Abstract
This chapter emphasizes the role of power measurement in impacting policymakers’ perceptions of the shifts in dyadic, regional, and global power balances, and reviews a number of traditional and unorthodox approaches to international stratification in terms of hard power. In comparing various methods of assessing and weighing US military power vis-à-vis Russia’s and China’s, the chapter stems from a premise (conceptualized in realist theories of international relations and substantiated by numerous historical cases) that probabilities of interstate military conflicts increase with radical shifts in distribution of tangible assets. As such measurements constitute an imperative prerequisite of strategic planning and affect policy decisions and the subsequent conduct of powerful states in relations with other international actors, Smolnikov seeks to examine how the social constructs of power narrative change with swings in the global allocation of tangible capabilities.
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Notes
- 1.
See the UN Charter. In fact, the whole mechanism of international security operated by the UN Security Council is based on the principle of unequal sovereignty . Institutionalized in favor of its permanent members, this principle allows them to block decisions they see detrimental to their core national interests. For an analysis of the international security utility of the Big Five’s legal exceptionalism in the UNSC, see Nico Krisch, “The Security Council and the Great Powers” in The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, eds. Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008): Ch. 5.
- 2.
See Martin Wight , with a foreword by Kenneth Robinson , “Is the Commonwealth a Non-Hobbesian Institution?” The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 16, no.2 (July 1978):119–135; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). On the ontology of the ‘world society’ concept, see Barry Buzan , From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
- 3.
Quoted in Rony Brauman, « Mission civilisatrice, ingérence humanitaire, » Le Monde diplomatique, septembre 2005, 2.
- 4.
See Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George , Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
- 5.
Great powers are not just states with large populations, strong militaries, big economies, and vast financial resources. To qualify for this status, they, along with being recognized as such worldwide, need to demonstrate self-determination in their international behavior—a quality, which the famous Italian diplomat and political writer Francesco Tommasini, for instance, identified, in the words of Antonio Gramsci , as an “ability to pursue an absolutely independent line of action which necessarily influenced all the other powers, great and small.” Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, v. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 259–260.
- 6.
Robert Gilpin , “The Rise of American Hegemony,” in Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846–1914 and the United States 1941–2001, eds. Patrick Karl O’Brien and Armand Clesse (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2002), 165–182; Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner , “Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment,” Review of International Studies 15, no.2 (April 1989):183–198; James E. Alt, Randall L. Calvert and Brian D. Humes, “Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” The American Political Science Review 82, no.2 (June 1988):445–466; Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929–39 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973); Isabelle Grunberg, “Exploring the ‘Myth’ of Hegemonic Stability,” International Organization 44, no.4 (Autumn 1990):431–477.
- 7.
See, for instance, Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002); Geoffrey Murray, China: The Next Superpower: Dilemmas in Change and Continuity (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998): Frank S. Fang, China Fever: Fascination, Fear, and the World’s Next Superpower (Berkeley, CA: Stone Bridge Press, 2007); Ted C. Fishman, China, Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World (New York; Toronto: Scribner, 2005); Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order (New York: Penguin Books, 2012). On arguments behind power transition see, for instance, Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989); Charles A. Kupchan … [et al.]; with the assistance of Jason Davidson and Mira Sucharov, Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order (Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 2001); Yildiz Atasoy, ed., Hegemonic Transitions, the State and Crisis in Neoliberal Capitalism (London; New York: Routledge, 2009). Arrighi, Giovanni and Beverly Silver, Chaos and Governance in the Modern World-System: Comparing Hegemonic Transitions (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
- 8.
Robert A. Dahl , “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science, 2, no.3 (July 1957):214.
- 9.
See Sir William Petty , Essays on Mankind and Political Arithmetic (New York: Cassell & Company, Ltd., 1888).
- 10.
See Karl Höhn, “Four Early Attempts to Develop Power Formulas (1741−1955),” Stosunki Międzynarodowe–International Relations 44, no.3–4 (2011):305–317.
- 11.
Johann Peter Süssmilch, Die göttliche Ordnung in den Veränderungen des menschlichen Geschlechts aus der Geburt, dem Tode und der Fortpflanzung desselben (Berlin: J. C. Spener, 1741).
