Abstract
Chapter 11 makes it clear why the conclusions which are drawn in the preceding chapters differ from those commonly reached in considerations of the unique roles of indexical beliefs. It is shown that the discussion of this book focusses on the rational import of indexical beliefs in a way that the discussions of others such as Perry, Lewis, Chisholm, Stalnaker, and Evans do not. This difference of focus explains the difference in conclusions drawn.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
- 2.
The indexes at issue here are specifically ones within a world, e.g., a context consisting of an agent, a time, and a place. It is quite common to think that propositions only have a truth-value relative to possible worlds. E.g., the proposition that Olley is making a mess will be true in all those worlds where I make a mess but not in any others.
- 3.
There are a number of different accounts of de re beliefs some of which would involve one needing to know something particular about the referent but most agree that it is one’s special relation to the referent rather than the knowing of the quality which distinguishes the de re from the de dicto (cf . Kaplan (1968)).
- 4.
If propositions are traditionally understood this follows. Though I do not want to be committed to this idea or interpretation of propositions. Perhaps a single I-proposition could pick out different facts for different people.
- 5.
Perry expands upon this view in more recent work (e.g. Perry (1997, 1998, 2006) in doing so he makes more propositions and facts relevant to the indexical beliefs (propositions concerning meaning and context). But it is clear that unless these are propositions that give facts non-indexical beliefs cannot capture, which they do not, then they will not be adequate to answer Q3.
- 6.
There are of course exceptions. Perhaps most notable is Castaneda , whose work inspired Perry and who goes on to give a more detailed account of action (cf. Castaneda (1990, 1992)). Parfit (1987) is another counterexample. However, I have addressed these accounts by defending a particular view of rational action in Chaps. 4, 5, and 6.
- 7.
- 8.
Lewis believes that individuals exist in only one possible world but that they have counterparts that are relevantly similar and that exist in different possible worlds. To this extent my presentation is misleading. It might be better to speak of self -ascribing the property of living in a world in which someone called ‘Olley’ is making a mess. But this does not affect my argument, so for ease of presentation I write as I do in the main text.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
I am not sure that this really works because I do not think it is clear that a diagonal proposition associated with a required indexical belief could not be the content of an appropriate non-indexical belief.
- 12.
Which is not to say it is subjective (cf. Evans (1981)).
- 13.
I do not mean Evans would say something this simplistic.
References
Castaneda, H.-N. (1990). Practical Thinking, Reasons for Doing, and Intentional Action: The Thinking of Doing and the Doing of Thinking. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 273–308.
Castaneda, H.-N. (1992). Indexical Reference and Bodily Causal Diagrams in Intentional Action. Studia Logica, 51, 439–462.
Chisholm, R. (1981). The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality. Brighton: Harvester.
Evans, G. (1981). Understanding Demonstratives. In H. Parret & J. Bouveresse (Eds.), Meaning and Understanding (pp. 280–303). Berlin: de Gruyter.
Evans, G. (1982). In J. McDowell (Ed.), The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kaplan, D. (1968). Quantifying In. Synthese, 19, 178–214.
Lewis, D. K. (1979). Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Philosophical Review, 88, 513–543.
Lewis, D. K. (1983a). Survival and Identity. In Philosophical Papers (Vol. I, pp. 55–72). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. K. (1983b). Postscript to ‘Survival and Identity’. In Philosophical Papers (Vol. I, pp. 73–77). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. K. (2001). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lowe, E. J. (1987). Lewis on Perdurance Versus Endurance. Analysis, 47, 152–154.
Lowe, E. J. (1998). The Possibility of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. (1987). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Perry, J. (1977). Frege on Demonstratives. Philosophical Review, 86, 474–497.
Perry, J. (1979). The Problem of the Essential Indexical. Nous, 13, 3–21.
Perry, J. (1997). Indexicals and Demonstratives. In B. Hale & C. Wright (Eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (pp. 586–612). Oxford: Blackwell.
Perry, J. (1998). Myself and I. In M. Stamm (Ed.), Philosophie in Synthetisher Absicht (A festschrift for Dieter Heinrich) (pp. 83–103). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
Perry, J. (2006). Self. In D. M. Borchert (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vol. 8, pp. 708–711). Detroit: Macmillan.
Stalnaker, R. C. (1981). Indexical Belief. Synthese, 49, 129–151.
Stalnaker, R. C. (1999). Introduction. In Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought (pp. 1–28). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Pearson, O.(. (2018). Closing Remarks. In: Rationality, Time, and Self. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71973-3_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71973-3_11
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-71972-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-71973-3
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)