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Mainstreaming Investment-Labour Linkage Through ‘Mega-Regional’ Trade Agreements

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Labour Standards in International Economic Law

Abstract

A growing number of large-scale free trade agreements, so-called ‘mega-regionals’, contain both investment and labour provisions. In this chapter, we argue that this bears the potential for mainstreaming investment-labour linkage into international investment law. Prompted by this prospect, we engage in an indepth analysis of the particular components of investment-labour linkages, their potentials and shortcomings. Our main observation is that the investment-labour linkage contained in the examined agreements has the potential to contribute to a more adequate balance between investors’ and workers’ interests. However, since the respective provisions largely leave this linkage to the stage of treaty interpretation and implementation, the tapping of this potential will eventually depend on the willingness and ability of investors and governments.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We use this term as a generic term for all treaties containing provisions of investment law, including bi- and plurilateral investment agreements, free trade agreements etc.

  2. 2.

    Gordon et al. (2014), p. 12.

  3. 3.

    Hereinafter ‘TTIP Proposal (I)’.

  4. 4.

    Hereinafter ‘TTIP Proposal (SD)’.

  5. 5.

    Stoll and Holterhus (2016).

  6. 6.

    For example, TTIP would cover around 50% of global trade and 30% of global GDP, Vogt (2015).

  7. 7.

    In the case of TPP, the withdrawal of the signature by the USA on 23 January 2017 and, in the case of TTIP, inter alia, the stagnating negotiations between the USA and the EU.

  8. 8.

    Stoll and Holterhus (2016). For an earlier account on multilateralization on the basis of most favoured nation-obligations see Schill (2009).

  9. 9.

    Examples are, with respect to the USA and Canada, NAFTA, but also the three treaties examined here.

  10. 10.

    Stoll and Holterhus (2016).

  11. 11.

    Stoll and Holterhus (2016).

  12. 12.

    Stoll and Holterhus (2016).

  13. 13.

    For analyses, see e.g. Dombois et al. (2004) and Finbow (2006).

  14. 14.

    See the survey by Van Duzer (2016a).

  15. 15.

    Of all IIAs concluded in 2012, around 40% contained labour provisions, see Gordon et al. (2014), p. 11.

  16. 16.

    Gordon et al. (2014), p. 12.

  17. 17.

    E.g. Prislan and Zandvliet (2013) and Zimmer (2017).

  18. 18.

    Gordon et al. (2014), pp. 10 ff. and Van Duzer (2016a), p. 171.

  19. 19.

    Van Duzer (2016a), p. 171.

  20. 20.

    See the references in Schrijver (2008) and Novitz (2017).

  21. 21.

    ILA (2002), p. 212.

    See also the ‘classic’ but more general definition in the World Commission on Environment and Development’s Report ‘Our Common Future’ (the so-called Brundtland Report): ‘We define [sustainable development] as paths of human progress that meet the needs and aspirations of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs’, WECD (1987).

  22. 22.

    See the thoughtful and in-depth analysis by Gehne (2011) and further Berner (2016), p. 182 f.

  23. 23.

    See e.g. the contributions in Cordonier Segger et al. (2011) and Berner (2016).

  24. 24.

    ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, adopted on 10 June 2008, preambular clause 5.

  25. 25.

    On these see Schrijver (2008) and Van Duzer (2016a), p. 143.

  26. 26.

    See e.g. Preamble Clause 9 CETA, which reads: ‘The Parties […] REAFFIRMING their commitment to promote sustainable development and the development of international trade in such a way as to contribute to sustainable development in its economic, social and environmental dimensions’ (capitals in original). See also Chapters 22–24 CETA and TTIP (SD). For the EU, this marks a departure from including human rights clauses in its earlier agreements, see Bartels (2012) and Novitz (2017).

  27. 27.

    See Schrijver (2008), p. 85.

  28. 28.

    Preamble Clause 1 and Art. 19.10 (6) (b) TPP.

  29. 29.

    Preamble Clause 12 TPP.

  30. 30.

    Art. 23.1(5) and Art. 23.3(4) TPP.

  31. 31.

