Abstract
Edith Stein consistently rejects the possibility that identification plays a constitutive role in the structure of community, whereas Max Scheler, though sympathetic to Stein’s claims, admits that community does require a basic level of identification, but is in no way reducible to a complete union wherein the individual is absorbed by the collective, the I by the we. The latter position is exemplarily taken up by Stein’s student Gerda Walther, who argues that the most intense form of community is an Einigung or Vereinigung, a becoming-one in which a we can overtake the I. I argue that Scheler’s claim of a low-level identification as constitutive of community must be rejected, for although one may feel unified or as “one” with a group, the feeling itself cannot negate the larger phenomenological and fundamental reality of individuation while undergoing the feeling of identification. We can deploy Stein’s understanding of the I and its embodiment to show how Scheler’s claims about the role of identification in community, though identification may be experienced as Scheler says it is, still remains grounded within the sphere of an individual I: one can never absolutely transcend the sphere of ownness that is constitutive of who and what an individual person is. At best, one may temporarily lose focus of the sphere of ownness, which is always possible in the natural attitude or in intense emotional experiences, but these possibilities do not negate the phenomenological and fundamental principle of personal individuation that is characteristic of Stein’s early work in phenomenology.
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Notes
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See, for example, González Di Pierro 2015.
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Cf. Betschart 2015: 74: “From the numeric perspective, individuality or, in Edith Stein ’s words, ipseity or selfness (Selbstheit), designates the pure I, which is individual; it is distinguished from all other objects. Stein takes up what Husserl says about the pure I, especially his treatment in section 57 of Ideas I: ‘If we retain a pure Ego as a residuum after our phenomenological exclusion of the world and the empirical subjectivity included in it (and an essentially different pure Ego for each stream of mental processes), then there is presented in the case of that Ego a transcendency of a peculiar kind – one which is not constituted – a transcendency within immanency.’”
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Cf. Betschart 2015: 76–7: “Despite the fact that lived experiences are necessarily differentiated according to the varying circumstances of life, Stein asks herself the question about interior differences, differences at the level of essence or, as she often says in her early work, the core or kernel of the person. Here is a passage from Stein’s doctoral dissertation where she discusses the role of internal and external circumstances in the development of the human person: ‘The individual with all his characteristics develops under the constant impression of such influences so that this person has such a nature because he was exposed to such and such influences. Under other circumstances he would have developed differently. There is something empirically fortuitous in this ‘nature.’ One can conceive of it as modified in many ways. But this variability is not unlimited; there are limits here. We find that not only the categorical structure of the soul as soul must be retained, but also within its individual form we strike an unchangeable kernel, the personal structure. I can think of Caesar in a village instead of in Rome and can think of him transferred to the twentieth century. Certainly, his historically settled individuality would then go through some changes, but just as surely he would remain Caesar (Stein 1989: 110).’
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Calcagno, A. (2017). The Role of Identification in Experiencing Community: Edith Stein, Empathy, and Max Scheler. In: Magrì, E., Moran, D. (eds) Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 94. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71096-9_8
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