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The Presidential System in Turkey pp 43–73Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Presidential Government System in Turkey

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Abstract

This chapter outlines the current opportunities and obstacles for establishing a presidential government system in Turkey and discusses the negotiations between the Justice and Development Party and the Nationalist Movement Party.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    With the amendment of the Article 146 of the constitution in the presidential government system package, the number of Constitutional Court members was reduced from 17 to 15. In this context, the election of Constitutional Court members from the Military Court of Appeals, Supreme Military Administrative Court was abolished. Out of 15 members, TGNA would elect 2 members from three candidates for each post nominated by the Court of Accounts Assembly among its chair and members and 1 member from candidates nominated by the heads of the bar associations from free attorneys by secret ballot. In this election to be held in the TGNA , two-thirds of the votes are required in the first round for each vacancy and an absolute majority of the total number of members is required in the second round. If the absolute majority fails in the second round, a third vote is held for the two candidates who received the highest number of votes in the second round; the candidate who receives the most votes in the third round is elected. The president would select 3 members from the three candidates nominated by the Supreme Court of Appeals for each vacant position; 2 members from the two candidates nominated by the Council of State for each vacant position from their relative chairs and members; 2 members from the three candidates nominated for each position by the Higher Education Council from university professors in the fields of law, economics and political science and who are not also a member of the Higher Education Council; and 4 members from top executives, independent lawyers, first-class judges and public prosecutors and Constitutional Court reporters who have been in the office for at least 5 years. In the elections nominating candidates for the Constitutional Court by the General Assembly of the Court of Appeals, the Council of State, the Court of Accounts and the Higher Education Council, the three candidates who receive the highest number of votes are considered as nominated for each vacancy. The three candidates with the highest number of votes from independent lawyers will be considered as nominated by the head of the bar association. To be elected a member of the Constitutional Court, the candidate should be at least 45 years old; faculty members should be professors or assistant professors, attorneys should be active for at least 20 years, top executives should be college graduates and have worked in public service for at least 20 years and first-class judges and public prosecutors should have worked at least for 20 years including the candidacy.

  2. 2.

    The most common inconsistency is the presidency and parliamentary membership. The 1929 Austrian constitution stipulates that the president cannot serve in another office that represents the people (A. 61). The 1937 Irish constitution states that if a member of the parliament is elected president, his party membership shall be void instantly (Article 12/6–2). Similarly, certain constitutions prohibit the president from engaging in any private or public professional or commercial activity that provides income. The Italian constitution states that the presidential mission is incompatible with all other duties absolutely. Also the Greek constitution states that the presidential duties and other duties are incompatible. The 1937 Irish constitution also prohibited the president from undertaking any duties or work that would bring income (Article 12/6–3). Similar provisions exist in the 1964 Israeli and Icelandic constitutions (Gözler 2001: 67–68).

  3. 3.

    It could be observed that presidential systems in Latin America frequently resort to governance by decree, bypassing the parliament, in other words, by decretismo, as Sartori put it. For example in Brazil, after the said powers were bestowed on the president with the 1988 constitutional amendment, the president frequently resorted to this power (Uluşahin 1999: 70).

  4. 4.

    The results demonstrated that in the presidential system, growth rates were 0.6–1.2 points lower on average, inflation rate was 6 points higher, inflation volatility was 4–9 points higher and income inequality was 16%–20% higher than the parliamentary system (see McManus and Özkan 2016).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ahi Evran University, Kırşehir, Turkey

    Battal Yilmaz

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Yilmaz, B. (2018). Presidential Government System in Turkey. In: The Presidential System in Turkey. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71267-3_4

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