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Abstract

This chapter explores of the relationship between Belgium’s fortress policy and strategy and offers a window into Belgium’s conflicted relationship with the status of neutrality. Having inherited a landscape dominated by strong points (fortresses), both army and society became embroiled in a lengthy debate about the cost of these structures and the extent to which neutrality should be armed. The content here demonstrates, once more, how party politics and local interests overrode the army and its professional considerations for national defence. Despite the construction of the national redoubt at Antwerp (1859) and fortifications on the Meuse (1887), the army remained hamstrung by the reluctance to introduce universal conscription. As such, the strategy of a central mobilisation and a retreat on Antwerp in the event of invasion remained largely unaltered into the twentieth century despite evolving trends and technology in war.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a general overview of the many fortifications and sieges in present-day Belgium from the fifteenth century until the 1830 Revolution, see H. Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique des Origines à Nos Jours, Vol. III (La Renaissance du Livre, Brussels, 1972–1975), pp. 79–80, 225–226, 234–239, 280–284, and 315–318. For their strategic importance during the War of Spanish Succession, see J. Ostwald, ‘The Decisive Battle of Ramillies 1706; Prerequisites for Decision in Early Modern Warfare’, Journal of Military History, vol. 64, no. 3 (2000), pp. 649–677.

  2. 2.

    C. Pearson, Mobilizing Nature: The Environmental History of War and Militarization in Modern France (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2012), p. 4; see also pp. 1–10.

  3. 3.

    Some aspects of the political-wrangling concerning the construction of fortifications in Belgium have been succinctly outlined in, D. Stevenson, ‘Fortifications and the European Balance before 1914’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 35, no. 6 (2012), pp. 845–847.

  4. 4.

    J. E Kaufmann and H. W. Kaufmann, The Forts and Fortifications of Europe 1815 1945. The Neutral States: The Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland (Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley, 2014), pp. 82–83.

  5. 5.

    F. Chazal, Discours prononcés par M. le Lieutenant Général Baron Chazal, Ministre de la Guerre. Discussion du Projet d’Agrandissement Général d’Anvers (Deltombe, Brussels, 1859), pp. 5–6.

  6. 6.

    É. Wanty, Le Milieu Militaire Belge de 1831 à 1914 (Palais des Académies, Brussels, 1957), p. 32; E. Witte, Le Royaume Perdu: Les Orangistes Belges Contre la Revolution 1828–1850 (Samsa s.p.r.l, Brussels, 2014), pp. 330–336.

  7. 7.

    D. H. Thomas, The Guarantee of Belgian Independence and Neutrality in European Diplomacy, 1830s–1930s (Thomas Publishing, Kingston, RI, 1983), pp. 28–29.

  8. 8.

    Ibid., pp. 29 and 392.

  9. 9.

    A. De Ryckel, Historique de l’Établissement Militaire de la Belgique Tome I (Gent, 1907), pp. 203–206.

  10. 10.

    P.P.R., 3 August 1858.

  11. 11.

    Ibid.

  12. 12.

    Chazal, Discours, pp. 12–13.

  13. 13.

    P.P.R., 4 March, 3 June, and 7 December 1853; Le Progrès, 14 April 1853; Le Propagateur, 15 June 1853.

  14. 14.

    J. Hoegaerts, Masculinity and Nationhood, 1830–1910: Constructions of Identity and Citizenship in Belgium (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014), p. 51.

  15. 15.

    P.P.R., 7 December 1853.

  16. 16.

    For more on the development of Belgian railways, see M. Laffut, ‘Belgium’, in P. O’Brien (ed.), Railways and the Economic Development of Western Europe, 1830–1914 (Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 1983), pp. 203–226.

  17. 17.

    P.P.R., 16 January 1856.

  18. 18.

    MRA Fonds Fortifications, Antwerp 73/3-10, Report in the name of the Section Centrale by Mr. Goblet, 17 May 1856; H. A. Brialmont, Réponse au pamphlet Anvers et M. Brialmont (Guyot, Brussels, 1865), p. 21.

  19. 19.

    Ibid., Antwerp 73/3-7, Note on the question of the enlargement of Antwerp and on the provisions that might be made to satisfy current requirements, 1855; Brialmont, Réponse, p. 13.

  20. 20.

    MRA Fonds Fortifications, Antwerp 73/3-7, Note on the military importance of Antwerp and the work it requires, 19 May 1852.

  21. 21.

    P.P.R., 3 August 1858.

  22. 22.

