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Using Selene to Verify Your Vote in JCJ

  • Vincenzo Iovino
  • Alfredo Rial
  • Peter B. RønneEmail author
  • Peter Y. A. Ryan
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10323)

Abstract

We show how to combine the individual verification mechanism of Selene with the coercion-resistant e-voting scheme from Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson (JCJ). This results in an e-voting scheme which allows the voter to check directly that her vote is counted as intended, but still allows her to mitigate coercion.

We also construct variants of the protocol which provide everlasting privacy or better verifiability. Further, both improvements of JCJ and Selene are discussed.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Vincenzo Iovino is supported by the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR grant no. 7884937). Further, this work is also supported by the INTER-Sequoia project from the Luxembourg National Research Fund, which is joint with the ANR project SEQUOIA ANR-14-CE28-0030-01.

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Copyright information

© International Financial Cryptography Association 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vincenzo Iovino
    • 1
  • Alfredo Rial
    • 1
  • Peter B. Rønne
    • 1
    Email author
  • Peter Y. A. Ryan
    • 1
  1. 1.University of LuxembourgEsch-sur-AlzetteLuxembourg

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