Abstract
In this paper, I identify an assumption at play in anti-semantic interpretative approaches to Frege: the notion that translatability to Frege’s concept script functions as a criterion for deciding whether a thought is expressed in a sentence or utterance. I question the viability of this assumption by pointing to Frege’s accounts of the aim and character of his logical language and scientific discourse more generally, and by looking at his remarks on poetic forms of language, literature and fiction (Dichtung). Since it seems clear that the sentences used in poetic and literary forms of language that Frege discusses, have Sinn and are possible to understand, in his view, I argue that the translatability criterion for thoughts is flawed. A discussion of Frege’s appeal to an approach of willingness to understand in a reader, and the relation between Frege’s use of elucidatory discourse and his conception of Dichtung is central to my exposition in this paper.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Gabriel and Polimenov (2012).
- 3.
Frege (1879, V).
- 4.
Cf. here Wittgenstein (2001, §§ 90, 110, 593).
- 5.
“If our language were logically more perfect, we would perhaps have no further need of logic, or we might read it off from the language. But we are far from being in such a position. Work in logic just is, to a large extent, a struggle with the logical defects of language, and yet language remains for us an indispensable tool. Only after our logical work has been completed shall we possess a more perfect instrument ” (Frege 1969/1979, 272/ 252).
- 6.
Cf. Frege (1892a/1997, 27–29/153).
- 7.
“Since mutual cooperation in a science is impossible without mutual understanding of the investigators, we must have confidence that such an understanding can be reached through elucidations [Erläuterungen], although theoretically, the contrary is not excluded” (Frege 1906/1984, 301/301).
- 8.
Cf. Weiner’s discussion in “Frege’s Unmetaphysical Story about Natural Language and Truth” (Weiner, forthcoming).
- 9.
See Frege (1884, §§ 26–27) where he ends a discussion about objectivity with these words: “Der Grund der Objectivität kann ja nicht in dem Sinneseindrucke liegen, der als Affection unserer Seele ganz subjectiv ist, sondern, soweit ich sehe, nur in der Vernunft . Es wäre wunderbar, wenn die aller exacteste Wissenschaft sich auf die noch zu unsicher tastende Psychologie stützen sollte.” See also Frege (1884, § 105), especially the second footnote to this section, and Frege (1969/1979, 133/122).
- 10.
Cf. Frege’s discussions of the relation between reason (Vernunft ) and science in Frege (1882, 55), and Frege (1918, 74) where he suggests that “[d]em Fassen der Gedanken muß ein besonderes geistiges Vermögen, die Denkkraft, entsprechen” and goes on to discuss the relation between thinking, truth and the foundation of science. See also Frege (1969/1979, 288/269).
- 11.
The three principles introduced in The Foundations of Arithmetic should perhaps be added to this list (Frege 1884, X).
- 12.
Cf. Frege (1969/1979, 139/128): “[The] task we assign to logic is only that of saying what holds with the utmost generality for all thinking, whatever its subject matter.”
- 13.
In several passages, Frege points out to a reader that his words must not be taken literally as this will lead to misunderstandings (e.g. Frege 1892b/1997, 205/193).
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
Cf. e.g. Frege (1906/1984, 301–302/301).
- 18.
This example connects with what we saw in the quotation from the Preface to the Begriffsschrift , where Frege suggests that it is a task of philosophy to “break the domination of words over the human spirit by laying bare illusions that through the use of language often almost unavoidably arise”. Here, Frege points at a potentially liberating and therapeutic aim that the philosopher might reach that corresponds with the overall picture of similarities between Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Frege’s work that is presented in the work of Conant and Diamond .
- 19.
Cf. also Frege (1969/1979, 201/185).
- 20.
Cf. Frege (1969/1979, 161/149).
- 21.
It has been suggested by Gabriel that Frege’s avoidance of “metaphor” when speaking of his use of figurative language is connected with a wish to put a distance between his work and the work of a poet. It is reasonable to conceive of Frege’s choice of words in this case from the perspective of his struggle against psychologism . See Gabriel (1991, 679), and my discussion below.
- 22.
Cf. Frege’s discussion in the essay “My Basic Logical Insights” (Frege 1969/1979, 271–272/251–252), and his discussion of assertoric force in connection with a distinction between a “Hilfssprache” and a “Darlegungssprache” (1969/1979, 281/260).
- 23.
- 24.
Cf. Frege (1969/1979, 142/130).
- 25.
The relation between Sinn and Bedeutung in cases like this (in Dichtung) is not as in scientific discourse, but unscientific.
- 26.
One might compare Frege’s appeal in these cases to Kant’s notion of sensus communis, and his distinction between sensus communis aestheticus and sensus communis logicus in the Third Critique, § 40. Cf. also Cavell’s implicit reference to this Kantian notion in his famous essay “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy ” (Cavell 2002, 73–96).
- 27.
Cf. Ishiguro (1969, 32–33) on Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘elucidation ’ in the Tractatus.
- 28.
- 29.
- 30.
I would like to thank Jan Harald Alnes for helpful suggestions and very valuable comments to drafts for this paper. I’m also grateful for comments and suggestions from participants at the workshop “Frege zwischen Dichtung und Wissenschaft” in Bergen, and from participants of the research seminars at Uppsala University, the University of Oslo and Tampere University. In particular, I would like to thank Joan Weiner , Juliet Floyd , Leila Haaparanta, Mirja Hartimo and Sharon Rider. Work on this paper was financed by the Research Council of Norway.
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Bengtsson, G. (2018). Frege on Dichtung and Elucidation. In: Bengtsson, G., Säätelä, S., Pichler, A. (eds) New Essays on Frege. Nordic Wittgenstein Studies, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71186-7_7
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