Keywords

Human security denotes a human-denominated, as opposed to State, focus for security. It highlights the duality of individual, universal—universalizable—human rights. This duality is central to the notion of human rights tied to human security. While not in itself the focus of this small book, the idea of human security beyond borders is fundamentally an exercise in reimagining the traditionally State-based loci of responsibility for those individual but also universal human rights.

In other words, though human rights can be taken to be universal, the responsibility for their security has been State-grounded. Though States have never been omnipotent in terms of their own or their citizens’ security, this particular moment in time poses especial challenges to territorially delineated security. The challenges of geopolitical shifts compounded by unprecedented impacts of climate change, migration, and pandemic (potential) make a case for rethinking human security of citizens and non-citizens alike—beyond borders.

Human security presents a lens through which to approach a human rights/responsibility nexus. Building on the philosophical background informed by Christian ethics and the Enlightenment, it represents the culmination of a half-century’s worth of effort to raise global awareness of human rights, dating from the establishment of the post–World War II institutions of the United Nations system.

1.1 Origins

The origin of State responsibility for security predates even the Treaty of Westphalia. It is to be found in the two pillars of modernity which arguably emerged with the articulation of dual allegiance expressed in Christianity . While not arguing for an exclusive Christian viewpoint of human security, taking the particular contributions of the influence of Christian ideas about God and the State into account does shed light on the secular constellation of Statehood which continues to be the building block of the international, State-based world order. Thus these dual allegiances refer not to those separate allegiances owed God and Caesar, but instead to the dual pillars of human and especially universal human rights. Here the first pillar refers to the conception of a deity in the arcane world, conveying a human right on the human creatures of the earth created in that image.

In Christianity there is only one god who is fundamentally concerned with every individual person’s salvation, it paves the way for modern individualism, which culminates in the assumption that the individual has inalienable rights. (Hösle 2003, 23)

Building upon this argument, the second pillar confers that human right universally, on all human beings as beings created in that image.

Only through reflection on the transcendent god did humans emerge from their immediate unity with their political community, and no matter how much this god at first bound this community to a religious value world whose claims were even more unconditional than those of the polis, his ultimate decline left behind a social world in which even the values of one’s own community appear to be objective facts that have no claim of their own to be loved or even merely obeyed. At the same time, this belief afforded a strong upswing, even an infinite emotion, to universal ideals, according to which all human beings should be regarded as equal. For if there is only one god, then he can hardly be the god of one’s own people alone. (Hösle 2003, 23)

Pillars one and two together lead one step further even from the separation, referred to above, between the spheres of Caesar and of God. They coalesce into a demand upon the governing State, the secular Caesarian State, to uphold the universalistic morality demanded by Christianity . “[Christianity] made possible a politics that was finally free of all religious and especially ritual considerations. …Through an extremely intensive moralization of the religious, it demanded an influence on politics that went far beyond what was conceivable for the ancients” (Hösle 2003, 24). In doing so, Christianity set a high bar for governance and States :

If Christianity demanded only a retreat from the world, it would be in a sense less threatening than it actually is. The difficulty with Christianity, however, consists in the fact that it not only devalues politics, but also makes demands on politics, based on its universalistic and individualistic ethics. (Hösle 2003, 24)

This process reinforced the secularity of the State, while simultaneously endowing it singularly with the authority and responsibility and accountability for a moral security: a human security. This is not to argue that either universal human rights or a State guarantee of security is accepted or implemented. It is to assert that the originating impulses exist and permeate if not penetrate the status quo, which is arguably the ideal of the universality of human security.

1.2 Emergence of Human Security

The concept of human security emerged in the post–Cold War era of the briefly heralded ‘unipolar’ moment which seemed to imply the end of inter-State security threats. It was first explicitly named in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) report , New Dimensions of Human Security, yet built on a long tradition of sovereignty theory. The human security scaffold is predicated on the national responsibility to accept, promote, and protect the—ever-expanding—pantheon of those human rights. Nef (1999) and others count between five and seven dimensions of human security, each of them with echoes in the UN definitions of human, as well as political and social, cultural and economic rights. They are generally accepted as including: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. Given both the vagary of their definitions and the vastness of their possible scope, with the sole exception of provisions of asylum tied to political (in)security, none of these human security elements are protected by legal provisions nationally, let alone internationally. Consequently, while these elements of human security ‘rights’ have benefited from a boundless imagination, the same cannot be said for the creativity applied to their realization, which remains the responsibility of the citizen-State.