    For example, Art. 22.1 CETA reads, in relevant parts: ‘The Parties recognise that economic development, social development and environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of sustainable development […].’ See also Art. 1(1) and Art. 2 TTIP Proposal (SD).

  32. 32.

    Further elaborated in the remaining articles of the TTIP Proposal (SD), see also Art. 22.1 CETA.

  33. 33.

    Art. 22.1 CETA. CETA mentions ‘investment’ only on certain provisions of its labour and environmental chapters, e.g. in Art. 23.3(3), Art. 23.4, Art. 24.5 and Art. 24.8(1) CETA.

  34. 34.

    Van Duzer (2016a), p. 148 et seq.

  35. 35.

    NAFTA Arbitral Panel, In the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain United States Origin Agricultural Products, Final Panel Report, 2 Dec 1996, CDA 95-2008-01, para. 122 and NAFTA Arbitral Panel, In the Matter of Cross Border Trucking Services, Final Panel Report, 6 Feb 2001, USA-MEX-98-2008-01, paras. 219 and 237.

  36. 36.

    Chapter 29 TPP; Art. 28.3 et seqq. CETA and Art. 9 TTIP Proposal (I) (drafters’ note).

  37. 37.

    E.g. Art. 8.15 CETA.

  38. 38.

    Art. XX (a) GATT. See Blüthner (2004) and Cottier (2017).

  39. 39.

    Art. XX (b) GATT.

  40. 40.

    Art. XX (e) GATT.

  41. 41.

    Art. 8.9 (1) CETA; Art. 3 (2) TTIP Proposal (SD) and Art. 2 (1) TTIP Proposal (I).

  42. 42.

    Art. 8.9 (1) CETA and Art. 2 (1) TTIP Proposal (I). Surprisingly, the non-exhaustive list of ‘legitimate public welfare objectives’ in Annex 8-A(3) CETA (concerning indirect expropriation) does not name labour or social objectives (Cf. Annex I (3) TTIP Proposal (I)). The precise scope of the term ‘social protection’ contained in CETA remains open. There is a chance that the term covers at least certain labour objectives.

  43. 43.

    Art. 8.9 (2) CETA and cf. the slightly different tone in Art. 2 (2) TTIP Proposal (I).

  44. 44.

    Art. 9.15 TPP.

  45. 45.

    As to TPP, the right to regulate is only reaffirmed with regard to ‘measures otherwise consistent with this [i.e. the investment] Chapter’ (Art. 9.15 TPP), arguably confining the clause’s legal relevance to an explicit restatement.

  46. 46.

    See the cases discussed below under Sect. 2.4. For a comparable example from outside the investment law context see ECJ, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 11 Dec2007, C-438/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772, para. 45.

  47. 47.

    Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 148 and Mills (2014), pp. 437 ff.

  48. 48.

    E.g. UNCITRAL, Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, paras. 305–306.

  49. 49.

    By exemplary comparison, the 2012 SADC Model BIT Template does not only stipulate the right to regulate, but also contains language on its reconciliation with investor rights through exceptions or balancing (Art. 20.1 and 20.2 SADC Model BIT Template).

  50. 50.

    For an overview over FTA labour provisions see Lazo Grandi (2009) and ILO (2013).

  51. 51.

    E.g. Art. 9.4, Art. 9.5 and Art. 9.9 TPP and Chapter 8 Section B CETA.

  52. 52.

    In some agreements, this is the sole content of NLS clauses, see e.g. Art. 5 (1) Austria-Kosovo-BIT; Art. 5 (1) Austria-Tadjikistan-BIT and Prislan and Zandvliet (2013), p. 24.

  53. 53.

    Art. 23.4 CETA; Art. 17 TTIP Proposal (SD) and Art. 19.4 and Art. 19.5 TPP.

  54. 54.

    Art. 19.4 TPP, thereby, however, expanding NLS obligations as compared to earlier US agreements, e.g. Art. 16.2 (2) CAFTA-DR, see Ebert (2017).

  55. 55.

    All these points are also mentioned by Prislan and Zandvliet (2013), p. 25.

  56. 56.

