Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Conducting Observations and Tests: Lambert’s Theory of Empirical Science

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
What Does it Mean to be an Empiricist?

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science ((BSPS,volume 331))

  • 353 Accesses

Abstract

The paper aims at analyzing Lambert’s conception of empirical knowledge that is part of scientific learning. Indeed, in the Neues Organon (1764), he claims that science is obtained with the help of both a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Lambert’s originality lies on the application of the analytic and synthetic methods of reasoning, which are traditionally used in formal disciplines, to the realm of experience. Transforming common knowledge into scientific a posteriori knowledge is mainly based on the employment of such demonstrative methods. This allows Lambert to introduce some important theoretical tools in his theory of experience, in particular about the search for the conditions of observations and experimentations as well as the establishment of hypothesis. For Lambert, the synthetic method in empirical deductions requires the use of conjectures and probable principles.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 109.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Lambert’s distinction is most probably partially taken from Wolff’s logic. Indeed, Wolff differentiates between historical, mathematical, and philosophical cognitions. The first enables us to conceive of particular facts, the second to measure quantities between things, and the third to explain how things are possible. This means, in particular, that philosophical knowledge shows how things, which are at first known through historical cognition, are possible entities (Wolff 1962).

  2. 2.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 386–387.

  3. 3.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 390–391.

  4. 4.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 414–415.

  5. 5.

    These three sciences are grounded on the simple concepts of space and time. First, geometry relies on the concept of space, constructing all figures and bodies from the spatial properties of the point, the distance, and the line. Second, chronometry is based on the concept of time, measuring its segmentations into cycles, periods, etc. Third, phoronomy is the theory of motion, velocity, and translation, which is made possible by the combination of both primitive concepts of space and time (Lambert 1965a, I, 423). In the Anlage zur Architektonik, Lambert details sciences that are founded on primitive concepts (Lambert 1965b, 40–47).

  6. 6.

    Debru (1977); Wolters (1980); Basso (1999); Leduc (2016). Recently, Maarten Bullynck has, however, examined Lambert’s application of his experimental method in hygrometry (Bullynck 2010).

  7. 7.

    Letter to Kant of November 1765, see Lambert (1968), 338–339 and Kant (1900), X, 66–67.

  8. 8.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 497–498; Lambert (1965b), 40–41.

  9. 9.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 472.

  10. 10.

    Lambert (2008), 446; Kant (2009), 243.

  11. 11.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 460.

  12. 12.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 95.

  13. 13.

    We find a similar distinction in Wolff (1965), 161–162.

  14. 14.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 423.

  15. 15.

    Lambert constantly refers to these authors when he examines the method of analyzing, especially in the Anlage zur Architektonik (Lambert 1965b, 6–13). Lambert is nevertheless quite critical of Wolff’s method, since he did not, according to Lambert, always follow the Euclidian model, which is at the basis of the geometrical methodology. For example, in the Deutsche Metaphysik (Wolff 2009), Wolff did not always provide the postulates and problems that were necessary for his demonstrations. In a recent paper, Katherine Dunlop analyzes these criticisms (Dunlop 2009).

  16. 16.

    Lambert (1965b), 21.

  17. 17.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 96.

  18. 18.

    Locke (1706), Book 2, Chap. 4, sections 1–6.

  19. 19.

    Although Lambert seems to maintain the same general model of cognition in both the Criterium veritatis (Lambert 2008) and the Neues Organon (Lambert 1965a), especially regarding the role of experience, there are of course some differences. On this aspect, see: Wolters (1980), 58–76.

  20. 20.

    Lambert already affirms this in the Criterium veritatis (Lambert 2008, 446–447).

  21. 21.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 348.

  22. 22.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 349–350.

  23. 23.

    Lambert explains how we can attain distinct and complete concepts in the first section of the Dianoiologie (Lambert 1965a, I, 6–10).

  24. 24.

    The last book of the Neues Organon (Lambert 1965a) called Phenomenologie, is devoted to this distinction between truth and appearances. Once again, Lambert probably took the concept of subreption from Wolff (1973, 484).