In practice, however, this is not the case, as non-State actors (NSAs) of various kinds advocate, influence, write, and implement the ordering rules. At the same time, the very legitimacy of the world order—State and NSAs all—is undergoing a shift: an uncoordinated stress test whose outcome is uncertain. Indeed, the State has also undergone a transformation. While the scope of human rights has expanded, that of States’ rights has both expanded and contracted, at times retracting and contracting and at others effectually expanding (again): constrained first by the Cold War logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD) ; opened to new forms of government by the ideas of Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ (Faubion and Rabinow 1994) and the 1990s’ promulgation of issue-specific governance regimes that included NSAs (Rosenau 1992); seemingly eroded by the ‘diffusion’ of power (Guzzini and Neumann 2012); only to be recaptured in the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) of 2001 (ICISS 2001). On the one hand, myriad regulations and treaties curtail State maneuvering with regard to, among many others, the realm of international health crises through the International Health Regulations (IHR , updated 2005, brought into effect 2007). On the other, adaptations to States’ continued (full) responsibility for the realization of human rights of their citizens continue to put the onus for an ultimate guarantee of human security (Šehović 2014) at their doorsteps. This is one side of the emergent challenge. The other is the void of imaginative beyond-State responses to the acceptance, promotion, and protection of the human rights’ realization of non-citizens beyond borders.

This book aims to address this gap by reimagining both State and human security beyond borders. Chapters 1 and 2 begin by laying out the foundational arguments that underscore State responsibility for citizens’ human rights. Chapter 3 analyzes the kind of gap that has emerged between the expansion of individual human rights and the (inadequate) adaptation to State responsibilities for such rights. Chapter 4 delves into concept of order, analyzing high and low-orders of State and human security. Chapters 5 and 6 offer case studies on migration and health to illustrate and evaluate these hypotheses. Chapter 7 concludes with possible policy and research recommendations.

1.3 Conceptual Overview

Like the concept of human security itself, this book has the potential to become an unwieldy tome. In order to limit its remit, it will focus on delineating the definitions of human security juxtaposed against State security (defense) and in relation to health security and citizenship. In addition to the 1994 UNDP report , the argument builds on that of the Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, (2003) , and the literature on the social determinants of health (Benatar 2011; Gill and Benatar 2016). This in turn builds upon centuries of development of the argument that State has the responsibility to promote and protect the rights of its citizens, not only in terms of territorial integrity but also in terms of welfare—including health (Gill and Benatar 2016). Together, these link national and international human security, and are applicable to reimagining, for example, citizenship rights to health security beyond borders (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 Nexus of health diplomacy –health security
Full size table

This illustrative nexus shows that just as global and international health diplomacy are differentiable, so, too, is international health security from global health security. Whereas the former emphasizes the security, primarily in the form of the protection of territory, of States, the latter prioritizes the health of people (in or between) any State. Yet regardless of whether State or human security is the ultimate goal, it is States which retain the status of the final arbiter of (any) security. This is because only States possess the necessary legal, procedural, and generally material capabilities of providing for and enforcing (human) security (Šehović 2014; Šehović 2017 forthcoming). Despite inputs and supplements and assumption of an increasingly diverse portfolio of roles and responsibilities both internationally and globally on the part of NSAs, whose numbers have exploded since the mid- to late 1990s, the centrality of States to the world order prevails.

Indeed, internationally recognized Statehood continues to be a prerequisite for a seat at the rule-making table. Ulrike Guérot , quoted in her provocative interview entitled “Europe needs to transcend the nation state” (2016), goes so far as to ask: “Why do we have a system in which we ask all the communities to become nation states first before joining a supranational entity?” Though this is not the question to be answered in this book, it nonetheless represents a lens to the frame explored here. By holding the implicit presumption of a State-based international order up to the light, Guérot sets the stage for the question this book asks: In a world of imperfect State security, of porous borders, how might it be possible to reimagine establishing and protecting human security beyond borders?

The question is premised on the endurance of the State-based international order . This is a practical consideration as the current order is built on States. Where and when these also act as Member States in collaboration with NSAs or other actors does not detract from the primacy of States.

