by the standards of international law’, ‘which in is composition is poly-ethnic’. Cfr. Kapustin (2015), p. 115.
- 142.
- 143.
- 144.
- 145.
See supra, Sect. 4.2.4.
Cfr. Ibid.
- 146.
See supra, Sect. 5.2.2.
- 147.
‘Address by President of the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014’, supra, Chap. 1, note 1, at para. 29.
- 148.
- 149.
‘Address by President of the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014’, supra, Chap. 1, note 1, at para. 31.
- 150.
Intervention of Ms. King (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), UN Doc. A/68/PV.80, of 27 March 2014, 27, p. 15. Cfr. Lagerwall (2014), p. 69.
- 151.
- 152.
Cfr. Marxsen (2014), p. 388.
- 153.
Cfr. Caminker (1994), pp. 1–82.
- 154.
Cfr. Fleiner (2011), p. 881.
- 155.
Cfr. Id., p. 882.
- 156.
Cfr. Pelc (2014), p. 547.
- 157.
- 158.
- 159.
- 160.
- 161.
- 162.
- 163.
See supra, Chap. 5, note 110.
- 164.
The text of Art. 65(2) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted on December 12, 1993, supra, Chap. 5, note 124, is as follows:
The admission to the Russian Federation and the creation in it of a new subject shall be carried out according to the rules established by the federal constitutional law.
- 165.
Cfr. ‘Opinion on ‘Whether Draft Federal Constitutional Law No. 462741-6 on Amending the Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on the Procedure of Admission to the Russian Federation and Creation of a New Subject within the Russian Federation is Compatible with International Law’, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 98th Plenary Session (Venice, 21–22 March 2014), CDL-AD(2014)004, 12, p. 2, para. 7. http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2014)004-e. Luchterhandt (2014), p. 171.
- 166.
- 167.
On the ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’, supra, Chap. 5, note 122.
- 168.
- 169.
Cfr. Pronin (2015), p. 135.
- 170.
Cfr. Id., p. 136.
- 171.
Cfr. Marxsen (2014), p. 390.
- 172.
- 173.
Cfr. Id., p. 12, para. 46.
- 174.
Cfr. Id., p. 12, para. 47.
- 175.
Cfr. Id., p. 5, para. 17.
- 176.
See supra, Sect. 6.2.2.
- 177.
See supra, Sect. 5.1.2.
- 178.
Cfr. ‘Opinion on ‘Whether Draft Federal Constitutional Law No. 462741-6’, CDL-AD(2014)004, supra, Chap. 6, note 165, p. 6, para. 22.
- 179.
Cfr. Merezhko (2015), p. 194.
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Escudero Espinosa, J.F. (2017). The Legality of the Secessions of Kosovo and Crimea. In: Self-Determination and Humanitarian Secession in International Law of a Globalized World. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72622-9_6
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