Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Several Masked Implementations of the Boyar-Peralta AES S-Box

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Book cover Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2017 (INDOCRYPT 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10698))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Threshold implementation is a masking technique that provides provable security for implementations of cryptographic algorithms against power analysis attacks. In recent publications, several different threshold implementations of AES have been designed. However in most of the threshold implementations of AES, the Canright S-Box has been used. The Boyar-Peralta S-Box is an alternative implementation of the AES S-Box with a minimal circuit depth and is comparable in size to the frequently used Canright AES S-Box. In this paper, we present several versions of first-order threshold implementations of the Boyar-Peralta AES S-Box with different number of shares and several trade-offs in area, randomness and speed. To the best of our knowledge these are the first threshold implementations of the Boyar-Peralta S-Box. Our implementations compare favourably with some of the existing threshold implementations of Canright S-Box along the design trade-offs, e.g. while one of our S-Boxes is 49% larger in area than the smallest known threshold implementation of the Canright AES S-Box, it uses 63% less randomness and requires only 50% of the clock cycles. We provide results of a practical security evaluation based on real power traces to confirm the first-order attack resistance of our implementations.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Becker, G., Cooper, J., DeMulder, E., Goodwill, G., Jaffe, J., Kenworthy, G., Kouzminov, T., Leiserson, A., Marson, M., Rohatgi, P., et al.: Test vector leakage assessment (TVLA) methodology in practice. In: International Cryptographic Module Conference, vol. 1001, p. 13 (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Bilgin, B.: Threshold implementations: as countermeasure against higher-order differential power analysis (2015)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Bilgin, B., Daemen, J., Nikov, V., Nikova, S., Rijmen, V., Van Assche, G.: Efficient and first-order DPA resistant implementations of Keccak. In: Francillon, A., Rohatgi, P. (eds.) CARDIS 2013. LNCS, vol. 8419, pp. 187–199. Springer, Cham (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08302-5_13

    Google Scholar 

  4. Bilgin, B., Gierlichs, B., Nikova, S., Nikov, V., Rijmen, V.: Higher-order threshold implementations. In: Sarkar, P., Iwata, T. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2014. LNCS, vol. 8874, pp. 326–343. Springer, Heidelberg (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45608-8_18

    Google Scholar 

  5. Bilgin, B., Gierlichs, B., Nikova, S., Nikov, V., Rijmen, V.: A more efficient AES threshold implementation. In: Pointcheval, D., Vergnaud, D. (eds.) AFRICACRYPT 2014. LNCS, vol. 8469, pp. 267–284. Springer, Cham (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06734-6_17

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Bilgin, B., Gierlichs, B., Nikova, S., Nikov, V., Rijmen, V.: Trade-offs for threshold implementations illustrated on AES. IEEE Trans. Comput. Aided Des. Integr. Circ. Syst. 34(7), 1188–1200 (2015)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  7. Bilgin, B., Nikova, S., Nikov, V., Rijmen, V., Stütz, G.: Threshold implementations of all 3 \(\times \) 3 and 4 \(\times \) 4 S-boxes. In: Prouff, E., Schaumont, P. (eds.) CHES 2012. LNCS, vol. 7428, pp. 76–91. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_5

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  8. Boyar, J., Peralta, R.: A small depth-16 circuit for the AES S-box. In: Gritzalis, D., Furnell, S., Theoharidou, M. (eds.) SEC 2012. IAICT, vol. 376, pp. 287–298. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30436-1_24

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  9. Canright, D.: A very compact S-box for AES. In: Rao, J.R., Sunar, B. (eds.) CHES 2005. LNCS, vol. 3659, pp. 441–455. Springer, Heidelberg (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/11545262_32

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Chari, S., Jutla, C.S., Rao, J.R., Rohatgi, P.: Towards sound approaches to counteract power-analysis attacks. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 398–412. Springer, Heidelberg (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48405-1_26

  11. Coron, J.S., Naccache, D., Kocher, P.: Statistics and secret leakage. ACM Tran. Embed. Comput. Syst. (TECS) 3(3), 492–508 (2004)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  12. Coron, J.-S., Kocher, P., Naccache, D.: Statistics and secret leakage. In: Frankel, Y. (ed.) FC 2000. LNCS, vol. 1962, pp. 157–173. Springer, Heidelberg (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45472-1_12

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. De Cnudde, T., Bilgin, B., Gierlichs, B., Nikov, V., Nikova, S., Rijmen, V.: Does coupling affect the security of masked implementations? In: Guilley, S. (ed.) COSADE 2017. LNCS, vol. 10348, pp. 1–18. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64647-3_1

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  14. De Cnudde, T., Bilgin, B., Reparaz, O., Nikov, V., Nikova, S.: Higher-order threshold implementation of the AES S-box. In: Homma, N., Medwed, M. (eds.) CARDIS 2015. LNCS, vol. 9514, pp. 259–272. Springer, Cham (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31271-2_16