The question is also based on two additional assumptions: (1) that borders are porous, and will continue to be so; and (2) that such porousness leads to two choices: (a) State-centric security, prioritizing external territorial demarcation, and internally directed citizenship ; and (b) human security beyond borders, requiring a new conceptualization of citizenship with(out) regard for territory. The latter would require a reimagining of the allocation and attribution of human (security) rights and responsibilities. If the first assumption holds true, then the second must also be correct. That is the argument put forward in this book (Box 1.1).

Box 1.1 Assumptions

Assumption 1: The ‘rules’ of the State-based order are shifting, with no clear loci of responsibility and accountability for (human) security.

Question 1: What is changing in the reordering of State-based ‘rules of the game,’ with what anticipated consequences, in terms of the loci of responsibility and accountability for (human) security?

Assumption 2: A renewed articulation and application of universal human rights is necessary, particularly with the acknowledgment of the increasing numbers of State-less (non-citizen) people.

Question 2: How might it be possible to renew universal rights through a sub-State, State, and supra-State articulation and implementation?

In order to test its assumptions and to answer its questions, this book draws on a long list of literature on State sovereignty and human security and analyzes two relevant case studies. In terms of sovereignty literature, this can be divided into two sets: that which rests on the assumption of State sovereignty and its enduring preeminence capable of withstanding change (Matthews 1997; Philpott 2001; Hösle 2003; Carlson and Owens 2003; Krasner 1999; Kissinger 2015) and that which assumes that the rise of NSAs in particular presages a State-less, if not stateless, order (Slaughter 2004; Guzzini and Neumann 2012; Risse 2012; Terhalle 2015). It is indisputable that the number and role of NSAs have increased exponentially since especially the end of the Cold War. A mountain of literature has contributed to the understanding of their assumption of responsibilities and potential and modes of accountability. Yet as the case studies, focused on human security vis-à-vis health and migration, show, the scope and depth of NSA involvement in, for example, HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) and AIDS response and governance wax and wane. Whether a trend, or a recurring cycle, can be identified remains to be seen. As such, it remains an open question whether the ultimate guarantee of responsibility for human security will rest with States, with NSAs, or with another form of governance.

The project is exploratory. It refines questions that need asking, and engages with pressing questions both in the current geopolitical sphere and at the local level. By articulating and exploring these questions and possible answers to them, the project aims to bring the questions into the public sphere and engage with possible community and policy solutions.

First, briefly, this project traces the historical trajectory of rights’ demands on State (Hösle 2003; Carlson and Owens 2003; Philpott 2001). In doing so, it lays out the argument for State guarantee of human security—beyond the obligation to protect the integrity of territorial borders. For the overall argument of the book, it is also necessary to differentiate between State-focused security of humans—citizens—within State borders, and the security of any and all human beings both within and between States. Understanding this distinction makes the case of reimagining human security beyond borders plausible.

Second, taking into account these rights’ demands and dimensions of human security, the project then charts the orders of responsibility between State and non-State actors, accounting for (any) gaps. Here, the focus is on not just functional or operational realization of rights, but on their guarantee. It explores two case studies chosen for their timeliness and their relevance to both State security and human security, as well as their complicated relationships to borders: health and migration.

Health is a universal right in theory. It links human rights discourse with that of responsibility, both State and human. With regard to State responsibility, health is also linked with defense: securing territory requires a fit (standing) military (Howell 2014). Responsibility for human health security takes into account both individual and communal decision-making and their relationship: individual freedom versus communal protection, as seen most glaringly in the debate around vaccination (Šehović 2017, forthcoming). As such, health is a unique, local commodity, inextricably tied to communities and States. It is international insofar as its protection depends upon more than one State’s actions. It is also increasingly being framed as global in practice: from the WHO through to the current focus on universal health coverage (UHC) and the Framework Convention for Global Health (FCGH) . Health critically depends upon the implementation of systems based in and on State capabilities, notably with regard to services such as maternity care, as well as on surveillance at and across borders, as is the case with transnational threats such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and H5N1 (avian influenza) .

In this, health introduces a dichotomy of threats and vulnerabilities as distinct from risks (Nunes 2014; Liotta and Owen 2006; Singer and Baer 2011). It is often—not always—possible to minimize vulnerabilities and risks through the deliberate establishment and use of culturally appropriate and applicable systems (Lenard and Straehle 2012; Farmer 1999). It is more possible to control risks than vulnerabilities; and both are more controllable than threats.

