Abstract
This chapter gives an account of Nigeria’s first engagement with regulatory cooperation, and the normative drivers that drove a rapprochement to Montreux. The policy choice of contracting is associated to the fight against Boko Haram and to contingencies, including political transition. I delineate how state responsibility may arise for a territorial and contracting state—direct attribution of wrongful conduct to the hiring state—or a state failure to prevent, investigate, punish, or redress PMSC conduct. Thus, the engagement with Montreux Document would be significant step in clarifying the responsibilities with possible regional implications for other states and for regional and continental political organizations.
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Notes
- 1.
Jack Murphy’s interview to Eeben Barlow. Blog post. Available at: http://sofrep.com/40633/eeben-barlow-speaks-pt-3-tactics-used-destroy-boko-haram/#ixzz3buTIuECZ Accessed June 1, 2015.
- 2.
Ibid. Also: Barlow advocates relentless offensive action means immediately exploiting successful combat operations to keep the heat on the enemy. This strategy relies on the synchronization of every asset brought to the battlefield, and applied on multiple fronts against Boko Haram . One of those tactics includes the relentless pursuit of enemy forces.
- 3.
Her definition avoids several important conceptual problems inherent to the conventional definitions. Cf. Chap. 1.
- 4.
Cf., the section “The Wonga Coup” in Chap. 6.
- 5.
Rona also note the important point that the government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya departs from the traditional practices witnessed in the twentieth century; mercenaries were not used to overthrow the government: allegedly, they were used by the government to quell civilian protests. Rona 2013, p. 324.
- 6.
For the theory on information effects, I refer here to Mattli and Woods 2009.
- 7.
Jack Murphy’s interview to Eeben Barlow mentions this event as the game changer. “STTEP was contracted to deploy to Nigeria. Their mission was to train a mobile strike force to rescue the Chibok school girls kidnapped by Boko Haram.”
- 8.
- 9.
The Economist. Private security is hollowing out Nigeria’s security forces. October 17th, 2015. The source cited is Red24, a Scottish security firm. It is obviously an estimate.
- 10.
The campaign focused equally on Boko Haram and on the Nigerian government, and its ineptitude, corruption, and brutality. It criticizes not only Boko Haram’s devastating actions but also the environment that has given the group its raison d’être and the ability to conduct such a major attack. Nigerians asked for the return of the Chibok girls, of course, but also for better governance, more security, and less corruption. The activist message simplified a complicated story, but it did break through that domestic barrier.
- 11.
Authors’ interviews, March 2015.
- 12.
“Some of them are in the executive arm of government, some of them are in the parliamentary/legislative arm of government, while some of them are even in the judiciary.” Cited in Pham, J. P. (2012).
- 13.
Authors’ interviews, March 2015.
- 14.
Nigeria Hires S’ African Mercenaries Again to Battle Boko Haram. October 23, 2015, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nigeria-hires-s-african-mercenaries-again-to-battle-boko-haram/223527/ Accessed November 15, 2015.
- 15.
I refer to Van de Walle 2001.
- 16.
The Nigeria Social Violence Project is led by Dr. P. Lewis at the African Studies Program at Johns Hopkins SAIS; Available at: http://www.connectsaisafrica.org/research/african-studies-publications/social-violence-nigeria/
- 17.
Armed and made up of Niger Delta Militants with Consultants from foreign PMSCs. Email correspondence, Gen. Ishola Williams, March 2015.
- 18.
Email correspondence, Gen. Ishola Williams, March 2015.
- 19.
Ibid.
- 20.
Ibid.
- 21.
At present, this has not been established.
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Boggero, M. (2018). Nigeria’s Engagement. In: The Governance of Private Security . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69593-8_7
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