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Banking Regulation and Supervision in the USA

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Raising Capital or Improving Risk Management and Efficiency?

Abstract

This chapter aims at analysing the financial regulation and supervision applied by US authorities, pointing out the key features as well the main tools used for examining the safety of banks. In particular, attention focuses on CAMELS ratings; this acronym refers to the six components of a bank’s condition that are assessed: capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk.

Recently the relevance of an overall assessment of the banks pushed the European supervisors towards an extension of the analysis of bank situations, in order to include not only the capital adequacy but also additional aspects, such as the business model, governance and risk management, risks to capital and to liquidity, and funding. It would appear, in other words, that the new rational of the European supervisory review and evaluation process is moving towards a model similar to CAMELS.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy

    Paola Ferretti

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  1. Paola Ferretti
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy

    Fabiano Colombini

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Ferretti, P. (2018). Banking Regulation and Supervision in the USA. In: Colombini, F. (eds) Raising Capital or Improving Risk Management and Efficiency?. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71749-4_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71749-4_10

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-71748-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-71749-4

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

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