Abstract
Web traffic encryption has shifted from applying only to sensitive websites (such as banks) to a majority of all Web requests. Until recently, one of the main limiting factors for enabling HTTPS was the requirement to obtain a valid certificate from a trusted certification authority. This process traditionally involves steps such as paying a certificate issuance fee, ad-hoc private key and certificate request generation, and domain validation procedures. To remove this barrier of entry, the Internet Security Research Group (ISRG) introduced “Let’s Encrypt”, a new non-profit certificate authority that uses a new protocol called Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) to automate certificate management at all levels (request, validation, issuance, renewal, and revocation) between clients (website operators) and servers (certificate authority nodes). Let’s Encrypt’s success is measured by its issuance of over 27 million free certificates since its launch in April 2016. In this paper, we survey the existing process for issuing domain-validated certificates in major certification authorities. Based on our findings, we build a security model of domain-validated certificate issuance. We then model the ACME protocol in the applied pi-calculus and verify its stated security goals against our security model. We compare the effective security of different domain validation methods and show that ACME can be secure under a stronger threat model than that of traditional CAs. We also uncover weaknesses in some flows of ACME 1.0 and propose verified improvements that have been adopted in the latest protocol draft submitted to the IETF.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
CloudFlare incidentally also operates Let’s Encrypt’s infrastructure, rendering it a centralized point of failure for ACME and ad-hoc CAs alike. While ACME is a centralization-agnostic protocol, Let’s Encrypt operates with a fully centralized infrastructure.
- 3.
Full model available at https://github.com/Inria-Prosecco/acme-model.
- 4.
We also specify a fully public channel named pub.
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© 2017 International Financial Cryptography Association
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Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Kobeissi, N. (2017). Formal Modeling and Verification for Domain Validation and ACME. In: Kiayias, A. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10322. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70972-7_32
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70972-7_32
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