The Shapley-value

  • László Á. Kóczy
Part of the Theory and Decision Library C book series (TDLC, volume 48)


The value introduced by Shapley is still one of the most popular solution concepts for cooperative games. As a well-defined, always nonempty solution, it is an attractive solution that is supported by a fine axiomatisation and is a model that has also been implemented. When externalities are introduced into the game, both its axiomatisation — namely, the Null Player Property — and its construction looking at marginal contributions need to be modified. In this Chapter we use the already modified axioms to establish values that resemble the Shapley-value in some sense as well as present some results where natural extensions of the Shapley-value are modified. We discuss the potential approach for partition function form games and present result for the implementation and the calculation of extended Shapleyvalues.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Economics, Centre for Economics and Regional StudiesHungarian Academy of SciencesBudapestHungary

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