    MRA Fonds Fortifications, Antwerp 73/3-12, Report upon the entrenched camp lately formed round Antwerp by Captain W. M. Dixon, Royal Artillery, and Captain R. M. Laffan, Royal Engineers, May 1854.

  23. 23.

    H. Greefs, ‘De Schelde geblokkerd in 1839: hoe Antwerpen opinieuw een provinciestad werd’, in M. Van Ginderachter et al. (eds.), Het Land dat Nooit Was: Één Tegen-Freitelijk Geschiedenis van Belgie (De Bezig Bij Antwerpen, Antwerp, 2014), p. 77.

  24. 24.

    MRA Fonds Fortifications, Antwerp 73/3-10, Report in the name of the Section Centrale by Mr. Goblet, 17 May 1856.

  25. 25.

    Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (Routledge, London & New York, 1983), p. 62. For an overview of Jominian principles, see pp. 60–75; J. Shy, ‘Jomini’ in P. Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986), pp. 143–185.

  26. 26.

    Thomas, The Guarantee, p. 393.

  27. 27.

    The law of 1791 and the Royal Decree of 1815 were still in force during the 1850s; see also MRA Fonds Fortifications, Antwerp 73/3–12, Note on the question of the enlargement of Antwerp and on the provisions that might be made to satisfy current requirements, 1855.

  28. 28.

    P.P.R., 7 December 1852 and 7 December 1853.

  29. 29.

    La Belgique Militaire, 27 March 1887, p. 402.

  30. 30.

    Col. De Lannoy, ‘Le Roi Léopold 1er et la Défence Nationale: l’organisation de l’armée et la question des fortifications d’Anvers’, Revue belge d’histoire militaire, vol. 24, no. 1 (1981), pp. 145–147. Henri Alexis Brialmont (25 May 1821–21 July 1903) graduated from the École Militaire in 1843, and served as private secretary to Minister of War, Félix Chazal in 1847–1850. Promoted to Lieutenant-General in 1877, and he was Inspector General of the Army until his retirement in 1892.

  31. 31.

    Brialmont, Réponse, pp. 23–24.

  32. 32.

    C. Faque, Henri-Alexis Brialmont: Les Forts de la Meuse 1887–1891 (Les Amis de la Citadelle de Namur, Namur, 1988), pp. 16 and 29.

  33. 33.

    G. Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), pp. 281–284; R. Tombs, ‘The wars against Paris’, in S. Förster and J. Nagler (eds.), On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), pp. 541–545.

  34. 34.

    Belgique Militaire, 27 March 1887, p. 414.

  35. 35.

    Stevenson, ‘Fortifications’, p. 845.

  36. 36.

    Thomas, The Guarantee, pp. 398–399.

  37. 37.

    H. A. Brialmont, Situation Militaire de la Belgique: Traveaux de défense de la Meuse (C. Muquardt, Brussels, 1882), p. 195.

  38. 38.

    La Meuse, 19 April 1880.

  39. 39.

    Brialmont, Situation Militaire, p. 195.

  40. 40.

    Ibid., p. 185.

  41. 41.

    La Meuse, 21 May 1880.

  42. 42.

    G. Schallich, ‘Quelques chiffres concernant le coût des forts “Brialmont” de Liège et de Namur’, Bulletin d’Information du Centre Liègeois d’Histoire et d’Archeologie Militaires, vol. 3, no. 3 (1986), p. 35.

  43. 43.

    Ibid., p. 36; La Meuse, 14 and 28 February 1887; l’Indépendence Belge, 18 February 1887.

  44. 44.

    Stevenson, ‘Fortifications’, p. 831; Schallich, ‘Quelques chiffres’, p. 36.

  45. 45.

    For a detailed description of the technical aspects of the Meuse forts and their construction, see Faque, Henri-Alexis Brialmont, pp. 33–40; Kauffman and Kauffman, Forts & Fortifications, pp. 85–90.

  46. 46.

    L. De Vos, La Première Guerre Mondiale (J. M. Collet, Braine-l’Alleud, 1997), p. 30.

  47. 47.

    Schallich, ‘Quelques chiffres’, p. 38.

  48. 48.

    For more on Belgium’s arms industry, see P. Leonard, ‘Le Manufacture d’Armes de l’État (M.A.E.)’, Bulletin d’Information du Centre Liègeois d’Histoire et d’Archeologie Militaires, vol. 3, no. 1 (1986), pp. 5–24; J. Herlant, ‘De Fonderie Royale de Canons, industriële pijler voorde uitrusting van de Belgische Defensie tussen 1830 en 1870. Historische en technologische analyse’, Cahiers belges d’histoire militaire, vol. 3 (2005), pp. 99–197.