- 12.
The list compiled by Karl Höhn. Powermetrics Information Network. Available at: http://powermetrics.bplaced.net/literature/
- 13.
See, for instance, Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray , “Net Assessment I in the 1930s,” Mershon Center Defense Supply Service, Washington, D.C., 20310-5220.
- 14.
“Secretary General’s Monthly Press Conference and Launch of the Annual Report for 2012, Opening Remarks and Q&A,” January 31, 2013. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_94269.htm?selectedLocale=en
- 15.
Ibid.
- 16.
Raymond Aron , Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, with a new introduction by Daniel J. Mahoney and Brian C. Anderson (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 48, 52–57.
- 17.
See P.K. Singh, Y.K. Gera, Sandeep Dewan (eds.), Comprehensive National Power: A Model for India (New Delhi: United Service Institution of India: Vij Books India, 2013).
- 18.
“The NATO Defence Planning Process.” Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm?selectedLocale=en
- 19.
See P.G. Kuznecov, Sistema priroda—obshhestvo—chelovek: Ustojchivoe razvitie / O.L. Kuznecov, P.G. Kuznecov, B.E. Bol’shakov. (Dubna: Mezhdunarodnyj universitet prirody, obshhestva i cheloveka “Dubna,” 2000).
- 20.
The National Material Capabilities data set; Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965.” in Peace, War, and Numbers, ed. Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19–48; J. David Singer, “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985” International Interactions 14, no.2 (May 1988):115–132; Composite Index of National Capability (CINC ) index Version 4.0.
- 21.
Henry J. Kenny, “Vietnamese Perception of the 1979 War with China,” in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, eds. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 232.
- 22.
See A.W. Marshall, “Problems of Estimating Military Power,” P-3417 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, August 1966).
- 23.
See Talbot C. Imlay, Facing the Second World War: Strategy, Politics, and Economics in Britain and France, 1938–1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 80; Glyn Stone, “From Entente to Alliance: Anglo-French Relations, 1935–1939” in Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation, eds. Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (London: Routledge, 2000), 193.
- 24.
See Niall Ferguson , The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West (New York: Penguin, 2006), 361–380.
- 25.
See Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard, 2000), 12.
- 26.
Sebastian Cox, “Chapter 5: British Military Planning and the Origins of the Second World War,” in Military Planning and the Origins of the Second World War in Europe, eds. B.J.C. McKercher and Roch Legault (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 107.
- 27.
Ted Robert Gurr, “The Political Dimension of National Capabilities: Concepts and Measurement Pages,” International Interactions 14, no.2 (May 1988):133–139.
- 28.
David Singer, “Reconstructing the Correlates of War…”:117.
- 29.
Ibid. The Theory of Power Credibility conceives credibility as a fungible resource. There is, however, no consensus among IR theorists on the issue of power fungibility . Realist s, such as Kenneth Waltz, assume that power, in principle, is fungible, even though international actors may vary in their ability to convert their tangible resources into influence so that “[p]ower may be only slightly fungible for weak states, but it is highly so for strong ones.” Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 333. Joseph Nye’s and Robert Keohane ’s theory of “complex interdependence ” suggests that it is military force that cannot be transferred to other forms of power “across issue-areas” (Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 197.) David Baldwin argues that political resources are poorly fungible, yet appears to consider such properties as “information, and a reputation for making credible threats or promises to rank generally high” in a hypothetical list of fungible power resources. David A. Baldwin , “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics 31, no.2 (January 1979):165–166. Stefano Guzzini , while looking at the fungibility dilemma from a constructivist perspective, proposes moving away from indeterminacy of realist interpretation of power by putting power in interpretivist and communicative context. See Stefano Guzzini, Power, Realism and Constructivism (London; New York: Routledge, 2013). Wolf Hassdorf , drawing to Bourdieu’s notion of “symbolic capital ,” suggests examining the issue of power fungibility along similar lines. See Wolf Hassdorf, “Contested Credibility: The Use of Symbolic Power in British Exchange-Rate” in Power in World Politics, eds. Felix. Berenskoetter and Michael Williams, (New York Routledge, 2007), 141–161. Additionally, for discussions on fungibility of power in world politics, see Robert J. Art, “Force and Fungibility Reconsidered,” Security Studies 8, no.4 (June 1999):183–189, and David A. Baldwin , “Force, Fungibility, and Influence,” Security Studies 8, no.4 (June 1999):173–183.
