Abstract
Mergers between firms can have anti-competitive consequences, to a degree that depends on the number of merging firms and on the industries in which the firms operate. If the firms are in the same industry, and if there are many that merge into one firm, the situation is like going from pure competition to pure monopoly, with starkly anti-competitive effects—see Chap. 2 for discussion. If there are few firms in an industry to start with, merging few into one is less dramatic than merging many to one, and merger effects may be less severe.
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Gilbert, S. (2018). Mergers. In: Multi-Market Antitrust Economics. Quantitative Perspectives on Behavioral Economics and Finance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69386-6_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69386-6_4
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