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Part of the book series: Studies in Systems, Decision and Control ((SSDC,volume 125))

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Abstract

In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) to the members of a supply chain. We propose model of three-tier supply chain in decentralized state that is including supplier, manufacturer and retailer. For analyzing supply chain performance in decentralized state and the relationships between the members of supply chain, we use Stackelberg game and we consider in this paper a hierarchical equilibrium solution for a two-level game. Specially, we formulate a model that crosses through multiperiods by a dynamic discreet Stackelberg game. We obtain an equilibrium point at where both the profits of members and the level of CSR taken by supply chains are maximized.

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Acknowledgements

This paper is devoted to Professor Jaime Gil-Aluja, who has inspired generations of theorists to relate their theory to interesting issues of economics and has convinced generations of experimentals to believe that his theories might provide useful insights.

The authors are grateful to the referees for their constructive input.

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Correspondence to Massimiliano Ferrara .

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Ferrara, M., Pansera, B.A. (2018). A Dynamic Game for a Sustainable Supply Chain Management. In: Berger-Vachon, C., Gil Lafuente, A., Kacprzyk, J., Kondratenko, Y., Merigó, J., Morabito, C. (eds) Complex Systems: Solutions and Challenges in Economics, Management and Engineering. Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, vol 125. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69989-9_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69989-9_19

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-69989-9

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