Abstract
The final chapter looks at some new developments that could potentially transform PMOs in the future, namely the rise of warlord enterprises, the growing importance of cyber warfare as a form of proxy warfare, and the new technology of ‘smart weapons.’ It is argued that the U.S. government has inadvertently contributed to a ‘durable disorder’ in many parts of the world, which makes proxy warfare both more viable as well as less consequential. Cyber warfare is becoming a form of proxy warfare since autonomous hacker groups and activists are needed for deniability and for getting access to a target society in an increasingly balkanized Internet. Smart weapons can change the dynamics of proxy wars and mitigate their consequences by enabling sponsors to exercise greater control over proxies.
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Notes
- 1.
The only notable exception might be the French support to the American revolutionaries in the War of Independence. However, since France was an absolutist monarchy motivated merely by the idea of harming its geostrategic rival Britain, the outcome of the creation of an American Republic was more of an unintended consequence. The American Revolution likely inspired the French Revolution, which ended the very government that had supported the Continental Army.
- 2.
‘Ungoverned spaces’ are not really ungoverned since they tend to be controlled by nonstate actors, who can impose their rules on respective populations. These are merely territories beyond the effective control of a government. The CIA had identified over 50 ungoverned spaces in the early 2000s and had warned that they provide safe havens to terrorist groups.
- 3.
Since the 1990s the Russian mafia has operated in the guise of private security companies. Warlords are now offering security services in conflict zones to governments, NGOs, and companies. McFate argued: ‘The US outsourcing of security has normalized the market for force, inspiring warlords and other conflict entrepreneurs to start their own PMCs.’ See McFate 2014, 156.
- 4.
Sean McFate pointed out, ‘[i]n Afghanistan , 18,867 individuals worked for PMCs, of these, only 197 were US citizens. Similarly, in Iraq , only 1,017 of the 11,628 contractors were Americans.’ See McFate 2014, 150–151. McFate argues that the employment of foreign and indigenous fighters is mostly motivated by achieving cost savings for the PMCs as salaries are the main overhead for these companies. Foreign and indigenous personnel is cheaper and enables a PMC to have a higher profit margin and to make more competitive bids for contracts.
- 5.
The US has systematically collected biometrics in Iraq and Afghanistan to identify insurgents. Unfortunately, there is little information as to how successful this single measure was in terms of reducing violence.
- 6.
Thomas Rid has suggested that ‘cyberwar will not take place’ in the sense of cyber warfare being used as the sole mode of attack. Instead, Rid considers that activities usually associated with cyber warfare , namely cyber espionage, cyber sabotage, and cyber subversion, should not be considered war or warfare. See Rid 2011.
- 7.
A former leader of Nashi later confirmed that the group was responsible for the cyber attack and did so on behalf of the Russian government. See Shachtman 2009.
- 8.
Several governments have created ‘troll armies’ to engage the enemy in the field of social media and thereby shape perceptions of a conflict in a deniable way that is also more credible with foreign audiences since trolls only seem to represent the ‘average joe.’
- 9.
An article in the New York Times by Mark Landler made the case that the Obama administration was actively seeking political change in the Middle East prior the Arab Spring . President Obama ordered the production of classified report on the future of the region. The report, known as Presidential Study Directive, ‘identified likely flashpoints, most notably Egypt, and solicited proposals for how the administration could push for political change in countries with autocratic rulers who are also valuable allies of the United States, these officials said…Leon E. Panetta , acknowledged in testimony before Congress, needed to better identify “triggers” for uprisings in countries like Egypt.’ See Landler 2011.
- 10.
It is an interesting phenomenon that social media content is now used by the mainstream media as ‘authentic’ or fact with little effort made to test or determine their authenticity. There are many examples that are relevant here such as the reporting on Syria, ISIS, or the conflict in Ukraine .
- 11.
The US has primarily used drones against nonstate actors with no or little air defense capability in places like Afghanistan , Iraq , Somalia , Yemen , and the tribal regions of Pakistan .
- 12.
The Libyan rebels acquired an Aeryon Scout drone from a Canadian company for $100,000, which was used for reconnaissance missions. Similarly, Iran transferred reconnaissance drones to Hezbollah, which were used over Israel and in Syria .
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Krishnan, A. (2018). New Developments. In: Why Paramilitary Operations Fail. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71631-2_10
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