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Wireless Datapaths and Security

  • B. Gil
  • H. Ip
  • Guang-Zhong Yang
Chapter

Abstract

For Implantable Medical Devices (IMD), we have discussed in the previous chapters the technical challenges related to biocompatible materials, flexible fabrication processes, system-on-chip design, low-power operation, and packaging. Increasingly advanced computing capabilities found in IMDs and networking technologies can further broaden the applications and enhance the functions of these devices. However, they can only make a real impact on healthcare when a high level of security is incorporated in these devices. This chapter discusses the relationship between different components of an IMD security system under intrinsic resource constraints. A qualitative overview of the strategies commonly used to provide a secure implant system is provided and the chapter covers the design considerations of lightweight and no-hardware-intensive algorithms for implants.

List of Acronyms

ACL

Control access list

AOA

Angle of arrival

ASIC

Application specific integrated circuit

BCC

Body-coupled communication

CA

Cellar automata

CMOS

Complementary metal-oxide semiconductor

DTOA

Differential time of arrival

ECC

Error correcting codes

EEG

Electroencephalogram

EMA

European Medicines Agency

ESDS

ECG-based secret data sharing

FDA

Food and Drug Administration

GE

Gate equivalents

IID

Independent-identically distributed

IMD

Implantable device

LFSR

Linear feedback shift register

LPN

Learning parity in the presence of noise

MAC

Message authentication code

MICS

Medical Implant Communication System

NFC

Near-field communication

NFSR

Nonlinear feedback shift register

OTP

One-time pads

PKI

Public-key infrastructure

PRG

Pseudorandom generator

RAM

Random access memory

RF

Radiofrequency

RFID

Radiofrequency identification

RN

Random number

RSSI

Received signal strength indicator

RV

Random variable

SHA

Secure hash algorithm

TOA

Time-of-arrival

USRP

Universal software radio peripheral

WMTS

Wireless Medical Telemetry Services

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Hamlyn CentreImperial College LondonLondonUK

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