Abstract
We propose a work-in-progress protocol to detect man-in-the-middle attacks during the communication between two parties, by leveraging the existence of disjoint paths between the communicating parties. Our protocol allows us to detect attackers either at the protocol level (through delay measurements) or at the user level (if the attackers tamper with the data).
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Notes
- 1.
This is the only time the user will have to use one of the undesirable solutions such as password-based authenticated key exchange, but this only needs to be done once per user.
- 2.
By successful we mean that attackers can remain part of the conversation, while honest users exchange messages, without being detected.
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Acknowledgement
We thank Virgil Gligor and Ross Anderson for very interesting discussions during the Security Protocols Workshops and for great ideas on how to improve our work.
This work was sponsored in part by the European Commission, through the SSICLOPS H2020 project.
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Costea, S., Choudary, M.O., Raiciu, C. (2017). Security from Disjoint Paths: Is It Possible?. In: Stajano, F., Anderson, J., Christianson, B., Matyáš, V. (eds) Security Protocols XXV. Security Protocols 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10476. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71075-4_27
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71075-4_27
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