Abstract
Cooperative game theory allows players to realise common goals, but it is not about altruistically helping each other. This part of the book deals with models where the focus is at the joint, cooperative ability of players to represent their interests, to maximise their payoffs. Coalitions may set their hopes high, but what they wish and can achieve may or may not be the same. Dominance combines the both and is the fundamental concept that shapes cooperative negotiations and determines possible equilibrium agreements.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kóczy, L.Á. (2018). Dominance. In: Partition Function Form Games. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 48. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69841-0_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69841-0_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-69840-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-69841-0
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)