Advertisement

How Demonstrative Complex Pictorial Reference Grounds Contextualism

  • Alberto VoltoliniEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology book series (PEPRPHPS, volume 18)

Abstract

By resuming ideas originally developed in my Voltolini (2009), I will try to show again that demonstrative reference as to pictorial matters provides good examples in favor of contextualism, the position holding that wide context, the concrete situation of discourse, may have the semantic role of fixing truthconditions for an utterance, i.e., a sentence in that context. This time I will focus on complex cases of pictorial reference, those that cases of complex pictorial experiences such as collapsed seeing-in and nested seeing-in exhibit.

Keywords

contextualism traditionalism demostratives pictorial reference 

References

  1. Borg, E. (2004). Minimal semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Borg, E. (2012). Pursuing meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Caplan, B. (2003). Putting things in context. The Philosophical Review, 112, 191–214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Cappellen, H., & Lepore, E. (2005). Insensitive semantics. Oxford: Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Corazza, E., Fish, W., & Gorvett, J. (2002). Who is I? Philosophical Studies, 107, 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Crane, T. (2013). The objects of thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Everett, A. (2013). The nonexistent. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Higginbotham, J. (1994). Priorities in the philosophy of thought. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 68(Suppl), 85–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Hopkins, R. (2008). What do we see in film? The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 66, 149–159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Hopkins, R. (2010). Inflected pictorial experience: Its treatment and significance. In C. Abell & K. Bantinaki (Eds.), Philosophical perspectives on depiction (pp. 151–180). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Husserl, E. (2006). Phantasy, image consciousness, memory. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  12. Kaplan, D. (1989a). Demonstratives. In J. Almog et al. (Eds.), Themes from Kaplan (pp. 481–563). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  13. Kaplan, D. (1989b). Afterthoughts. In J. Almog et al. (Eds.), Themes from Kaplan (pp. 565–614). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  14. Kripke, S. (2008). Frege’s theory of sense and reference: Some exegetical notes. Theoria, 74, 181–218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Künne, W. (1992). Hybrid proper names. Mind, 101, 721–731.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Penco, C. (2013). Indexicals and demonstratives: On the debate between Kripke and Künne. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 88, 55–71.Google Scholar
  17. Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Predelli, S. (2005). Contexts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Recanati, F. (2004). Literal meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  20. Reichenbach, H. (1947). Elements of symbolic logic. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
  21. Voltolini, A. (1995). Indexinames. In J. Hill & P. Kotàtko (Eds.), Karlovy Vary studies in reference and meaning (pp. 258–285). Prague: Filosofia Publications.Google Scholar
  22. Voltolini, A. (2006). Fiction as a base of interpretation contexts. Synthese, 153, 23–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Voltolini, A. (2009). How demonstrative pictorial reference grounds contextualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90, 402–418.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Voltolini, A. (2014). Fiction and indexinames. Journal of Literary Theory, 8, 292–321.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Voltolini, A. (2015). A syncretistic theory of depiction. Basingstoke: Palgrave.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Voltolini, A. (2016). A syncretistic theory of proper names. In A. Bianchi, V. Morato, & G. Spolaore (Eds.), The importance of being called Ernesto. Reference, truth, and logical form (pp. 141–164). Padua: Padova University Press.Google Scholar
  27. Voltolini, A. (2017). The singularity of experiences and thoughts. TopoiGoogle Scholar
  28. Wiesing, L. (2010). Artificial presence. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
  29. Wollheim, R. (19802). Seeing-as, seeing-in, and pictorial representation. In Art and its objects (pp. 205–226). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  30. Wollheim, R. (1987). Painting as an art. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  31. Wollheim, R. (1998). On pictorial representation. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 56, 217–226.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy of Mind, Department of Philosophy and Education SciencesUniversity of TurinTurinItaly

Personalised recommendations