A Methodology for Monitoring and Control Network Design

  • István KissEmail author
  • Béla Genge
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10242)


The accelerated advancement of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) transformed the traditional and completely isolated systems view into a networked and inter-connected “system of systems” perspective. This has brought significant economical and operational benefits, but it also provided new opportunities for malicious actors targeting critical ICS. In this work we adopt a Cyber Attack Impact Assessment (CAIA) technique to develop a systematic methodology for evaluating the risk levels of ICS assets. The outcome of the risk assessment is integrated into an optimal control network design methodology. Experiments comprising the Tennessee Eastman chemical plant, the IEEE 14-bus electricity grid and the IEEE 300-bus New England electricity grid show the applicability and effectiveness of the developed methodology.


Industrial Control Systems Impact assessment Cyber attack Optimal network design Risk assessment 



This work was supported by a Marie Curie FP7 Integration Grant within the 7th European Union Framework Programme (Grant no. PCIG14-GA-2013-631128).


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.“Petru Maior” University of Tîrgu MureşTîrgu MureşRomania

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