Abstract
This chapter updates a previous contribution by the same title published in the 2003 edition of the present Handbook. It first defines the conceptual dimensions of the post-modern paradigm—hypermodernism, antimodernism, post-historicism and anti-humanist naturalism—in order to assess their relevance for the analysis of contemporary military institutions. It then compares the 1990–2001 and 2001–2015 time frames to evaluate the degree of continuity and change noted in a number of trends as regards the overall strategic context, military organization, martial action, the resources placed at their disposal, as well as societal trends and civil-military relations. It finds that technological hypermodernism and its attendant paradoxes are alive and well, as predicted by post-modernists. But the post-9/11 era has done away with the uncertainty that prevailed in the 1990s as to the ends of military action, and security has at least partly resumed its age-old military meaning. Likewise, the antimodern dimension that came out so strongly between 1990 and 2001 has since been mitigated by the call for a reinstatement of some sovereign powers of the State—even though the place of the military as a tribe among tribes and the deterioration of soldier-statesman relations continue to point in a post-modernist direction. The post-historicist tendencies at work in the 1990s have persisted, and even been reinforced by the “counter-revolution in military affairs” that Afghanistan and Iraq produced, as well as by pastiches of “pre-modern” forms. Finally, the anti-humanist naturalism in evidence during the first decade into the post-Cold War era has been considerably softened, if not erased, since 2001. The general conclusion offered in the 2003 edition remains unchanged: while the post-modern paradigm has pragmatic value in providing new insights and drawing attention to aspects that might have passed unnoticed without it, its metaphysically charged meta-theoretical assumptions are unnecessary.
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Notes
- 1.
Early use of the term “post-modern” in the military field was by American authors: see Moskos, in Kuhlmann and Dandeker (1992), Moskos & Burk, in Burk (1994). For more recent American assessments making it the main tool of analysis, see Moskos et al. (2000). For a dissenting opinion, see Booth et al. (2001). Yet, the term later caught on in Europe, as evidenced in the rather large share of European contributions to the above-mentioned edited volumes, and elsewhere in separate pieces, notably by Italian sociologists. But while some authors embraced it enthusiastically, others used it much more cautiously. See Footnote 8.
- 2.
Aron (1969).
- 3.
Forsé (1989). Applying an “entropic” paradigm to the study of large social entities over long periods, the author shows that the most stable social structure, to which social processes tend spontaneously, is a pyramid characterized by an inverse exponential profile, in which relative inequality is constant. When the system is closed and material or symbolic resources are scarce, such a pyramid has a narrow base and tapers to a considerable height, betraying a high concentration of power, riches or prestige; when they are in abundance, differentials decrease, producing a pyramid that is broader-based and flatter. Opening the system, as is the case today with globalization processes, introduces a measure of negative entropy, thereby (temporarily) increasing differentials.
- 4.
Thereby fulfilling the “fundamental democratization” prophecy formulated by Mannheim (1940).
- 5.
Cf. the works of Granet et al. (1995).
- 6.
Taylor (1989).
- 7.
See Giddens (1991, p. 9).
- 8.
Not every author, of course, accepts the term and agrees with the view of history it conveys. Some, like Anthony Giddens, while they see much the same trends developing, argue that the present stage cannot in any meaningful sense be regarded as being beyond modernity, and prefer the phrase “radical modernity” because it emphasizes continuity rather than discontinuity. Sharing that view, a number of French authors now use the word “surmodernité” to the same effect. The present writer agrees with that fundamental assessment: despite his skepticism, his use of “post-modern” here is value-neutral.
- 9.
The list of such authors, from Jean-François Lyotard (who coined the phrase in the late 1970s) and Richard Rorty onward, is long, and the concept has been applied to a huge number of fields. The synthesis presented here seeks to locate its central dimensions: the elements on which leading proponents agree explicitly or implicitly, and the way commentators and critics see them.
- 10.
Touraine (1992).
- 11.
Touraine, op.cit.
- 12.
Moscovici (1988).
- 13.
Fleckenstein (2000).
- 14.
- 15.
This is not to say, however, that Western militaries were left entirely without other missions to perform: quite the contrary. Deterrence of nuclear war remained, albeit in the background. So did the capability to fight conventional wars of varying magnitude and to project rapid reaction forces in bids to prevent local conflicts from destabilizing an increasingly interdependent world. Verification of arms control accords, containment of nuclear proliferation and drug trafficking, aid to civil authorities, at home and abroad, in cases of natural or man-made disasters, infrastructure support, to name but a few, also figured in the possible roles of latter-day military organizations.
- 16.
The lesson was that if human resource quality is high, training suitable, and doctrine flexible enough, it will make for adaptability; if not, military institutions will become blunt, unresponsive instruments, and schizophrenic soldiers the norm. The latter is especially the case in view of the possibility now offered by satellite technology to soldiers on overseas theaters of operations to communicate with their families back home. Interference between family and military groups with strong claims on the attention and loyalty of service members may disturb the classical sources of motivation and primary cohesion among soldiers. The subject had come to the attention of commanders during the Gulf War: it was raised in the memoirs of Gen. Schwartzkopf and of (French Army) Gen. Maurice Schmitt, former chief of the Defense staff.
