Abstract
This chapter provides an interpretation of Ifeanyi Menkiti’s normative conception of personhood and communalism, in order to use such interpretation as a backdrop for critically examining the criticisms by Kwame Gyekye. Menkiti’s account of communalism indicates that the community plays a significant role in shaping the normative nature of a person. However, Gyekye criticizes Menkiti’s view as a radical form of communitarianism, which implies that the community is ontologically constitutive of the person. This means that personhood is dependent totally on the community, such that the community overrides individual freedom, rights, and autonomy. I argue that Gyekye’s criticism of Menkiti’s view involves a misunderstanding. I clarify Menkiti’s view in order to show that the community does not override individual rights and freedom.
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- 1.
- 2.
Gyekye (1997).
- 3.
For a similar point, see Matolino (2009).
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
Menkiti (1984: 176).
- 7.
Menkiti (2004: 324).
- 8.
Menkiti (1984: 171).
- 9.
Ibid: 176. Emphasis added.
- 10.
Ibid: 179.
- 11.
Ibid.
- 12.
Ibid.
- 13.
Menkiti (2004: 324).
- 14.
Menkiti (1984: 179–180).
- 15.
Ibid: 174.
- 16.
Ibid: 179.
- 17.
Ibid: 172.
- 18.
Ibid.
- 19.
Menkiti (1984: 173).
- 20.
Gyekye (1981, 1997).
- 21.
Ibid: 173.
- 22.
Ibid. Emphasis added.
- 23.
Ibid: 180.
- 24.
Frankena (1963: 35).
- 25.
Menkiti (1984: 180).
- 26.
Menkiti (2004: 324).
- 27.
Menkiti (1984: 171).
- 28.
Mbiti (1969: 141).
- 29.
Menkiti (1984: 171).
- 30.
Menkiti (2004: 324).
- 31.
Menkiti (1984: 172).
- 32.
Ibid. Emphasis added.
- 33.
Ibid. Emphasis added.
- 34.
Menkiti (2004: 326).
- 35.
Ibid: 325.
- 36.
Ibid: 330.
- 37.
Ibid: 328. Emphasis added.
- 38.
Ibid: 327.
- 39.
Ibid: 324.
- 40.
Menkiti (1984: 180). Emphasis added.
- 41.
Gyekye (1997: 56).
- 42.
Ibid: 55–56.
- 43.
Ibid: 40.
- 44.
Ibid: 41.
- 45.
Ibid: 37.
- 46.
Ibid: 49.
- 47.
Gyekye (1984).
- 48.
Gyekye (1997: 49).
- 49.
Ibid.
- 50.
Ibid: 108.
- 51.
Ibid: 49.
- 52.
Ibid.
- 53.
Menkiti (1984: 173).
- 54.
Gyekye (1997: 40).
- 55.
Ibid: 50.
- 56.
Ibid: 49.
- 57.
Menkiti (1984: 175).
- 58.
Gyekye (1997: 50).
- 59.
Ibid: 50–51.
- 60.
Gyekye (1984).
- 61.
Ikuenobe (2006: 52).
- 62.
Gyekye (1997: 37).
- 63.
Ibid: 50.
- 64.
Menkiti (1984: 177).
- 65.
Gyekye (1997: 54).
- 66.
Ibid: 57.
- 67.
Raz (1986).
- 68.
Gyekye (1997: 54–55).
- 69.
Ibid: 54.
- 70.
Raz (1986).
- 71.
Menkiti (1984: 176).
- 72.
Gyekye (1997:47).
- 73.
Ibid: 54.
- 74.
Gyekye (1987: 143).
- 75.
Gyekye (1997: 50–51).
- 76.
Gyekye (1997: 41–43).
- 77.
Ibid: 40.
- 78.
Ibid: 53.
- 79.
Ibid: 56.
- 80.
Ibid: 176. Emphasis added.
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Ikuenobe, P. (2018). An Examination of Menkiti’s Conception of Personhood and Gyekye’s Critique. In: Etieyibo, E. (eds) Method, Substance, and the Future of African Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70226-1_10
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