Abstract
In this paper, we will discuss Peter van Inwagen’s contribution to the epistemological debate about revealed peer disagreement. Roughly, this debate focuses on situations in which at least two participants disagree on a certain proposition based on the same evidence. This leads to the problem of how one should react rationally when peer disagreement is revealed. Van Inwagen, as we will show, discusses four possible reactions, all of which he rejects as unsatisfying. Our proposal will be to point to hidden assumptions in van Inwagen’s reasoning and ask whether he is willing to reject at least one of these to get rid of the problem. In short, our thesis amounts to the following: Of the two epistemological claims, which we call “Weak” and “Full-blown Fallibilism”, van Inwagen cannot simultaneously accept the first and reject the latter, while this is what he seems to suggest. Revealing this potential dilemma for van Inwagen’s position will lead to a more detailed discussion of how “rationality”, “truth”, “evidence” and “justification” interrelate and how a closer look at their relation might help solving the puzzle of revealed peer disagreement.
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Notes
- 1.
There are at least some hints, however, that van Inwagen might take philosophy to be an exceptional case with regard to the depth, range or indissolubility of disagreement (van Inwagen 2004, 47–51; van Inwagen 2005, 144–146). We will come back to these complications in Sect. 2.4.1. For the moment, however, we can base our generalization of the problem both on direct evidence from the realities of scientific research itself and on clear admission of its reach beyond philosophy in van Inwagen’s texts (cf. van Inwagen 1996, 147–149).
- 2.
That said, we do not want to deny that the layperson’s perspective on the never-ending disputes among philosophers can be trivially dismissed. Of course, reflecting on such a perspective has severe consequences once it comes to the question whether philosophy can be said to be a science or a rational enterprise at all (cf., e.g., Sosa 2011).
- 3.
Van Inwagen mentions a special condition for philosophical disagreements of interest: p and non-p must be controversial positive philosophical propositions (van Inwagen 2009, 16). Van Inwagen admits that it is notoriously difficult to define what a positive philosophical thesis is and tries to outline this notion by a few paradigmatic examples and counterexamples. In his understanding, “Formalism is not the correct philosophy of mathematics” is not a positive philosophical thesis, nor are “Utilitarianism is not an acceptable ethical theory” or “Knowledge is not simply justified true belief”. Yet, while the negation of such a negative belief must be a positive belief, the negation of a positive belief can sometimes also be a positive belief (van Inwagen 2009, 16–17).
One might also wonder whether terms like “compatibilism” or “materialism” may be rightfully treated as if they would clearly denote sufficiently clear-cut philosophical propositions. In order not to complicate matters further, however, we will simply follow van Inwagen in employing these terms “assuming that these terms have been sufficiently well defined that they denote particular propositions” (van Inwagen 2009, 16).
- 4.
According to van Inwagen, the main sort of evidence philosophers have in order to support their beliefs are arguments (van Inwagen 2009, 18–20).
- 5.
We neither claim these options to be exhaustive nor do we read van Inwagen as contending that these paths to solving the puzzle comprise all possible options. Rather, we think van Inwagen discusses these attempts since he ascribes each a certain basic plausibility and we will limit our focus in the same manner.
- 6.
At some points throughout his texts on disagreement, van Inwagen expressly appreciates it as a form of philosophical “heroism” to abstain from any substantial positive philosophical argument whatsoever. On the other hand, however, he is not willing to withdraw to such a purely defensive position (van Inwagen 2009, 35).
- 7.
Cf. van Inwagen 2009, 28–29: “[It] is not essential to the suggestion that I am canvassing that ‘inarticulable’ evidence be essentially or in principle inarticulable. The suggestion requires only that a person have at a certain time evidence that he is not then able to articulate.”
- 8.
Van Inwagen sometimes calls the counterpart to this incommunicable insight “evidence in the courtroom and laboratory sense” (van Inwagen 1996, 149) and lists the following paradigmatic examples: “photographs, transcripts of sworn statements, the pronouncements of expert witnesses, records of meter readings – even arguments, provided that an argument is understood as simply a publicly available piece of text, and that anyone who has read and understood the appropriate piece of text thereby has the evidence that the argument is said to constitute” (van Inwagen 1996, 149).
- 9.
- 10.
Unfortunately, van Inwagen refuses to explicate the concept “sufficient evidence” in much detail (cf. van Inwagen 2009, 20). In fact, this is quite a pity and many of the puzzles bothering us about van Inwagen’s stance on rational disagreement stem from the fact that van Inwagen does not clarify the relation between “sufficient evidence”, on the one hand, and “rational belief”, “justification” and “truth”, on the other.
- 11.
Most obviously the principle plays a crucial role in van Inwagen’s papers“It Is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence” (1996) and“Listening to Clifford’s Ghost”(2009). This famous principle initiated and still plays a central role within the debate about the ethics of belief. For an overview on and introduction to central themes and positions in this debate see Chignell 2013.
- 12.
In the following we do not discuss a potential rejection of premise P1 of the argument: To us, it is obvious that if “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence”, then one should suspend judgment with respect to p in case one has insufficient evidence to believe that p. The reason simply is that epistemically responsible subjects should avoid epistemic wrongdoing.
- 13.
In fact, van Inwagen clearly says that he finds Clifford’s “ethical evidentialism an unattractive thesis” (van Inwagen 2009, 34).
- 14.
- 15.
Still, it bears noting that van Inwagen’s approach to “revisit the problem of free will” partly shares the spirit of philosophical therapy in that it dissolves at least some philosophical debate by going back to doubtful presuppositions of the discussion and reframing or even dissolving the problem (see Chap. 1 in this volume).
- 16.
As we have already mentioned, even van Inwagen draws all of his examples of RPD from philosophy, religion or politics to which some sort of “exceptionalism” might apply (van Inwagen 1996, 147). So if one extends the problem in this manner and is not willing to treat RPD in other disciplines in the same fashion, philosophical exceptionalism would at best provide an incomplete solution.
- 17.
Here, the distinction between different kinds of the much-discussed thesis of the underdetermination of theories by data might be of help (cf., e.g., Seidel 2014, 66–69): Transient underdetermination, i.e. underdetermination given a body of data available, does not undermine scientists’ aspirations to truth and rationality (quite the contrary), and would only if these cases turned to be in fact cases of permanent undetermination, i.e. underdetermination given any data whatsoever. As long as rational peer disagreement upon sufficient evidence does not become permanent, we do not need to fear getting lost on the track to truth.
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Bögner, F., Meyer, T., Schnieder, K., Seidel, M. (2018). Rational Peer Disagreement upon Sufficient Evidence: Leaving the Track to Truth?. In: Jansen, L., Näger, P. (eds) Peter van Inwagen. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70052-6_2
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