  49. 49.

    l’Indépendence Belge, 19 February 1887.

  50. 50.

    Belgique Militaire, 27 March 1887, p. 402, and 22 May 1887, p. 659; La Meuse, 13 March 1888.

  51. 51.

    La Meuse, 10 February 1887.

  52. 52.

    Belgique Militaire, 13 March 1887, pp. 340–343, and 27 March 1887, pp. 402–410.

  53. 53.

    Ibid., 8 May 1887, p. 612.

  54. 54.

    Wanty, Milieu Militaire Belge, p. 176.

  55. 55.

    La Meuse, 24 February 1887.

  56. 56.

    Belgique Militaire, 13 March 1887, pp. 341–343, and 27 March 1887, pp. 409–410 and 420.

  57. 57.

    Ibid., 19 September 1886, p. 360.

  58. 58.

    Ibid., 27 March 1887, p. 415.

  59. 59.

    Ibid., p. 422.

  60. 60.

    For more detail on this, see Chap. 4.

  61. 61.

    Stevenson, ‘Fortifications’, p. 831.

  62. 62.

    Wanty, Milieu Militaire Belge, p. 236.

  63. 63.

    Belgique Militaire, 4 February 1906, pp. 105–106.

  64. 64.

    Courrier de l’Escaut, 26 January 1906.

  65. 65.

    MRA Fonds Moscou 5029, 1906 Commission into the Second Line of Defence at Antwerp, 25 June 1906–26 January 1907, 2nd Meeting, 4 July 1906.

  66. 66.

    Belgique Militaire, 18 March 1906.

  67. 67.

    Ibid., 4 February 1906, p. 106. Other figures suggest that the perimeter was no more than 95 kilometres in length; see Stevenson, ‘Fortifications’, p. 847.

  68. 68.

    Wanty, Milieu Militaire Belge, p. 237.

  69. 69.

    For more on the National Service League in Great Britain, see I.F.W. Beckett, ‘The nation in arms, 1914–18’, in I.F.W. Beckett and K. Simpson (eds.), A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1985), pp. 4–6; T. Bowman and M. Connelly, The Edwardian Army (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), pp. 47–48 and 159–162.

  70. 70.

    Belgique Militaire, 18 March 1906. Prior to 1902, the fortress artillery at Antwerp, Liège, Namur, Dendermonde, Diest, and Huy was split into 58 active and seven reserve batteries, along with three special companies. After the 1902 reorganisation, it was increased to 50 active and 27 reserve batteries. Similarly, the infantry had consisted of the 13th and 14th Line Infantry Regiments (each comprised of three active and two reserve battalions), the three reserve battalions of the Regiment of Carabiniers, and the 32 reserve battalions of the remaining infantry regiments. This totalled six active and 39 reserve battalions, prior to 1902. After this date, the 13th and 14th Line Infantry Regiments retained their association with the fortress, albeit now formed of three active, one reserve, and two fortress battalions. They were joined by the 35 newly formed fortress battalions of the remaining infantry regiments. See Exposé 1902, Tome I, p. 451; L. A. Lecleir, L’Infanterie: Filiations et Traditions (Service de l’historique des Forces armées belges, Brussels, 1973), p. 65.

  71. 71.

    V. Ducarne, Supplément au Bulletin de la Défense National de Janvier 1911: Conférence donnée le 29 novembre 1911 à la Conférence du Jeune Barreau par le Lieutenant general Ducarne: La question militaire en Belgique (Brussels, 1911), p. 15.

  72. 72.

    Le Soir, 31 August, 1–3, 21 September, and 29 November 1911.

  73. 73.

    SHD 7 N 1156, Report by Duruy, 20 November 1910.

  74. 74.

    Ibid., Report by Duruy 4 January 1912; A. Duchesne, ‘Aprréciations françaises sur la valeur de l’armée belge et les perspectives de guerre de 1871 à 1914’, Carnet de la Fourragère, vol. 14, no. 3 (1961), p. 196.

  75. 75.

    J. Wullus-Rudiger, La Belgique et l’Équilibre Européen (Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1935), p. 67.

  76. 76.

    Wanty, Milieu Militaire Belge, p. 236.

  77. 77.

    SHD 7 N 1156, Report by Duruy, 9 November 1909.

  78. 78.

    Ibid.

  79. 79.

    SHD, 7 N 1159, Report by Génie, 18 January 1914.

  80. 80.

    Ibid., 1156, Report by Drury, 9 November 1909.

  81. 81.

    Wanty, Milieu Militaire Belge, pp. 247–248.

  82. 82.

    Ibid., pp. 249–250.

  83. 83.

    La Chronique, 20 May 1914.

  84. 84.

    SHD 7 N 1156, Report by Duruy, 9 November 1909; 7 N 1157, Report by Drury 19 January 1912. For more on the French ‘cult of the offensive’, see D. Porch, ‘The French Army and the Spirit of the Offensive, 1900–14’ in B. Bond and I. Roy (eds.), War and Society: A Yearbook of Military History (Croom Helm, London, 1975), pp. 117–143; A. J. Echevarria, ‘The Cult of the Offensive Revisited: Confronting Technological Change before the Great War’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 25, no. 1 (2002), pp. 199–214.

  85. 85.

    Lt.-Gen. E. Galet, Albert King of the Belgians in the Great War (trans. Maj.-Gen. Sir E. Swintonl; Putnam, London, 1931), pp. 4–6.

  86. 86.

    Wanty, Milieu Militaire Belge, pp. 254–255.

  87. 87.

    B. Colson, ‘La première traduction française du “VOM KRIEGE” de Clausewitz et sa diffusion dans les milieu français et belge avant 1914’, Revue belge d’histoire militaire, vol. 26, no. 5 (1986), pp. 345–363.

  88. 88.

    There has been a significant amount of work conducted on British prewar planning, 1904–1914, that came to influence their dealings with the Belgians and the French. For some of the most prominent, see J. E. Tyler, The British Army and the Continent, 1904–1914 (E. Arnold, London, 1938); J. E. Helmreich, ‘Belgian concern over neutrality and British intentions, 1906–1914’, Journal of Modern History, vol. 36 (1964), pp. 416–427; S. R. Williamson Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904–1914 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1969); N. d’Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy: Defence Administration in Peacetime Britain 1902–1914 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973); J. Gooch, The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900–1916 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974); D. French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, 1905–1915 (Allen & Unwin, London, 1982); K. M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904–1914 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985); J. Stengers, ‘Belgium’ in Wilson (ed.), Decisions for War 1914 (Routledge, London, 1995), pp. 151–174; W. Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–1918 (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996); H. Strachan, ‘The British Army, its General Staff and the Continental Commitment 1904–1914’, in D. French and B. Holden Reid (eds.), The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation c. 1890–1939 (Routledge, London, 2002), pp. 75–94.

  89. 89.

    See, F. Vandaele, ‘Les “conversations” anglo-belges d’avant guerre’, Revue Belge des Livres, Documents et Archives de la Guerre 1914–18, vol. 8, no. 1 (1932), pp. 63–69.

  90. 90.

    For more on British reactions to the Congo, see M. E. Thomas, ‘Anglo-Belgian Military Relations and the Congo Question, 1911–1913’, Journal of Modern History, vol. 25 (1953), pp. 157–165; T. Packenham, The Scramble for Africa 1876–1912 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1991), pp. 586–595 and 662; R. O. Collins, King Leopold, England, and the Upper Nile, 1899–1909 (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968), p. 303. For more on the Belgian General Staff, see W. Marsily, Les chefs d’état-major de l’armée belge et le respect de la neutralité (Librairie Payot, Lousanne & Paris, 1917).

  91. 91.

    SHD 7 N 1156, Report by Duruy, 8 June 1910; 7 N 1157, Report by Duruy, 9 December 1911.

  92. 92.

    T. Bridges, Alarms and Excursions: Reminiscences of a Soldier (Longmans, London, 1938), p. 62.

  93. 93.

    Ibid., p. 63.

  94. 94.

    TNA, WO 106/47, DMO to CIGS, Appreciation of the Political and Military Situation in Europe, 20 September 1911.

  95. 95.

    D. Porch, The March to the Marne: The French Army 1871–1914 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981), pp. 228–229; E. Greenhalgh, The French Army and the First World War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014), pp. 19–21.

  96. 96.

    Wanty, Milieu Militaire Belge, pp. 260–263.

  97. 97.

    Galet, Albert King of the Belgians, pp. 201–210.

  98. 98.

    H. Strachan, The First World War: Vol I, To Arms (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001), p. 271.

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Draper, M. (2018). Fortress Policy and Strategy. In: The Belgian Army and Society from Independence to the Great War. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70386-2_6

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