Abstract
In this chapter we introduce a networked version of the Possessor’s and Trader’s game, where, among the two basic strategies used in the Hawks-Dove game, hawks (H) and doves (D), it includes two other strategies based on the property of resources: Possession (P), as the right to occupy or possess what one owns; and Trade (T), as the right to buy and sell ownership. The simulations presented in this chapter describe how evolutionary forces, depending on the simulation parameters, allow the emergence of the different type of populations (D, C, P or T) over several complex topologies. The evolution of these populations clearly depends on several parameters as the cost of fighting, the trading values, the network topology, the owner’s probability and, under certain conditions, the neighborhood size. We also study the effect of partner switching (a.k.a. rewiring) to discover that, in all the topologies and conditions analyzed, the results are worse than without rewiring, and the global payoff decreases due to the effect of hawks. We also consider the effect of allowing the agents to accumulate payoff during a certain number of rounds, and we have discovered that the global payoff improves significantly when agents accumulate resources during five rounds or more. Finally, we introduce the possibility to create an informal trading social network, where traders seek for other traders, and connect to them; avoiding the hawks in their own neighborhoods. This trading social network is much more successful for traders, and for the global payoff, than the previous all-to-all attempt.
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Notes
- 1.
Usually the payoffs for the (Hawk, Hawk) strategy are denoted as \((V-C)/2\) each, but in this chapter we assume that \(c=C/2\); keeping the notation from [15] where \(c=h\).
- 2.
Most simulations show relative stability with less than 100 iterations, and this limit was extended five times to provide a higher reliability.
- 3.
Using \(c=0\) we only have hawks, and it is not represented in the figure. Besides, after \(c \ge 4\) the possessors curve remains equal.
- 4.
Note that in [3] we used the typical Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix.
- 5.
Remember that in such game, the dove strategy is not used in practice by the agents, so the percentage of hawks is the complementary.
- 6.
We only present values of \(c \in \{1,2\}\) as for higher values of c the strategy distributions almost do not change.
- 7.
When \(c=0\) hawks are the most popular, even more than without rewiring. When \(c=4\) the results are a bit better for possessor but similar to \(c=3\).
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Acknowledgements
This work was partially supported by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) together with the Galician Regional Government under agreement for funding the Atlantic Research Center for Information and Communication Technologies (AtlantTIC).
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Burguillo, J.C. (2018). Ownership and Trade in Complex Networks. In: Self-organizing Coalitions for Managing Complexity. Emergence, Complexity and Computation, vol 29. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69898-4_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69898-4_11
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