- 17.
As witnessed by a series of referendums in Switzerland (or the cool reception reserved for its “Army 95” plan), the fact that the prescriptions (though not the analysis) of the 1994 Defense White Paper in France, deemed too cautious, were all but abandoned after 1995, the debate that raged around the Bett Report in Britain, or the hesitant German compromise between the old continental mobilization and the new expeditionary force concepts.
- 18.
This was the case in Britain with the “Options for Change” debate from 1990–91 onward. See Dandeker (1996).
- 19.
Cf. Snow (1991), Toffler and Toffler (1993). The then most recent technological breakthroughs were in the fields of computers, miniaturization, information technology, telecommunications, artificial intelligence, specialty materials, avionics and airframes, precision weaponry, computer-aided design and manufacturing, biotechnology, catalysis and other chemical processes.
- 20.
- 21.
Janowitz (1960).
- 22.
The revolutionary potential of such technological developments was also perceived by critics, notably among “socially responsible” peace activists: see, for instance, Gray (1997).
- 23.
Boëne (1990).
- 24.
This “law” was named after Norman Augustine, a leading figure in American defense industry and government circles who first drew attention, in the mid-1970s, to downward trends in the armament inventories of high-tech armed forces. He foresaw that, if allowed to go unchecked, such trends would leave the US Air Force by the year 2016 with but one aircraft, so sophisticated, versatile and costly that it would by itself exhaust its entire equipment budget.
- 25.
When the call came for junior officers to reinforce Army units’ cadre assets in the Saudi desert as part of the French contribution to the Gulf War, some battalion commanders were reported to have spontaneously refrained from designating their Saint-Cyr graduates (supposedly the best the officer corps has to offer), on the grounds that their very expensive training made them too precious to be wasted in what they regarded as a side-show…
- 26.
Technology, over the long term, has increased the destructive power of weapons to such an extent that it limits the rational uses of armed force in the cause of national interests, as well as its legitimacy among populations who, from Verdun and the Somme onward, even more so after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, have had every reason to fear a great war. Once the threshold of instant mass-destruction capabilities was crossed, as Janowitz observed, military organizations became “constabulary forces” seeking viable international relations rather than strategic victory, and applying, where possible, the minimum degree of coercion to achieve the limited effects intended by their political masters. The post-Cold War era may have removed the structural conditions for a major confrontation (at least for a decade or two), it has abolished neither the sources of local or regional conflict, nor the western attitudes toward war that are the end-product of a century-long learning curve.
- 27.
See also Chap. X in this volume, “The Sociology of the Military and Asymmetric Warfare”.
- 28.
Singer (2009).
- 29.
- 30.
Yakovleff (2012).
- 31.
This classically comprised a common culture spread through highly normative socialization turning individuals into citizens, an internal market whose size and homogeneity made economies of scale and mass-production possible, and collective political purpose implemented by bureaucratic machinery, of which a mass armed force, geared to the defense of national territory and international status, formed an essential part. Citizenship implied political participation (rights) as well as conscript military service (obligations). The latter, made necessary by the huge manpower requirements of total war, was the condition of the former.
- 32.
- 33.
The list of such new formations included Eurocorps (France, Belgium, Spain, Germany, Luxemburg), soon to be transformed into a European Rapid Reaction Force, Eurofor (Italy, France, Spain, Portugal), Euromarfor (ad hoc composition), German-Dutch Corps, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, European Air Group, European Satellite Center, EU Military Headquarters. The same applied to defense industries, downsized and (though to a lesser extent) restructured along European lines in the 1990s.
- 34.
Fleckenstein, op.cit.; Klein, in Boëne and Dandeker (1998).
- 35.
The only major intervention of that kind in which a European power decided to go it alone was the commitment of French troops to Rwanda following the genocide which took place there in 1994. The main reason was that other European nations initially refused to participate.
- 36.
Thus, Somalia placed an Italian general in a position to arbitrate between orders from Rome and from New York; Bosnia saw a British general publicly defend UN action there against attacks from conservative US politicians, a French general ignore or openly defy the UN secretary-general’s authority, French and British officers assume positions in Sarajevo that differed from the official stance of their respective ministers of Defense within NATO (“Who's in Charge in Bosnia? NATO and UN Fight it Out”, International Herald Tribune, 3 October 1994); in 1996, a French general was recalled to Paris after he had openly doubted the applicability of the Dayton accords…
- 37.
Van der Meulen, in Boëne et al. (2000).
- 38.
Congruence between peace support or humanitarian missions and dominant (individualist) values in civilian society is no doubt part of the interpretation. Yet, it was not the sole factor: with the draft gone, military action (as Martin Shaw remarked) became a spectator sport. In addition, a slow, little-noticed rise in the valuing of order in the public sphere since the mid-1980s may have played a part: how else can one account for the fact that the police, which does not take much part in peace support operations overseas, also achieves high approval ratings?
- 39.
See the chapters on Germany, Switzerland and France in Moskos et al. (2000), op.cit.; also, Boëne and Dandeker (1998), op.cit. A November 2000 Eurobarometer survey squarely placed the military as the most trusted public institution in the EU at large. Approval ratings are in the 70–90% range, which represented a substantial increase over three decades in most Western countries.
- 40.
At the time of writing the original chapter, a ruling by the German constitutional court to the effect that antimilitary activists could not be forbidden to call soldiers “murderers” without violating the norm of free speech met with a resounding public outcry. In France, following the announcement of cutbacks, disbanded battalions and closing armaments factories, the dominant reaction was to treat service members as an endangered rare species.
- 41.
Moskos et al. (2000), op.cit.
- 42.
See also Chap. 15 in this volume, “Military Officer Education”.
- 43.
Dandeker (1994).
- 44.
That the trend is not irreversible is indicated by Lithuania’s recent return to conscription (2015) in the face of a resurgent threat from Russia.
- 45.
- 46.
Mention should also be made of the political interference in military action that has become common due to the potential political repercussions of the turn of events in the field: political “logic” and military “grammar” are much closer-knit than used to be the case. While officers recognize that this is made inescapable by instant communications and media reporting, they nonetheless often resent the loss of professional autonomy that it entails.
- 47.
In Britain, the rate of trust in government and political parties in 2014 was respectively 17% (British Social Attitudes Survey n°32: http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-32/politics.aspx) and 14% (Eurobarometer, autumn 2014, p.38: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_anx_en.pdf); in contrast, confidence in the military was placed at 84% (Eurobarometer, autumn 2014, op.cit., p.37). The same year in the US, confidence in government fell to 29% (Presidency) and 7% (Congress), while trust in the military stood at 74% (Gallup Historical Trends 2014: http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx).
- 48.
- 49.
A worthy introduction to such developments is available in Ellner (2010).
- 50.
For instance, Cot and Durandin (2013).
- 51.
Such being the case, it was only a matter of time before cultural diversity displaced social representativeness as the criterion by which to judge the acceptability of the armed services’ social composition. When societies were tightly integrated and military service was regarded as a citizen’s obligation, the system was considered fair only if the military’s rank and file did not become the preserve of the underprivileged: if the middle and upper classes were duly represented in proportions approximating those in society at large. Under an all-volunteer format, the social composition of the military reflects that of the working population, which means that unless incentives can entice upwardly mobile types, the rank and file will be made up of the lower educated. Those who feel discriminated against and ill at ease in civilian society—among them, many second or third generation immigrants, though propensity to enlist varies from one ethnic minority to another—will be attracted to an institution subject to public scrutiny, in which discrimination is distinctly less and where the functional need for internal cohesion translates into “brotherhood of arms”. In other words, they will reproduce the African-American community’s strategy in the United States.
- 52.
In the older all-volunteer forces, such policies (fight against race and gender discrimination, promotion of equal opportunity) were enacted during the last stages of the Cold War: in the 1970s in the US military, in 1988 in Britain. They were introduced shortly after the shift to AVFs elsewhere in Europe in the countries concerned.
- 53.
See Boëne (2002).
- 54.
Given minority underrepresentation in the rank and file and (more markedly) among cadres, the British armed services were accused of “institutional racism” in the late 1990s. To remedy that situation, they instituted recruitment targets which met with mitigated success, as propensity to enlist varies from one minority to the next. British nationals of South Asian descent were known to demand that all symbols from colonial history be removed from military museums so as to facilitate recruitment among them.
- 55.
- 56.
- 57.
Krulak (1997).
- 58.
So do the strong aspirations of military families to lead “normal lives”, and the little-noticed fact that under an AVF format civilian employees form the largest component of defense ministries.
- 59.
Ben-Ari and Eran-Jona (2014).
- 60.
- 61.
This was recognized early on in the United States: the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, partly drafted after September 11th, somewhat toned down the radical changes proponents of the RMA had in mind.
- 62.
Hassner (2007).
- 63.
This was noted in the previous period already. Adherence to conservative values (functional as well as sociopolitical) by large portions of the military was among the more prominent findings of then recent studies in Britain and the US: Strachan (2000), Feaver and Kohn (2001). Israel, too, seemed affected by that trend: see Maman et al. (2001).
- 64.
Woodward (1958).
- 65.
The best documented case in that regard was that of Britain. This was a recurrent theme in Christopher Dandeker’s works in that period.
- 66.
- 67.
Bromund (2009).
- 68.
Jakubowski (2013).
- 69.
Touraine, op.cit., p. 221.
- 70.
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Boëne, B. (2018). The Military as a Tribe Among Tribes. Post-modern Militaries and Civil-Military Relations: An Update. In: Caforio, G., Nuciari, M. (eds) Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71602-2_10
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