Characteristics of Contraction of Economic Agents in the Framework of Bankruptcy Institute
In modern conditions, bankruptcy institute is intended to preserve the balance of interests of the state and business, to regulate contractions between economic agents. At the same time, parties interacting within bankruptcy institute (a principal of an enterprise in default, shareholders, creditors, employees) have opposite interests, which lead to conflicts among them. In return, conflicts of interest have a big influence on the choice of the priority mechanism for solving the current crisis situation. The article studies the characteristics of economic agents in the situation of insolvency depending on targets and available information. It specifies the impact of identified conflict of interest based on the desire to obtain distributive advantages and the choice of a mechanism for resolving the current crisis situation: preference for rehabilitation or liquidation procedures.
KeywordsBankruptcy institute Agency relationship Conflict of interests Shareholders Creditors
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