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Re-examining Modern Realist and Constructivist Concepts of World Politics

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Great Power Conduct and Credibility in World Politics

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Abstract

This chapter presents a critical re-evaluation of realist and constructivist explanations of the mechanisms underpinning world politics and great power behavior. Initially, it considers the theoretical vitality of various realist threads, and points out to their limitations in explicating irregularities in the comportment of the contemporary great powers. Next, it assesses the salience of constructivist approaches in the same venue, and pinpoints respective constraints in this analytical framework. Finally, Smolnikov elaborates on the causal relationship between the stages of great power cycle and patterns of great power behavior. His proposition goes against the well-established classical and structural realist notions of the primary motives behind great powers’ policies that respectively confine those to invariable power and security enhancement disregarding their positions in the global distribution of relative power.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 40.

  2. 2.

    Ibid., 44.

  3. 3.

    Ibid.

  4. 4.

    Ibid., 54, 56.

  5. 5.

    Alastair J. H. Murray , Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997), 33.

  6. 6.

    Mark R. Brawley , Liberal Leadership: Great Powers and their Challengers in Peace and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Mark R. Brawley, Turning Points: Decisions Shaping the Evolution of the International Political Economy (Peterborough, Ont.; Orchard Park, N.Y.: Broadview Press, 1998); Mark R. Brawley, Political Economy and Grand Strategy: A Neoclassical Realist View (London; New York: Routledge, 2010); Mark R. Brawley, The Politics of Globalization: Gaining Perspective, Assessing Consequences (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2003); Mark R. Brawley, Afterglow or Adjustment?: Domestic Institutions and Responses to Overstretch (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

  7. 7.

    Thomas J. Christensen , Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), First edition; Thomas J. Christensen, The Need to Pursue Mutual Interests in U.S.-PRC Relations (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2011); Thomas J. Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

  8. 8.

    Colin Dueck , The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015); Colin Dueck, Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010); Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006).

  9. 9.

    Benjamin O. Fordham , Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of U.S. National Security Policy, 1949–51 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Benjamin O. Fordham, “The Limits of Neoclassical Realism: Additive and Interactive Approaches to Explaining Foreign Policy Preferences,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 251–279.

  10. 10.

    Steven E. Lobell , The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003); Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, Kristen P. Williams, Steven E. Lobell, and Neal G. Jesse, eds., Beyond Great Powers and Hegemons: Why Secondary States Support, Follow or Challenge (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Security Studies/Stanford University Press, 2012).

  11. 11.

    Norrin M. Ripsman , Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield, and Norrin M. Ripsman, eds., Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000); Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy: Sanctions, Incentives and Target State Calculations (New York: Routledge, 2013); Norrin M. Ripsman and T.V. Paul, Globalization and the National Security State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

  12. 12.

    Gideon Rose , How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle: A History of American Intervention from World War I to Afghanistan (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010); James F. Hoge, Jr. & Gideon Rose, eds., Understanding the War on Terror (New York: Foreign Affairs/Council on Foreign Relations: distributed by W.W. Norton, 2005); James F. Hoge, Jr., and Gideon Rose, eds., How Did This Happen?: Terrorism and the New War (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001).

  13. 13.

    Randall L. Schweller , Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006); Randall L. Schweller, Maxwell’s Demon and the Golden Apple: Global Discord in the New Millennium (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); James W. Davis, ed., Psychology, Strategy and Conflict: Perceptions of Insecurity in International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2013).

  14. 14.

    Jennifer Sterling-Folker , Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of Anarchy: Explaining U.S. International Policy-Making After Bretton Woods (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); Jennifer Sterling-Folker, ed., Making Sense of International Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2013) 2nd edition; Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams, eds., Power in World Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007).

  15. 15.

    William C. Wohlforth , The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Cornell University Press, 1993);William C. Wohlforth and Stephen G. Brooks, World Out of Balance: International Relations Theory and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton University Press, 2008); T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, eds., Status in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, eds., International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); William C. Wohlforth and Stephen G. Brooks, America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century (Oxford University Press: July 2016).

  16. 16.

    Jeffrey W. Taliaferro , Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004); Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Steven E. Lobell, eds., The Challenge of Grand Strategy: The Great Powers and the Broken Balance Between the World Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

  17. 17.

    Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2003). 1st ed.; Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World: Release 2.0 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2011). Updated and expanded ed.; Rudyard Griffiths and Patrick Luciani, eds., Does the 21st Century Belong to China?: Kissinger and Zakaria vs. Ferguson and Li: The Munk Debate on China (Toronto: Anansi, 2011).

  18. 18.

    Jeffrey W. Taliaferro , “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security 25, no.3 (Winter, 2000–2001):135.

  19. 19.

    Norrin M. Ripsman , “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 170.

  20. 20.

    Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds., Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 6.

  21. 21.

    Mark R. Brawley , “Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Calculations: Explaining Divergent British, French, and Soviet Strategies Toward Germany Between the World Wars (1919–1939),” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 75–98.