  25. 25.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 351.

  26. 26.

    Idem.

  27. 27.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 368. On chemistry in the eighteenth Century, see the article of Bernard Joly, Chap. 11, in this volume.

  28. 28.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 357.

  29. 29.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 352–353.

  30. 30.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 353.

  31. 31.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 365–366.

  32. 32.

    On this question, see the article of Siegfried Bodenmann, Chap. 6, in this volume.

  33. 33.

    Trembley (1744), iii.

  34. 34.

    Lambert also gives the example of Christopher Columbus who was seeking a road to reach India, but ended up discovering the American continents. In this case, the result was completely undetermined, although there was an intention and a preparation for finding a new sea route: Lambert (1965a), I, 366.

  35. 35.

    Lambert’s position must also be compared with some doctrines held by philosophers at the Berlin Academy of Science, that Lambert joins in 1763. Leonhard Euler, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis and Johann Bernhard Merian were important figures of this institution, who maintained ideas about scientific methodology. On this topic, see the article of André Charrak, Chap. 10, in this volume, but also Leduc & Dumouchel (2015).

  36. 36.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 387.

  37. 37.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 370.

  38. 38.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 373–374.

  39. 39.

    As Lambert explains in the Criterium veritatis, analysis, in its general sense, is used to resolve a concept or a proposition into simpler contents. In a way, it does not provide new knowledge; rather it decomposes already acquired cognitive content (Lambert 2008, 438–439). In contrast, synthesis constitutes a true method of discovery (Lambert 2008, 443).

  40. 40.

    Wolff already mentions this point in his theory of experience (Wolff 1965, 185–186).

  41. 41.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 371–372. Earlier, Lambert makes reference to Jean Richer’s numerous observations with the pendulum, especially in Cayenne (Lambert 1965a, I, 355). But these experiences are considered by Lambert, as Fremderfahrungen, namely experiences made by others. Experiences conducted by others can be accepted only under strict conditions of validation. In particular, all the concepts and individuals involved in the experience must be known to us, otherwise it only provides incomplete and unreliable knowledge: “Besonders aber ist anzumerken, dass wenn die Erfahrung, so man von andern hat, einen neuen Begriff in sich schliesst, aus diesem Begriffe alle Individualien notwendig wegbleiben, und daher die Erzählung unvollständig wird” (Lambert 1965a, I, 354).

  42. 42.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 372–373.

  43. 43.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 374–375.

  44. 44.

    Buffon (1749–89), Tome II, 41–52. On Buffon’s theory of experience, see the article of Catherine Wilson, Chap. 7, in this volume.

  45. 45.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 367.

  46. 46.

    Aristotle (1982), II, 3.

  47. 47.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 363–364. Otto von Guericke summarizes the results of his experiments in the third chapter of his Experimenta nova (ut vocantur) magdeburgica de vacuo spatio (Guericke 1672), 71–73.

  48. 48.

    Newton (1687), III, prop. XIX-XX.

  49. 49.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 359–360.

  50. 50.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 42–43. In the following paragraphs, Lambert also mentions a second way of showing the possibility of a thing, namely the demonstration. In this regard, Leibniz and Wolff have maintained a very similar position, see Leibniz (1999), 589 and Wolff (1965), 140–141.

  51. 51.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 363.

  52. 52.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 369.

  53. 53.

    Lambert (1965a), I, 375.

Bibliography

Other Primary Literature

  • Aristotle. 1982. De generatione et corruptione. Trans. with notes by C.J.F. Williams. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Buffon, Georges-Louis Leclerc. 1749–88. Histoire Naturelle générale et particulière. Paris: Imprimerie Royale., 36 vols.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guericke, Otto von. 1672. Experimenta nova (ut vocantur) Magdeburgica de vacuo spatio. Amsterdam: Johann Jansson.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, Immanuel. 1900. Kants gesammelte Schriften, ed. Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, reprint. Berlin: De Gruyter.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2009. Kant’s Critique of pure reason. Background source materials, ed. and transl. by Eric Watkins. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lambert, Johann Heinrich. 1965a. Neues Organon oder Gedanken über die Erforschung und Bezeichnung des Wahren und dessen Unterscheidung von Irrthum und Schein (1764), ed. Hans-Werner Arndt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms (Philosophische Schriften 1-2).