Vulnerabilities here refer to what Liotta and Owen have debated as structural weaknesses which make health harder to achieve or to maintain (Liotta and Owen 2006). Examples include environmental factors such as persistence of endemic disease and poor infrastructure, but also ‘creeping vulnerabilities’ such as expanding malaria regions (due to) and climate change. While not easily addressed, coping mechanisms and adaptations can make it possible to lift or limit these vulnerabilities.

Risks refer more specifically to the confluence of factors influencing the likelihood of a health crisis or (infectious) disease outbreak. In this rendering, risk refers to (lack of) herd immunity coupled with the probability of the introduction of, for instance, polio or measles. It also refers to the degree of possible spread of tuberculosis (TB) due to the vulnerability caused by population density, as well as the heightened potential of the spread of drug-resistant TB, or HIV, in the context of inadequate or interrupted medical treatment. Comprehensive interventions can—in theory and practice—reduce these risks.

Threats, but contrast, are more difficult to eliminate. These include (re)emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) such as SARS, H5N1, and Middle East respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus (MERS-CoV) , as well as HIV and AIDS (HIV) and Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) . The problem with such threats is that they cannot be wholly anticipated. Consequently, they cannot be eliminated. However, coordinated and collaborative research, such as that being conducted through the Centre for Viral Zoonoses and the Zoonoses Research Unit at the University of Pretoria in South Africa, with (potentially) the Robert Koch Institute and the School of Public Health at the University of Heidelberg in Germany, together with the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) , the EU CDC and the US CDC, might make inroads into anticipating and preparing for appropriate and mitigating responses.

In terms related to migration, the calculus to and of human security rights and responsibilities is a bit different. Migration need not be seen as a threat (at all). Risks then can be minimized, and responding to the vulnerabilities posed to migrants, and to both sending and recipient countries, can be systemically addressed. The link between migration and health can serve to make this clear.

Migration appears to be more obviously dependent upon border controls than health, though the case for this is not clear-cut. Continual migration , complemented by successive waves of a greater or lesser magnitude, has been and is a fundamental fact. Climate change is an additional driver of this phenomenon (Singer and Baer 2011). So, too, are repeated (new) eruptions of EIDs, as well as concomitant burdens of returning vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles, and non-communicable diseases (NCDs) . Borders stem neither the tides of diseases nor those of migrants.

Third, and consequently, given the historically high number of migrants moving across the globe, and the expedited potential for (new) EIDs , the project speaks to a moment when these rights and responsibilities are in the process of being profoundly challenged. Fourth, and finally, the project aims to offer initial ideas to take into account in any new ordering of rights and responsibilities.

1.4 Conclusion

This book ties two traditionally separate spheres together, namely, geopolitical order as primarily related to State security and human security, typically rendered a concern of the ‘development’ agenda—of States. Binding the two reconceptualizes order for both human and State security as seen against two of the most pressing issues of our time: health and human (in)securities. It seeks to identify the sources, both theoretical and practical, of the increased pressure on rights and responsibilities for health and human security.

In so doing, it positions itself within the scholarly debate on the series of ordering changes that have occurred in the global system of governance since the 1990s. These have (unwittingly) diverged from the understanding of the State as the arbiter within its territory and as the guarantor of (human) security within its borders. This had had two separate sets of consequences. First, an attempt through the paradigm of human security (UNDP 1994), exemplified but not operationalized by the concept of the R2P (ICISS 2001), to expand the host of arbiters and guarantors upward to the ‘global’ (international) community has possibly failed. Second, interventionist actions of various NSAs to implement material guarantees of (human) security reaching both citizens and non-citizens (including refugees) have solved some immediate problems but not answered the question of where accountability lies at the last instance.

Given the current migration and refugee crisis, this diffuse relationship between States and citizens, and especially, non-citizens, is of particular interest. The impending wave(s) of anticipated climate (environmental) migrants makes an additional case of conceptualizing and addressing the legal and administrative challenges of (re)negotiating the relationship between States and citizens, responsibility and accountability. This short framing of the argument with pertinent examples is an apt way to contribute to and stimulate further scholarship and practical debate.