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Enabling Vote Delegation for Boardroom Voting

  • Oksana KulykEmail author
  • Stephan Neumann
  • Karola Marky
  • Melanie Volkamer
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10323)

Abstract

A lot of decisions are made during boardroom meetings. After a discussion, the head of the board often asks for a quick poll. But what if you cannot join the meeting? So called boardroom voting schemes have been proposed to conduct the poll over the Internet and thereby enabling also those who are not present but available online to participant in the poll. But what if you are not available at this point in time? For important decisions you may want to delegate your vote to a present and trusted board member. In this paper, we show how to extend an existing boardroom voting scheme towards delegation functionality. The new scheme is evaluated against security requirements determined for boardroom voting and security requirements tailored to the delegation process.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This paper has been partially developed within the project (HA project no. 435/14-25) funded in the framework of Hessen ModellProjekte, financed with funds of LOEWE –Landes-Offensive zur Entwicklung Wissenschaftlich-ökonomischer Exzellenz, Förderlinie 3: KMU-Verbundvorhaben (State Offensive for the Development of Scientific and Economic Excellence). It has also been partially developed within the project ‘VALID’ - Verifiable Liquid Democracy - which is funded by the Polyas GmbH. This work has also been supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) as well as by the Hessen State Ministry for Higher Education, Research and the Arts within CRISP.

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Copyright information

© International Financial Cryptography Association 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Oksana Kulyk
    • 1
    Email author
  • Stephan Neumann
    • 1
  • Karola Marky
    • 1
  • Melanie Volkamer
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Technische Universität DarmstadtDarmstadtGermany
  2. 2.Karlstad UniversityKarlstadSweden

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