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Justification Awareness Models

  • Sergei ArtemovEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10703)

Abstract

Justification Awareness Models, JAMs, incorporate two principal ideas: (i) justifications are prime objects of the model: knowledge and belief are defined evidence-based concepts; (ii) awareness restrictions are applied to justifications rather than to propositions, which allows for the maintaining of desirable closure properties. JAMs naturally include major justification models, Kripke models and, in addition, represent situations with multiple possibly fallible justifications. As an example, we build a JAM for Russell’s well-known Prime Minister scenario which, in full generality, was previously off the scope of rigorous epistemic modeling.

Keywords

Modal logic Justification logic Epistemology Knowledge Belief 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Melvin Fitting, Vladimir Krupski, Elena Nogina, and Tudor Protopopescu for helpful suggestions. Special thanks to Karen Kletter for editing and proofreading this text.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The City University of New York, The Graduate CenterNew York CityUSA

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