    E.g. Art. 16.2 (a) CAFTA-DR. See Abel (2017).

  57. 57.

    Art. 23.4 CETA; Art. 17 TTIP Proposal (SD) and Art. 19.5(1) TPP.

  58. 58.

    Prislan and Zandvliet (2013), p. 24.

  59. 59.

    Prislan and Zandvliet (2013), p. 24.

  60. 60.

    Art. 19.4 and Art. 19.5 (1) TPP, see also e.g. Art. 16.2 (a) CAFTA-DR.

  61. 61.

    Art. 17 TTIP Proposal (SD): ‘[The parties shall not derogate] in order to encourage, or in a manner affecting, trade or investment’.

  62. 62.

    In this vein, the intentional element in CETA’s NLS clause resembles a codification of the ‘aims-and-effects test’ discussed in WTO jurisprudence. In WTO, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Panel, 11 July 1996, WT/DS8/R, para. 6.16–6.19, the panel rejected this test for the same reasons as given here, implicitly upheld by the Appellate Body in WTO, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, 4 Oct 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, para. 115.

  63. 63.

    OECD (1996), Brown (2000) and Häberli et al. (2012).

  64. 64.

    In this respect, a crucial—presently open—question will be whether the clause requires causation or merely coincidence, the latter arguably being easier to establish.

  65. 65.

    Office of the Unites States Trade Representative, In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, US Initial Written Submission, 3 Nov 2014, paras. 96–103; US Oral Statement, 2 June 2015, paras. 27–30; US Supplementary Written Submission, 17 June 2015, para. 8; Initial Written Submission of Guatemala, 2 Feb 2015, paras. 451–472 and Guatemala’s Supplementary Submission and Replies to Panel Questions, 17 June 2015, paras. 16–20.

  66. 66.

    For a use of this expression in a domestic constitutional context, see Stoll et al. (2017).

  67. 67.

    Art. 19.3 TPP; see also Art. 19.6 TPP on measures to discourage the importation of goods produced by forced or compulsory labour. The TTIP-Proposal contains issue-specific articles on core labour standards instead of referencing specific ILO Conventions, Arts. 4–8 TTIP Proposal (SD).

  68. 68.

    Art. 23.2 CETA and Art. 3(2) TTIP Proposal (SD).

  69. 69.

    See e.g. PCIJ, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. UK), 1924, PCIJ Series A No. 2, p. 34 and ICJ, Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2009, p. 213, 238, para. 52; see also Tzanakopoulos and Ventouratou (2017).

  70. 70.

    Cf. ILO (2013), Ebert (2017) and Vogt (2015).

  71. 71.

    Art. 23.2 CETA reads: ‘[…] each Party shall seek to ensure those laws and policies provide for and encourage high levels of labour protection and shall strive to continue to improve such laws and policies with the goal of providing high levels of labour protection.’ Cf. the somewhat stronger language (‘[…] shall ensure […]’) in Art. 3 (2) TTIP Proposal (SD).

  72. 72.

    Stoll et al. (2015), p. 17.

  73. 73.

    See Alschner (2017), pp. 57 et seqq.

  74. 74.

    For an exception which likely applies to at least some labour standards, see Annex I (3) TTIP Proposal (I) (‘social protection’).

  75. 75.

    Art. 9.7 (1) TPP; Art. 8.12 (1) CETA and Art. 5 (1) TTIP Proposal (I). See also Art. 1110 NAFTA; Art. 13 Energy Charter Treaty and Reinisch (2008), p. 420 et seqq.

  76. 76.

    On these terms see Reinisch (2008) and López Escarcena (2014).

  77. 77.

    See the definition of ‘measure’ in Art. 1.1 CETA.

  78. 78.

    See generally e.g. Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, 16 Sep 2003, para. 20.29 and Reinisch (2008), p. 432.

  79. 79.

    E.g. Sornarajah (2015), p. 210 and Zimmer (2017) with further references.

  80. 80.

    Veolia Propreté v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/15, arbitration pending.

  81. 81.

    Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, 4 Aug 2010.

  82. 82.

    Antoine Goetz et al. v. Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, 10 Feb 1999.

