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Using Incentives to Foster Security Information Sharing and Cooperation: A General Theory and Application to Critical Infrastructure Protection

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Critical Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10242))

Abstract

Various measures have been proposed to mitigate the underinvestment problem in cybersecurity. Investment models have theoretically demonstrated the potential application of security information sharing (SIS) to Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). However, the free rider problem remains a major pitfall, preventing the full potential benefits of SIS from being realised. This paper closes an important research gap by providing a theoretical framework linking incentives and voluntary SIS. This framework was applied to CIP through a case study of the Swiss Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Security. The SIS model was used to analyse the incentive mechanisms that most effectively support SIS for CIP. Our work contribute to an understanding of the free rider problem that plagues the provision of the public good that is cybersecurity, and offer clues to its mitigation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In our study we use the term “cybersecurity” as a synonym for “information security,” referring to the protection of information that is transmitted over the Internet or any other computer network.

  2. 2.

    “security information sharing” SIS can be defined as the mutual exchange of cybersecurity-relevant information on vulnerabilities, phishing, malware, and data breaches, as well as threat intelligence, best practices, early warnings, and expert advices and insights.

  3. 3.

    In particular the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the 2015 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA).

  4. 4.

    In December 2015, the European Parliament and Council agreed on the first EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity, adopting the EU Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive.

  5. 5.

    An ISAC is a generally a nonprofit organisation that provides a platform for SIS between the government and CIs.

  6. 6.

    Unlike ISACs, ISAOs are not directly tied to CIs and offer a flexible and voluntary approach for SIS.

  7. 7.

    A fusion center is an information sharing center designed to promote information sharing between different agencies.

  8. 8.

    The TPI technology helps organizations to analyze and aggregate real-time threat data in order to support defensive actions.

  9. 9.

    The interconnected 2008 global financial crisis bears several resemblances to what could happen in a major cyber “risk nexus” scenario.

  10. 10.

    The goal of this platform is to bring together CI stakeholders to improve SIS at the international level.

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Mermoud, A., Keupp, M.M., Ghernaouti, S., Percia David, D. (2017). Using Incentives to Foster Security Information Sharing and Cooperation: A General Theory and Application to Critical Infrastructure Protection. In: Havarneanu, G., Setola, R., Nassopoulos, H., Wolthusen, S. (eds) Critical Information Infrastructures Security. CRITIS 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10242. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71368-7_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71368-7_13

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