Abstract
In this chapter, I defend a classic praxeological approach to technology: a robust philosophical reflection on our technological practices demands an adequate theory of action. My interest lies in exploring certain ontological and epistemological issues arising from this programmatic statement. First, I characterize the point of view of praxeology and determine the set of basic properties of technical action. Second, I suggest that the application of this viewpoint to the world of the products of technical action par excellence, namely artifacts, encourages the adoption of Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘family resemblances’ to map that world. Third, I suggest that, epistemologically speaking, the praxeological focus on our technological practices promotes what will be called a ‘pluralistic view’ of the knowledge embodied in such practices.
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- 1.
This feature, of major importance for the correct understanding of technical action, has its roots in Aristotle (1970) and his medieval followers; e.g., Thomas Aquinas (1988). For these philosophers, intention is, generally speaking, having an intention to do something. Thus, in their reflections on practical reasoning, they combine the idea of intention with a choice to act in a certain time and space. Therefore, to try something is to choose to do something, be willing to do it, and do it when given the chance. Within this framework, intention is a product of a process of deliberation on possible courses of action. It follows that intention implies a strong sense of planning (Austin 1970), since to have an intention is equivalent to having an action plan. Therefore, the content of the intention of an agent is constrained by the plans for the proposed ends. In other words, what is intended in an action plan depends on what an agent plans.
This insight is especially important because it justifies, in a sense, the transformation of the analysis of intention into the study of the formation and structure of action plans. This lays the foundation for the best interpretation of the content of the intentions in technical action.
- 2.
Recall Marx’s dictum: “what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality.” (1980, p. 198).
- 3.
According to Kroes (2012, p. 137), “This physical structure has to be put together, synthesized, from parts (components) some of which may already exist, others of which may have to be tailor-made for the specific case at hand. It is for that reason that designing is often characterized as a synthetic activity, or as an activity that uses synthetic methods, as opposed to scientific research that is commonly characterized as an analytic activity, or as an activity that uses analytic methods.”
- 4.
The fact that it is a deliberative and decisional activity means that designing resembles a process of invention rather than discovery (see Kroes 2012, p. 133).
- 5.
As Broncano claims, “The action of the engineer introduces changes in history and, in a deep sense, it changes the conditions of existence, although he may not be aware of the consequences of his action.” (2006, p.110).
- 6.
- 7.
Of course, I am leaving aside the thesis that artifacts lack an essence. Eliminativism is a thesis of this kind. According to eliminativism, artifacts qua artifacts do not exist. Those objects to which we refer to as artifacts are merely aggregates of matter organized in a certain way. Of course, there are different strategies to reach this conclusion. See, e.g., Van Inwagen (1990) or Merricks (2003).
- 8.
While this conclusion opens up a promising avenue to use ontology as a guide to an epistemology (see Carrara and Vermas 2009), I do not have the space here to delve into the issue.
- 9.
It should be noted that functional considerations and the evolutionary history of these cultural objects may be relevant when assessing the naturalness of these groupings.
- 10.
Technical rules involve a descriptive formulation of an intentional action, which depicts the structure of a particular hypothetical imperative (Toribio 1995).
- 11.
An exhaustive characterization of this position can be found in Sandrone (2016).
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Acknowledgments
I would like to Andrés Vaccari, Fernando Broncano and Jesús Vega for their contributions to these ideas. This chapter has been written with the support of CONICET and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (FFI2009.12054; FFI2013-45659-R).
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Lawler, D. (2018). Praxeology Approaches Technology: The Ontology and Epistemology of Our Technological Practices. In: Laspra, B., López Cerezo, J. (eds) Spanish Philosophy of Technology. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 24. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71958-0_2
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