  83. 83.

    Annex 9-B TPP; Annex 8-A CETA and Annex I TTIP Proposal (I).

  84. 84.

    Annex 9-B(3)(a) TPP.

  85. 85.

    Quote from Annex 8-A (3) CETA, see also Annex I(3) TTIP Proposal (I) and Annex 9-B(3)(b) TPP.

  86. 86.

    IUSCT, Starrett Housing Corp. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Interlocutory Award, 4 Iran-US CTR 122 (158), 19 Dec 1983.

  87. 87.

    See Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 133 et seqq.

  88. 88.

    UNCITRAL, Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v. Mongolia, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 28 Apr 2011, paras. 350 et seqq.

  89. 89.

    UNCITRAL, Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v. Mongolia, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 28 April 2011, para. 362.

  90. 90.

    Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, 29 May 2003.

  91. 91.

    Art. 8.10 (2) CETA and Sec. 2 Art. 3 (2) TTIP Proposal (I).

  92. 92.

    Art. 8.10 (2) CETA and Sec. 2 Art. 3 (2) (f) TTIP Proposal (I).

  93. 93.

    Art. 9.6 (1) and Annex 9-A TPP.

  94. 94.

    On the debate on divergences and convergences between the customary FET standard and autonomous FET standards in IIAs and FTAs see Dralle (2011), p. 8 et seqq. and Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 130 et seqq. with further references.

  95. 95.

    See Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 145 et seqq. with references to arbitral practice.

  96. 96.

    UNCITRAL, Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic, 17 Mar 2006, paras. 305–306.

  97. 97.

    Art. 9.6 (4) TPP.

  98. 98.

    Art. 8.10 (4) CETA and Sec. 1 Art. 3 (4) TTIP (I).

  99. 99.

    In this regard, the ICSID Tribunal in El Paso endorsed and applied in the context of FET the Iran-US Claims Tribunal’s general findings in Starrett Housing concerning strikes, lock-outs and changes of the economic and social system, ICSID, El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 31 October 2011, para. 363.

  100. 100.

    UNCITRAL, Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v. Mongolia, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 28 Apr 2011, paras. 363 et seqq.

  101. 101.

    UNCITRAL, Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v. Mongolia, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 28 Apr 2011, para. 370.

  102. 102.

    Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 161.

  103. 103.

    ICSID, Noble Ventures v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 12 Oct 2005, para 160 et seqq.

  104. 104.

    ICSID, Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 27 Aug 2008, para. 236.

  105. 105.

    A similar situation was at stake in the ELSI case, ICJ, Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), Judgment, 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports 1989, p. 15 (63 et seqq.), paras. 103 et seqq.

  106. 106.

    ICJ, Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), Judgment, 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports 1989, p. 15 (65), para. 108.

  107. 107.

    ICSID, Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 27 Aug 2008, para. 179 f. and ICSID, Noble Ventures v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 12 Oct 2005, para 164 with further references. Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 161.

  108. 108.

    Prior international investment jurisprudence has not touched on these distinctions in greater detail, as the respective claims were dismissed on factual grounds.

  109. 109.

    ICSID, Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 27 Aug 2008, paras. 248–249.

  110. 110.

    See ICSID, Noble Ventures v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 12 Oct 2005, para. 166.

  111. 111.

    Art. 9.6 (2) (b) TPP.

  112. 112.

    Art. 8.10 (5) CETA.

  113. 113.

    In the context of labour issues, this broader interpretation was e.g. pleaded by the claimants—but rejected by the tribunal—in UNCITRAL, Paushok v. Mongolia (Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v. Mongolia, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 28 Apr 2011, para. 361. Unlike CETA, TTIP and TPP, some BITs explicitly include legal security, Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 161.

  114. 114.

    See the contributions by Gehne, Krause and Aghazadeh in this volume.

  115. 115.

    Hepburn and Kuuya (2011), pp. 596–607.

  116. 116.

    Art. 72 (b) and (c) EU-CARIFORUM.

  117. 117.

    Chapter III, notably Art. 14 ECOWAS Supplementary Act.

  118. 118.

