Advertisement

Mergers

  • Scott Gilbert
Chapter
  • 398 Downloads
Part of the Quantitative Perspectives on Behavioral Economics and Finance book series (QPBEF)

Abstract

Mergers between firms can have anti-competitive consequences, to a degree that depends on the number of merging firms and on the industries in which the firms operate. If the firms are in the same industry, and if there are many that merge into one firm, the situation is like going from pure competition to pure monopoly, with starkly anti-competitive effects—see Chap.  2 for discussion. If there are few firms in an industry to start with, merging few into one is less dramatic than merging many to one, and merger effects may be less severe.

Keywords

Merger Horizontal merger Vertical merger Conglomerate merger Independent goods 

References

  1. Buccirossi, P. (2008). Handbook of antitrust economics. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  2. Cournot, A. (1838). Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth. Translated by Nathaniel T. Bacon, with a Bibliography of Mathematical Economics by Irving Fisher, and published by The Macmillan Company (1897, New York, NY).Google Scholar
  3. Davis, P., & Garcés, E. Quantitative techniques for competition and antitrust analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Farrell, J., & Shapiro, C. (1990). Horizontal mergers: An equilibrium analysis. American Economic Review, 80, 107–126.Google Scholar
  5. Farrell, J., & Shapiro C. (2010a). Antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers: An economic alternative to market definition. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 10, 9.Google Scholar
  6. Farrell J., & Shapiro C. (2010b). Upward pricing pressure and critical loss analysis: Response. CPI Antitrust Journal, 1–17.Google Scholar
  7. Faulkner, D., Teerikangas, S., & Joseph, R. J. (2012). The handbook of mergers and acquisitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Hausman J, Moresi, S., & Rainey, M. (2011). Unilateral effects of mergers with general linear demand. Economic Letters, 111, 119–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Hay, G. A., & Werden, G. J. (1993). Horizontal mergers: Law, policy, and economics. American Economic Review, 83(2), 173–177; Papers and proceedings of the one hundred and fifth meeting of the American Economic Association (May 1993), pp. 173–177.Google Scholar
  10. Kreps, D. M. (1990). A course in microeconomic theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Mas-Collel, A., Whinston, M. D., & Green, J. R. (1995). Microeconomics theory. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Nicholson, W., & Snyder, C. M. (2012). Microeconomic theory: Basic principles and extensions (11th ed.). New York, NY: Cengage Learning.Google Scholar
  13. Shapiro, C. (1989). Theories of oligopoly behavior. In R. Schmalensee & R. D. Willig (Eds.), Handbook of industrial organization (Vol. I, pp. 329–414). Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
  14. Stigler, G. J. (1964). A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72, 44–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Varian, H. R. (1992). Microeconomic analysis (3rd ed.). New York: W.W. Norton and Company.Google Scholar
  16. Williamson, O. (1968). Economies as an antitrust defense: The welfare tradeoffs. American Economic Review, 58, 18–36.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Scott Gilbert
    • 1
  1. 1.Southern Illinois UniversityCarbondaleUSA

Personalised recommendations