- 30.
See David Singer, “Reconstructing the Correlates of War…,” 22.
- 31.
“The supreme importance of the military instrument,” wrote Carr, “lies in the fact that the ultima ratio of power in international relations is war.” Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty-Years’ Crisis 1919–1939: Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan & Co., 1946), 109.
- 32.
George Modelski and William R. Thompson , Seapower and Global Politics, 1494–1993 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988).
- 33.
A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1903) 12th ed.
- 34.
George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Seapower and Global Politics, 16–17.
- 35.
See Dakota L. Wood (ed.), 2017 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense (The Heritage Foundation: Washington, D.C., 2016).
- 36.
See Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons—The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” in Primacy and Its Discontents: American Power and International Stability, eds. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2008).
- 37.
See Barry Posen , “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28, no.1 (Summer 2003):5–46.
- 38.
On the ascending scale of 1 to 5 the report assessed threats to US vital security interests emanating from North Korea at 5 (severe); Russia , China, and terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan at 4 (high); Iran and terrorism in the Middle East at 3 (elevated); North Korea’s behavior at 5 (hostile); and the rest of the group at 4 (aggressive). In terms of capabilities, Russia, China, North Korea, and terrorist groupings in Afghanistan and Pakistan scored 4 (gathering), while Iran and Middle East terrorist organizations received 2 points (aspirational). The aggregated level of threat to the United States in 2015 was assessed as “elevated.” Dakota L. Wood (ed.), 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2015), 10–11.
- 39.
Ibid., xiii.
- 40.
William Inboden, “The Role of a Strong National Defense” in Dakota L. Wood (ed.), 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength, 15.
- 41.
Quoted in Leo Shane III and Andrew Tilghman, “Trump’s Military Will Have More Troops and More Firepower—If He Can Find More Money,” Military Times, November 20, 2016. Available at: http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/donald-trump-military-spending
- 42.
Quoted in John Hayward “John Bolton: ‘Much Stronger U.S.-U.K. Relationship’ Will Emerge from Brexit and Trump’s Election,” Breitbart News Daily, November 10, 2016. Available at: http://www.breitbart.com/radio/2016/11/10/bolton-much-stronger-u-s-u-k-relationship-emerge-brexit-trumps-election/
- 43.
See Charles Tiefer, “President Trump Is Likely to Boost U.S. Military Spending By $500 Billion To $1 Trillion,” Forbes, November 9, 2016. Available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/charlestiefer/2016/11/09/president-trump-is-likely-to-boost-u-s-military-spending-by-500-billion-to-1-trillion/#13b003d74108
- 44.
George Kennan , “Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall” [“Long Telegram”], February 22, 1946. Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers.
- 45.
See Dmitry Bykov, “Voennye Normativy” (“Military Standards”), Kommersant -Sankt-Peterburg, June 29, 2015. Available at: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2757166
- 46.
See Julian Cooper, “Russia ’s State Armament Programme to 2020: A Quantitative Assessment of Implementation 2011–2015,” FOI-R--4239—SE, March 2016, DOI:10.13140/RG.2.1.3859.3685
- 47.
“The Effects of Finland’s Possible NATO Membership: An Assessment,” March 29, 2016, 53. Available at: http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=157408&GUID={71D08E6C-3168-439F-9C31-0326D1014C26}
- 48.
Dave Majumdar, “The Russian Navy Report You Missed (But Need to Read, Now),” The National Interest, December 17, 2015.
- 49.
Quoted in Dan Lamothe, “Russia is Greatest Threat to the U.S., Says Joint Chiefs Chairman Nominee Gen. Joseph Dunford,” The Washington Post, July 9, 2015. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/07/09/russia-is-greatest-threat-to-the-u-s-says-joint-chiefs-chairman-nominee-gen-joseph-dunford/?utm_term=.58c082f86000
- 50.
Quoted in Andrea Shalal, “U.S. Reshaping Budget to Account for Russian Military Threat,” Reuters, December 4, 2016. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-russia-idUSKBN13U0CX
- 51.
See Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, “Russians ‘Closed the Gap’ For A2/AD: Air Force Gen. Gorenc,” Breaking Defense, September 14, 2015. Available at: http://breakingdefense.com/2015/09/russians-closed-the-gap-for-a2ad-air-force-gen-gorenc/
- 52.
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Remarks by President Obama and Chancellor Merkel of Germany in a Joint Press Conference,” German Chancellery, Berlin, Germany, November 17, 2016. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/11/17/remarks-president-obama-and-chancellor-merkel-germany-joint-press
- 53.
Deborah Haynes, “Russia Has Edge over us in Battle, Army Admits,” The Times, August 10, 2016. Available at: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/russia-has-edge-over-us-in-battle-army-admits-tsl7j63f5
- 54.
See Ogonek (Kommersant), “Voennaja nagruzka stala tormozom” (“Military load became a break”), Ogonek 41 (October 17, 2016):14. Available at: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3114479
- 55.
See Global Firepower Index (GFP). Available at: http://www.globalfirepower.com
- 56.
For instance, a Pentagon report to the US Congress, in assessing trends evolving in the PLA’s relative capabilities, warns that “China’s military modernization has the potential to reduce core U.S. military technological advantages.” “Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015” (Washington: Department of Defense, 2015), i. One can further refer to the RAND corporation’s “scorecards” report that evaluates the unfolding trends in Sino-American dyadic hard power equation. The report argues that in 1996–2017 China has substantially improved her capability to attack US air bases, conduct anti-surface warfare, and project her air force in the areas adjacent to the mainland. The evolving shifts in favor of China assumingly present serious challenges for the United States with respect to possible war scenarios in case of conflicts over Taiwan and Spratly Islands. See Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2015).
- 57.
See Zhimin Chen, “China’s Power form a Chinese Perspective(II): Back to the Center Stage” in Assessing China’s Power, ed. Jae Ho Chung (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 279, 284.
- 58.
Xi Jinping made this statement at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on October 18, 2017. See “Highlights of Xi’s Report to 19th CPC National Congress,” available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com
- 59.
These objectives should be considered in the context of Chinese leaders’ desire to turn their country into “a global leader in terms of comprehensive national strength and international influence” by mid-century. Quoted in Ting Shi, “Xi Plans to Turn China into a Leading Global Power by 2050,” Bloomberg, October 18, 2017. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com
- 60.
Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2000), 221.
- 61.
As of 2014. CNP is presented in Li Shenming, Zhang Yushan, eds., Annual Report on International Politics and Security 2015 (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2015), which contains a chapter analyzing power distribution among and influence by the world’s strongest nations. Its author, Yang Yuan, argues that “the situation of ‘one superpower and multi great powers’ has yet to be fundamentally changed, and that the United States is still the undisputed ‘sole superpower’ in the world.” He believes that “[w]hether the international structure will be changed from ‘unipolarity’ to ‘bipolarity’ in the future will depend on China.”
- 62.
P. K. Singh, Y. K. Gera, and Sandeep Dewan, eds., Comprehensive National Power: A Model for India, United Service Institution of India (New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt. Ltd., 2013), 55.
- 63.
Ibid., 56.
- 64.
See Satish Kumar, Kanwal Sibal, S.D. Pradhan, et al., “National Power Index 2012,” New Delhi: Foundation for National Security Research (December 2012).
- 65.
See Stephen Walt , The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
- 66.
The data operationalizes defense pacts, that is bilateral or multilateral agreements obliging major power to intervene militarily if a treaty member is attacked by a third party. See David J. Singer, and Melvin Small, “Formal Alliances, 1815–1939: A Quantitative Description,” Journal of Peace Research 3, no.1 (January 1966):5.
- 67.
For details, see Lyle J. Goldstein, “Does China Need Allies?” The National Interest, March 31, 2016. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/does-china-need-allies-15634
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Smolnikov, S. (2018). Operationalization of Power. In: Great Power Conduct and Credibility in World Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71885-9_2
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