    Art. 18 (3)–(5) ECOWAS Supplementary Act.

  119. 119.

    Part 3 SADC Model BIT Template, especially Art. 15 and Art. 19.

  120. 120.

    Art. 19.7 TPP. In a similar vein, in Art. 9.16 TPP, ‘The Parties reaffirm the importance of each Party encouraging enterprises operating within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate into their internal policies those internationally recognised standards, guidelines and principles of corporate social responsibility that have been endorsed or are supported by that Party.’

  121. 121.

    Preamble Clause 10 and Art. 22.3 (2) (b) CETA. With regard to labour, see especially Part 1 V of the Guidelines.

  122. 122.

    Art. 22.3 (2) CETA.

  123. 123.

    Art. 19.10 (6) (t) TPP.

  124. 124.

    Art. 20 TTIP-Proposal (SD).

  125. 125.

    Art. 20 (3) TTIP (SD).

  126. 126.

    Art. 20 (4) and (5) TTIP (SD).

  127. 127.

    The distinction between indirect obligations, addressed to the state parties, and direct obligations, addressing the investor, is borrowed from Hepburn and Kuuya (2011).

  128. 128.

    Hepburn and Kuuya (2011), p. 609.

  129. 129.

    The ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership Commission’ (Art. 27.1 TPP), the ‘CETA Joint Committee’ (Art. 26.1 CETA) and the ‘Joint Committee’ (Art. X.1 TTIP (Inst)).

  130. 130.

    Art. 26.2 CETA; Art. X.2 and Art. X.3 TTIP (Inst) and Art. 27.2 (2) (a) TPP.

  131. 131.

    The main committees in CETA and TTIP meet in regular intervals; the default rule foresees annual meetings, Art. 26.1 (2) CETA and Art. X.1 (2) TTIP (Inst). The meeting intervals of the TPP main committee is more flexible, Art. 27.4 (1) TPP. The same applies to some subcommittees under all three drafts (see e.g. Art. 22.4(2) CETA). The CETA and TTIP committees’ standing orders are not predefined in the treaties but placed at their discretion (for the main committees see Art. 26.1 (4) (d) CETA and Art. X.1(5)(g) TTIP (Inst); for the subcommittees see Art. 26.2 (4) CETA and Art. X.3 (3) TTIP (Inst)), while Art. 27.4 TPP contains at least some general standing orders for the TPP committees.

  132. 132.

    Art. 26.3 CETA; Art. X.4 TTIP (Inst) and Art. 27.3 TPP.

  133. 133.

    Arts. 22.4 and Art. 26.2.1 (g) CETA and Art. X.3 (1) (c) TTIP (Inst).

  134. 134.

    See the TPP Labour Council, Art. 19.12 TPP.

  135. 135.

    Art. 8.44 CETA and Art. X.3 (b) TTIP (Inst).

  136. 136.

    Art. 27.2 (2) (a) TPP.

  137. 137.

    Art. 8.31 (3) CETA; Sec. 3, Art. 13 (5) TTIP (I) and Art. 9.24 (3) and Art. 27.2 (2) (f) TPP.

  138. 138.

    Art. 26.1 (5) (e) CETA; Art. X.1 (6) (b) TTIP (Inst) and Art. 27.2 (2) (f) TPP.

  139. 139.

    Art. 26.1 (5) (e) CETA; Art. X.1 (6) (b) TTIP (Inst) and Art. 9.24 (3) TPP.

  140. 140.

    For example, the intergovernmental Commission for Labor Cooperation established under NAALC has failed to ever ascertain a significant role in the implementation of the agreement.

  141. 141.

    Further on these mechanisms van den Putte (2015), Gött (2016), Xu (2017) and Orbie et al. (2017).

  142. 142.

    Art. 22.5 and Art. 23.8 (4) CETA.

  143. 143.

    Orbie et al. (2017).

  144. 144.

    For a mechanism at the bilateral level, Art. 19.14 (1) TPP.

  145. 145.

    For domestic consultative mechanisms, Art. 19.14 (2) TPP.

  146. 146.

    ILO (2013), p. 105.

  147. 147.

    For an extensive case-study see Dombois et al. (2004), van den Putte (2015) and Gött (2016). See also the contributions by Abel and Gött (this volume).

  148. 148.

    Shihata (1986).

  149. 149.

    Chapter 8, Sec. F CETA and Sec. 3 TTIP (I). See also Chapter II, Sec. 3 EU-Vietnam-FTA (text on trade in services, investment and e-commerce).

  150. 150.

    See Maupain (2013) and La Hovary (2017).

  151. 151.

    The only FTA-labour case that has ever reached the stage of arbitration is the case before the Arbitral Panel established pursuant to Chapter Twenty of the CAFTA-DR, In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, Final Report of the Panel, 14 June 2017. There is no reported case where FTA provisions on trade sanctions have ever been activated.

  152. 152.

    ILO (2013), p. 43 et seqq.

  153. 153.

    Bolle (2016), p. 2 et seqq. and Abel (2017).

  154. 154.

    USTR (2015). See Art. 19.15 (12) TPP.

  155. 155.

    Abel (2017).

  156. 156.

    Art. 23.11 CETA. The EU position prevailed over Canada’s proposal to include monetary penalties as a last resort, Ebert (2017), p. 14.

  157. 157.

    UNCITRAL, United Parcel Service of America v. Canada, Merits, 24 May 2007.

  158. 158.

    It essentially reasoned that the customary FET standard protected under NAFTA did not require the host state from anticompetitive behaviour, UNCITRAL, United Parcel Service of America v. Canada, Jurisdiction, 22 Nov 2002, paras. 86–99.

  159. 159.

    UNCITRAL, United Parcel Service of America v. Canada, Merits, 24 May 2007, para. 172.

  160. 160.

    UNCITRAL, United Parcel Service of America v. Canada, Merits, 24 May 2007, para. 187.

  161. 161.

    Prislan and Zandvliet (2013), p. 395 with further references.

  162. 162.

    Prislan and Zandvliet (2013), p. 395.

  163. 163.

    Prislan and Zandvliet (2013), p. 396.

  164. 164.

    Viñuales (2013), p. 1726, para. 32.

  165. 165.

    Viñuales (2013), p. 1728, para. 36.

  166. 166.

    UNCITRAL, United Parcel Service of America v. Canada, Decision on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, 17 Oct 2001, para. 73. By contrast, the tribunal refused to grant the petitioners standing as third parties, ibid. para. 43.

  167. 167.

    ICSID, Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, Letter Regarding Non-Disputing Parties, 5 Oct 2009.

  168. 168.

    Art. 3 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, further modified and expanded by Art. 8.36 CETA.

  169. 169.

    Art. 4 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules.

  170. 170.

    Van Duzer (2016b), p. 9.

  171. 171.

    Art. 8.36 (1) CETA.

  172. 172.

    On this imbalance see Gött (2015) and Stoll et al. (2017).

  173. 173.

    See extensively on the questions of the localization of investment contracts between national and international law as well as their common design von Walter (2015).

  174. 174.

    ICSID, Veolia Propreté v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/15, arbitration pending.

  175. 175.

    See above (Sects. 2 and 3).

  176. 176.

    On the controversy whether or not umbrella clauses actually make concessions in investment contracts part of the protection standards of applicable international investment treaties (and the sharply divided arbitral practice in this regard) see von Walter (2015).

  177. 177.

    Art. 7 TTIP Proposal (I).

  178. 178.

    Annex 9-B No. 3 (a) (ii) TPP (text taken from Fn. 36 in the relevant provision).

  179. 179.

    UNCITRAL, Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v. Mongolia, Jurisdiction and Liability, 28 Apr 2011, para. 370.

  180. 180.

    See above, Sect. 2.3.1.

  181. 181.

    See above, Sect. 2.3.1.

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    Henner Gött & Till Patrik Holterhus

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    Henner Gött

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Gött, H., Holterhus, T.P. (2018). Mainstreaming Investment-Labour Linkage Through ‘Mega-Regional’ Trade Agreements. In: Gött, H. (eds) Labour Standards in International Economic Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69447-4_12

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