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1965b. Anlage zur Architektonik oder Theorie des Einfachen und Ersten in der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntnis (1771), ed. Hans-Werner Arndt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms (Philosophische Schriften 3).

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1968. Briefwechsel, ed. by Hans-Werner Arndt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, vol. 1. (Philosophische Schriften 9)

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2008. Abhandlung vom Criterium veritatis. Hildesheim: Georg Olms. (Philosophische Schriften 10).

    Google Scholar 

  • Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1999. Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, VI: “Philosophische Schriften”, vol. 4: “1677 – Juni 1690”. Berlin: Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

    Google Scholar 

  • Locke, John. 1706. An essay concerning human understanding. 5th ed. London: Churchill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Newton, Isaac. 1687. Philosophiae Naturalis Principia mathematica. London: Joseph Streater for the Royal Society.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Trembley, Abraham. 1744. Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire d’un genre de polype d’eau douce, à bras en forme de cornes. Leyden: Jean & Herman Verbeek.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wolff, Christian. 1962. Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere. Hildesheim: Georg Olms. (Gesammelte Werke II, vol. 1.1), 3–5.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1965. Vernünfftige Gedancken von den Kräfften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauch in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit or Deutsche Logik (reprint of Halle 1713), ed. Jean École. Hildesheim: Georg Olms (Gesammelte Werke I, vol. 1).

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1973. Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere. Philosophia rationalis sive Logica, methodo scientifica pertractata et ad usum scientiarum atque vitae aptata (reprint of Frankfurt and Leipzig 1740), ed. Jean École. Hildesheim: Georg Olms (Gesammelte Werke II, vol 1.1–3).

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2009. Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt or Deutsche Metaphysik (reprint of Halle 1751), ed. Charles A. Corr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms (Gesammelte Werke I, vol. 2.1).

    Google Scholar 

Secondary Literature

  • Basso, Paolo. 1999. Filosofia e geometria Lambert interprete di Euclide. Florence: La Nuova Italia.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bullynck, Maarten. 2010. Johann Heinrich Lambert’s scientific tool Kit, exemplified by his measurement of humidity, 1769–1772. Science in Context 23 (1): 65–89.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Debru, Claude. 1977. Analyse et représentation. De la méthodologie à la théorie de l’espace. Paris: Vrin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dunlop, Katrin. 2009. Why Euclid’s geometry brooked no doubt: J. H. Lambert on certainty and the existence of models. Synthese 167: 48–52.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leduc, Christian. 2016. Métaphysique et mathématique chez Lambert. Une réponse à la Preisfrage de 1763. In Les Métaphysiques des Lumières, dir. par P. Girard, C. Leduc et M. Rioux-Beaulne, 207–225. Paris: Classiques Garnier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leduc, Christian, and Daniel Dumouchel, eds. 2015. La philosophie à l’Académie de Berlin au XVIIIe siècle. (Philosophiques 42/1, 7–130). Online edition: http://www.erudit.org/revue/philoso/2015/v42/n1/.

  • Wolters, Gereon. 1980. Basis und Deduktion. Studien zur Entstehung und Bedeutung der Theorie der axiomatischen Methode bei J. H. Lambert, 1728–1777. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada

    Christian Leduc

Authors
  1. Christian Leduc
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Christian Leduc .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of History, University of Zurich, Zürich, Switzerland

    Siegfried Bodenmann

  2. History and Philosophy of Science, Lille University/Marie Curie Individual Fellowship Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussel, Belgium

    Anne-Lise Rey

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Leduc, C. (2018). Conducting Observations and Tests: Lambert’s Theory of Empirical Science. In: Bodenmann, S., Rey, AL. (eds) What Does it Mean to be an Empiricist?. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 331. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69860-1_12

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation