Skip to main content
  • 211 Accesses

Abstract

Benjamin’s approach to Kafka is a convergence of prophecy and criticism. Kafka’s writings prepare themselves for continually being read as a twofold prophesy: of a future of myth, and of a potential philosophic capacity for shame about myth. Benjamin’s philosophic criticism responds to this impetus in Kafka’s writings and thereby continues the prophecy. Under mythic constraints, it is possible that all are victims of questionable imperatives. Shame about those imperatives is a possibility that may be prophesied. The basis for such shame is the inhuman, which may always be critically juxtaposed with human presumptions to dominate it. Whereas Agamben considers it certain that shame about the human will continue as long as the inhuman is witnessed, Benjamin’s Kafka prophesies this shame as simply a possibility.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 69.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 89.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Giorgio Agamben , Nudities, 6.

  2. 2.

    Agamben , Nudities, 5–6.

  3. 3.

    For elaboration see Rrenban, especially the chapter titled “Image of Dramatic Beauty.”

  4. 4.

    For Schlegel’s remark, see Athenaeum Fragments no. 80, Philosophical Fragments, 27/ Kritische Schriften und Fragmente 2, 111.

  5. 5.

    See too some seemingly pertinent remarks in the notes towards a revision of the 1934-essay: II:3, 1252–53, no. 24.

  6. 6.

    See Kafka , “A Page from an Old Document,” Kafka’s Selected Stories, 66–69/ “Ein altes Blatt,” Drucke zu Lebzeiten, KA, 263–67.

  7. 7.

    See Kafka, The Trial, 223/ Der Proceß, KA, 303.

  8. 8.

    For extensive remarks on this notion of preliminary prophecy, see Birnbaum, especially 163–69.

  9. 9.

    Fenves, Arresting Language, 230.

  10. 10.

    Giehlow is actually discussing Agrippa’s commentary on melancholy, which Benjamin – partially through Giehlow – develops into a way of considering melancholy in the baroque mourning plays. See Giehlow, 14.

  11. 11.

    The previous two paragraphs slightly rework material available in Rrenban, 179–82.

  12. 12.

    This note by Benjamin actually mixes points he recorded from various conversations with Brecht. Brecht’s reference to The Trial as a prophetic book is recorded in Benjamin’s note from August 31, 1934. Brecht’s reference to The Trial concludes a statement by Brecht (SW2, 787/VI, 529) that is more narrow than the statement made in Benjamin’s later note towards revision of the 1934-essay.

  13. 13.

    Fritsch, 2–3.

  14. 14.

    Fritsch, 201 n. 14.

  15. 15.

    Laruelle , Théorie générale des victimes, 19, 37, 98, 123–24,130, 133,145–46, 179.

  16. 16.

    Laruelle , Théorie générale, 52–53, 132, 137, 140, 160, 176, 186.

  17. 17.

    Laruelle , Théorie générale, 59.

  18. 18.

    Laruelle , Théorie générale, 81. See 205 too.

  19. 19.

    See Nietzsche , The Birth of Tragedy, 89/ Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Part 3, Vol. 1, 87.

  20. 20.

    Schmitt , Hamlet oder Hekuba, 39–51.

  21. 21.

    Schmitt , Hamlet oder Hekuba, 47.

  22. 22.

    Schmitt , Hamlet oder Hekuba, 51.

  23. 23.

    Benjamin is adapting Rosenzweig’s distinction of “modern tragedy” as a form more philosophic than is ancient tragedy (O, 112–13/ I;1, 291–92). Also relevant are Benjamin’s remarks in a 1926-review of Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s Der Turm, WuN 13:1, 25–29, especially 28–29.

  24. 24.

    Although in different terminology, such a point even seems to be made in Fritsch, 52.

  25. 25.

    See Kafka , Tagebücher, KA, 857. This statement on original sin is also cited by Benjamin in an early rough version of the 1934-essay (see II:3, 1223).

  26. 26.

    Kafka’s “The Judgement” is cited in the 1934-essay (SW2, 795–96/ II:2, 411) as indicative of a Kafkan father-son relationship. See “The Judgement,” Kafka’s Selected Stories, 3–12/ “Das Urteil,” Drucke zu Lebzeiten, KA, 41–61.

  27. 27.

    For the formulation “Nature itself,” see Deleuze and Guattari , Kafka, 35/ 64.

  28. 28.

    See too, for a reworking of the 1934-essay: II:3, 1261–62.

  29. 29.

    Kafka, The Trial, 231/ Der Proceß, KA, 312.

  30. 30.

    Agamben, Means without End, 133. It has been argued that Agamben’s more emphatic or insistent reading of Kafka’s “als sollte” is justified by the association of the verb “sollen” with “a necessity (ought to, had to) and not just a possibility (would)” (Snoek, 93). This reading overlooks, however, that the formulation “als sollte” is, and has long been, synonymous with “als ob” (as though, as if). See Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm , 1496.

  31. 31.

    Agamben, Remnants, 104. Mesnard and Kahan question whether the young Italian student is experiencing the Kafkan shame that Agamben ascribes to him (111–12). For the passage on the student, see Antelme , 231–32/ 252–53.

  32. 32.

    Deleuze and Guattari , Kafka, 44, 88/ 80–81, 156.

  33. 33.

    Blanchot , The Writing of the Disaster, 53/ L’écriture du désastre, 89.

  34. 34.

    Kofman , 14, 31/ 21, 39.

  35. 35.

    Kofman , 19–28/ 25–37. See Blanchot’s “The Idyll,” Vicious Circles, 1–36/ “L’Idylle,” “Après Coup” précédé par “Le Reassassement Éternel, 9–56.

  36. 36.

    Kofman , 26, 32/ 32–33, 40.

  37. 37.

    Levinas, New Talmudic Readings, 65/ Lévinas, Nouvelles Lectures Talmudiques, 28–29. Although this statement does not seem to be cited in it, a study devoted to Levinas’s “prophetic politics” is Philip J. Harold’s book.

  38. 38.

    Liska, “Die Tradierbarkeit der Lücke in der Zeit,” especially 199–206. See too: Liska, “The Messiah before the Law.” Also see Liska, “The Legacy of Benjamin’s Messianism,” especially 200–1, 208–13. A slightly revised version of the latter essay is also available: “Zur Aktualität von Benjamins messianischem Erbe,” see especially 223–224, 231–38. See too Liska, Giorgio Agambens leerer Messianismus, and a couple of essays that criticize Agamben in somewhat similar terms: Lebovic, “Benjamin’s ‘Sumpflogik,’” especially 191–99, 204–5, 209–10; and Geulen.

  39. 39.

    Agamben, Means without End, 119.

  40. 40.

    Agamben, Means without End, 121–22.

  41. 41.

    Agamben, Remnants, 104.

  42. 42.

    Levinas , On Escape, 64–65/ Lévinas, De l’évasion, 113–14.

  43. 43.

    Agamben . Remnants, 105–7. As mentioned, Anders’s Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen pertains mostly to the first shame that Agamben outlines: the shame about losing a sense of sovereign subjectivity.

  44. 44.

    Rolland , 45/ 69.

  45. 45.

    Guenther, “Resisting Agamben,” 62. See too: 70–72, 75.

  46. 46.

    Agamben , Remnants, 128.

  47. 47.

    Agamben , Remnants, 132–34.

  48. 48.

    Agamben , Remnants, 134.

  49. 49.

    Agamben , Means without End, 122–23.

  50. 50.

    Agamben , Means without End, 132. For Marx’s comments, see his letter of late March 1843 to Arnold Ruge in Karl Marx, Early Writings, 200/ Marx , Engels, Werke, vol. 1, 337.

  51. 51.

    In Means without End and in Remnants, Agamben is adapting views expressed by Primo Levi. As mentioned, Mesnard and Kahan are particularly detailed in criticizing this usage of Levi’s works (34–40, 79–83, 93–94).

  52. 52.

    Agamben, Means without End, 132.

  53. 53.

    This outlook diverges, therefore, from any view that would – for the sake of the “concept of intention” – insist on a strict distinction of passivity and activity. For such a view in the context of shame and philosophy, see Hutchinson, 82.

  54. 54.

    Cassirer , 43.

  55. 55.

    Part II below will be concerned with those elements of Benjamin’s Kafka-analyses that, like many of his other writings, still insist on a uniquely redemptive relationship of the human with the divine.

  56. 56.

    As noted above (in Chap. 2), there is, nonetheless, a complication, which will be a concern in Chap. 11 below. This complication is that Benjamin sometimes identifies the Vorwelt as itself mythic.

  57. 57.

    On the Scheherazade -like “epic memory [Gedächtnis]” that can always tell another story and thereby keep conclusive punishment at bay, see Benjamin’s “The Storyteller” (SW3, 154/ II:2, 453).

  58. 58.

    Bouretz, 238.

  59. 59.

    For the commandment, the translation given here follows Benjamin’s German (Du sollst Dir kein Bildnis machen). He cites no specific translation for this commandment from the second book of Moses (20:4). Luther’s version is “Du sollst dir kein Bildnes noch irgendein Gleichnis machen ….” (“You should make yourself no graven image, nor any likeness ….”) (see Die Bibel). The Bible translation edited by Leopold Zunz , with this passage of Exodus translated by H. Arnheim, has “Du sollst dir kein Bild machen, kein Abbild …..” (“You should make yourself no image, no copy ….”) (see Die vier und zwanzig Bücher der Heiligen Schriften). Benjamin was familiar with both the Luther translation and the translation edited by Zunz. Dropping the old-fashioned “graven” for the more modern synonym “carved,” the English translation in the Oxford Study Edition is “You shall not make a carved image for yourself nor the likeness of anything ….” (see The New English Bible with the Apocrypha). For a study that treats this commandment as the only commandment unconditionally effective in Benjamin’s writings, see Martel, The One and Only Law.

  60. 60.

    Agamben, Means without End, 122–23.

  61. 61.

    For critical (and occasionally sarcastic) comments on Agamben’s penchant for declaring someone “the first” to have accomplished what he says that person accomplished, see Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. I, 93–95, 329/ Séminaire. La bête et le souverain, vol. I, 136–139, 437.

  62. 62.

    For pertinent remarks see Kafka , Tagebücher, KA, 840–41.

  63. 63.

    Agamben , Means without End, 140. See too: Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Moran, B. (2018). Prophecy of Shame. In: Politics of Benjamin’s Kafka: Philosophy as Renegade. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72011-1_5

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics