Abstract
Peter van Inwagen is well known for holding an incompatibilist position, which consists in assuming free will and rejecting determinism. The paper critically discusses his position and contrasts it with fatalism, an alternative version of incompatibilism that consists in the rejection of free will in favor of determinism. Fatalism is often neglected, because many authors charge it to be inconsistent. The paper argues, first, that fatalism is consistent and, second, that it is even plausible on the basis of Humean skepticism. In the end, there will be outlined a specific notion of fatalistic incompatibilism which embraces ancient stoicism.
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Notes
- 1.
It is important to note that those two alternative descriptions are contradictory. The forked path is branching, while the linear path is non-branching as van Inwagen puts it (van Inwagen 2015, 269).
- 2.
See van Inwagen’s example of the Japanese astronomer (van Inwagen 1983, 159).
- 3.
Derk Pereboom gives a detailed analysis of the door scenario and the notion of epistemic openness (Pereboom 2014, Chap. 5).
- 4.
Additionally, it should be mentioned that there is another modal expression in both sentences: The speaker believes that something is the case. So the conjunction in (i) as well as the conjunction in (ii) are within another modal scope themselves. That might be confusing at first glance, but it is not a great deal. The difference between (i) and (ii) is that the speaker has a consistent belief in the first case and an inconsistent belief in the second case. But it is important to note that she only tells us, that she believes there are different possibilities to describe the world. Hence, the truth of (i) and (ii) only requires certain mental attitudes of the speaker; They are, thus, completely independent from general features of actual space-time.
- 5.
Of course, I also could buy both of them, but then the example becomes trivial. Assume that I do not have enough money with me.
- 6.
For van Inwagen’s own struggle to deal with unintuitive claims, see van Inwagen (1990, 108–114).
- 7.
It is for this reason that van Inwagen calls free will a “mystery”, which seems to be the only adequate option for him (van Inwagen 2000, 1).
References
Epictetus. 1928. The Encheiridion. In Discourses, Books 3–4. Fragments. The Encheiridion, trans. William A. Oldfather. Loeb Classical Library 218. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hume, David. [1739/40] 2000. A treatise of human nature, ed. D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton. New York: Oxford University Press.
Pereboom, Derk. 2014. Free will, agency and meaning in life. New York: Oxford University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An essay on free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 1990. Material beings. New York: Cornell University Press.
———. 2000. Freedom remains a mystery. Philosophical Perspectives 14: 1–19.
———. 2015. Metaphysics. 3rd ed. Boulder: Westview Press.
Acknowledgments
With best thanks to the discussion group on Peter van Inwagen’s papers on free will, especially Stefan Becker, Dongbeom Seo and Christian Weidemann for constructive discussions and critical remarks. Also many thanks to Georgia Buckley, Lea A. Schroeder, Dennis Gehlmann and Ludger Jansen for discussion and helpful advice in terms of language and final redaction of the manuscript.
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Reinhart, M. (2018). Embracing Life Without Free Will: A Fatalistic Proposal. In: Jansen, L., Näger, P. (eds) Peter van Inwagen. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70052-6_9
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