  22. 22.

    Jennifer Sterling-Folker , “Neoclassical Realism and Identity: Peril Despite Profit Across the Taiwan Strait,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 99–138.

  23. 23.

    Colin Dueck , “Neoclassical Realism and the National Interest: Presidents, Domestic Politics, and Major Military Interventions,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 139–169.

  24. 24.

    Peter Trubowitz , Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 23.

  25. 25.

    Benjamin O. Fordham , “The Limits of Neoclassical Realism: Additive and Interactive Approaches to Explaining Foreign Policy Preferences,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 256.

  26. 26.

    Ibid., 266.

  27. 27.

    See Mark R. Brawley , Political Economy and Grand Strategy: A Neoclassical Realist View (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 139–147.

  28. 28.

    Shiping Tang , “Taking Stock of Neoclassical Realism,” International Studies Review 11, no.4 (2009):800.

  29. 29.

    See Randall L. Schweller , “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29, no.2 (Fall 2004):159–201.

  30. 30.

    Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security 24, no.2 (September 1999):6–7.

  31. 31.

    Steven E. Lobell , Norrin M. Ripsman , and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro , “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4.

  32. 32.

    For an informative account of the end of the Cold War, see Michael J. Hogan, ed., The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

  33. 33.

    Kenneth N. Waltz , “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no.1 (Summer 2000):5.

  34. 34.

    Gideon Rose , “Neo-Classical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no.1 (1999):167.

  35. 35.

    See Fareed Zakaria , From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).

  36. 36.

    Daniel Wirls, Irrational Security: The Politics of Defense from Reagan to Obama (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 11.

  37. 37.

    William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War, 2.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., 127.

  39. 39.

    Anne L. Clunan, “Why Status Matters in World Politics,” in Status in World Politics, eds. T. V. Paul, Deborah Larson, and William Wohlforth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 273–274.

  40. 40.

    The notion of national power draws on Robert Bierstedt’s concept of social power as an attribute distinguished not only from prestige, influence, dominance, and rights but also from force and authority, and defined as the synthesis of the latter two properties. See Robert Bierstedt, “An Analysis of Social Power,” American Sociological Review 15, no.6 (December 1950):730–738.

  41. 41.

    See Adler, op cit.

  42. 42.

    See Peter J. Katzenstein , Cultural Norms and National Security. Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1996).

  43. 43.

    Robert J. Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the United States Is Not Destined to Decline (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 4.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., i.

  45. 45.

    A. Wess Mitchell and Jakub Grygiel, “The Vulnerability of Peripheries,” Quoted in Lieber, 133.

  46. 46.

    Lieber, 33.

  47. 47.

    Christian Reus-Smit , American Power and World Order Themes for the 21st Century (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 6. Also see Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

  48. 48.

    See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., 367.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., 366.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., 333–334.

  52. 52.

    Karl Deutsch , The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: Free Press, 1966), 111.

  53. 53.

    Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969), 8–9. Indeed, an idea that the primary condition of social interaction is humans’ ability of try on the role of others constitutes the major proposition in Meads’ scholarship on social behaviorism. George H. Mead, edited, with introduction, by Charles W. Morris, Mind, Self & Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago press, 1934).

  54. 54.

    Ludwig Wittgenstein; translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness; with an introduction by Bertrand Russell, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (New York: Routledge, 2001).

  55. 55.

    Bourdieu, 1977:165.

  56. 56.

    See Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

  57. 57.

    R.D. Laing, The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 41–42.

  58. 58.

    Nathanael Ingelo D.D. and Fellow of Eton Coll, The Perfection, Authority, and Credibility of the Holy Scriptures. Discoursed in a Sermon before the University of Cambridge, at the Commencement, July 4. 1658. (London: Printed by E.T. for Luke Fawn, at the sign of the Parrot in Pauls Church yard., 1659. [i.e. 1658] The second edition; H.B. Wilson, The American juror: being a guide for jurymen throughout the United States: containing rules for testing the credibility of witnesses and weighing and estimating evidence, together with a system of forensic reasoning for jurors (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1868.))

  59. 59.

    William C. Wohlforth , “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 19, no.3 (December 1994):14.

  60. 60.

    See Robert Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 9.

  61. 61.

    Wendt, 228.

  62. 62.

    Wendt, 224.

  63. 63.

    Ibid.

  64. 64.

    Christopher S. Browning, Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of Finland (Peter Lang: Bern, 2008), 59.

  65. 65.

    For a discussion on constitution and cause see, for instance, Richard Ned Lebow, Constructing Cause in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 58–64.

  66. 66.

    See Alexander Wendt , “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” Review of International Studies 24, no.5 (December 1998):101–118.

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  1. Department of Politics, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

    Sergey Smolnikov

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Smolnikov, S. (2018). Re-examining Modern Realist and Constructivist Concepts of World Politics. In: Great Power Conduct and Credibility in World Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71885-9_6

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