The 1990–1991 European Communities-Balkans Crisis

  • M. Leann Brown


This chapter considers the EC’s response to conflict in Yugoslavia in 1990–1991. Initially, EC members did not recognize the crisis’ potential for violence. However, previous economic and political achievements and a desire to put in place a Common Foreign and Security Policy and enhance its global reputation encouraged the EC to engage this security challenge. In the end, the EC could only agree to devote diplomatic attention to the problem, mediate, impose an arms embargo, and curtail financial support; no member was willing to commit peacekeeping forces without Serbian acquiescence and an effective ceasefire in place. The EC called upon the UN to assume responsibility for the conflict, in what is regarded as a policy failure and a turning point in the REO’s development.


European Communities (EC) Yugoslavia Common Foreign and Security Policy 1992 Maastricht Treaty France Germany Great Britain 


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© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. Leann Brown
    • 1
  1. 1.University of FloridaGainesvilleUSA

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