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  15. De Cnudde, T., Reparaz, O., Bilgin, B., Nikova, S., Nikov, V., Rijmen, V.: Masking AES with \(d+1\) shares in hardware. In: Gierlichs, B., Poschmann, A.Y. (eds.) CHES 2016. LNCS, vol. 9813, pp. 194–212. Springer, Heidelberg (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53140-2_10

    Google Scholar 

  16. Gandolfi, K., Mourtel, C., Olivier, F.: Electromagnetic analysis: concrete results. In: Koç, Ç.K., Naccache, D., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2001. LNCS, vol. 2162, pp. 251–261. Springer, Heidelberg (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44709-1_21

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  17. Gilbert Goodwill, B.J., Jaffe, J., Rohatgi, P., et al.: A testing methodology for side-channel resistance validation. In: NIST Non-invasive Attack Testing Workshop (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Goubin, L., Patarin, J.: DES and differential power analysis the “Duplication” method. In: Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 1999. LNCS, vol. 1717, pp. 158–172. Springer, Heidelberg (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48059-5_15

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  19. Goudarzi, D., Rivain, M.: How fast can higher-order masking be in software? In: Coron, J.-S., Nielsen, J.B. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2017. LNCS, vol. 10210, pp. 567–597. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56620-7_20

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  20. Gross, H., Mangard, S., Korak, T.: Domain-oriented masking: Compact masked hardware implementations with arbitrary protection order. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2016/486 (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  21. Ishai, Y., Sahai, A., Wagner, D.: Private circuits: securing hardware against probing attacks. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 463–481. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_27

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  22. Journault, A., Standaert, F.-X.: Very high order masking: efficient implementation and security evaluation. In: Fischer, W., Homma, N. (eds.) CHES 2017. LNCS, vol. 10529, pp. 623–643. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_30

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  23. Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential power analysis. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 388–397. Springer, Heidelberg (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48405-1_25

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  24. Kocher, P.C.: Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In: Koblitz, N. (ed.) CRYPTO 1996. LNCS, vol. 1109, pp. 104–113. Springer, Heidelberg (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9

    Google Scholar 

  25. Mangard, S., Pramstaller, N., Oswald, E.: Successfully attacking masked AES hardware implementations. In: Rao, J.R., Sunar, B. (eds.) CHES 2005. LNCS, vol. 3659, pp. 157–171. Springer, Heidelberg (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/11545262_12

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  26. Moradi, A., Poschmann, A., Ling, S., Paar, C., Wang, H.: Pushing the limits: a very compact and a threshold implementation of AES. In: Paterson, K.G. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2011. LNCS, vol. 6632, pp. 69–88. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20465-4_6

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  27. Nikova, S., Rechberger, C., Rijmen, V.: Threshold implementations against side-channel attacks and glitches. In: Ning, P., Qing, S., Li, N. (eds.) ICICS 2006. LNCS, vol. 4307, pp. 529–545. Springer, Heidelberg (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/11935308_38

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  28. Poschmann, A., Moradi, A., Khoo, K., Lim, C.-W., Wang, H., Ling, S.: Side-channel resistant crypto for less than 2, 300 GE. J. Cryptol. 24(2), 322–345 (2011)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  29. Prouff, E., Rivain, M.: Masking against side-channel attacks: a formal security proof. In: Johansson, T., Nguyen, P.Q. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2013. LNCS, vol. 7881, pp. 142–159. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38348-9_9

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  30. Reparaz, O., Bilgin, B., Nikova, S., Gierlichs, B., Verbauwhede, I.: Consolidating masking schemes. In: Gennaro, R., Robshaw, M. (eds.) CRYPTO 2015. LNCS, vol. 9215, pp. 764–783. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_37

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Prof. Vincent Rijmen for his valuable comments and feedback on the paper and the anonymous reviewers for providing constructive and valuable comments. This work was supported in part by NIST with the research grant 60NANB15D34, in part by the Research Council KU Leuven, OT/13/071 and by the Flemish Government through FWO project Cryptography secured against side-channel attacks by tailored implementations enabled by future technologies (G0842.13). Ashrujit Ghoshal was a Visiting Scholar at ESAT-COSIC, KU Leuven hosted by Prof. Vincent Rijmen. Thomas De Cnudde is funded by a research grant of the Institute for the Promotion of Innovation through Science and Technology in Flanders (IWT-Vlaanderen).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, Kharagpur, India

    Ashrujit Ghoshal

  2. ESAT-COSIC and imec, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Thomas De Cnudde

Authors
  1. Ashrujit Ghoshal
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Thomas De Cnudde
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ashrujit Ghoshal .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bengaluru, India

    Arpita Patra

  2. Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom

    Nigel P. Smart

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Ghoshal, A., De Cnudde, T. (2017). Several Masked Implementations of the Boyar-Peralta AES S-Box. In: Patra, A., Smart, N. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2017. INDOCRYPT 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10698. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71667-1_20

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71667-1_20

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-71666-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-71667-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation