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Railway System Failure Scenario Analysis

  • William G. TempleEmail author
  • Yuan Li
  • Bao Anh N. Tran
  • Yan Liu
  • Binbin Chen
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10242)

Abstract

Cyber security has emerged as an important issue for urban railway systems (URS) due to the increasing usage of information and communication technologies (ICT). As a safety-critical public infrastructure with complex, interconnected, and often legacy systems, URS pose challenges for stakeholders seeking to understand cyber threats and their impact, and prioritize investments and hardening efforts. However, other critical infrastructure industries such as the energy sector offer best practices, risk assessment methodologies, and tools that may be both useful and transferable to the railway domain. In this work we consider one successful security initiative from the energy sector in North America, the development of common failure scenarios and impact analysis (NESCOR failure scenarios), and assess their applicability and utility in URS. We use a publicly-available software tool that supports failure scenario analysis to assess example failures on railway supervisory control systems and identify directions for further improving railway failure scenario analysis.

Keywords

Railway Security assessment Risk assessment System modelling 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by the National Research Foundation (NRF), Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore, under its National Cybersecurity R&D Programme (Award No. NRF2014NCR-NCR001-31) and administered by the National Cybersecurity R&D Directorate. It was also supported in part by the research grant for the Human-Centered Cyber-physical Systems Programme at the Advanced Digital Sciences Center from Singapore’s Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR).

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • William G. Temple
    • 1
    Email author
  • Yuan Li
    • 1
  • Bao Anh N. Tran
    • 1
  • Yan Liu
    • 1
  • Binbin Chen
    • 1
  1. 1.Advanced Digital Sciences Center, Illinois at SingaporeSingaporeSingapore

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