Abstract
Modern antitrust law seeks to protect consumers from anti-competitive business practices. Goods markets with lots of competition among sellers tend to have lower prices—good for consumers—but good deals tend to be fewer when there are fewer firms. A concentration of market power, among few firms, is anti-competitive if it raises prices faced by consumers. The courts and government agencies that enforce antitrust law must decide what sorts of business practices are significantly anti-competitive. Economic models and analysis play a key role in such decisions, and this book will discuss a variety of economic models in which antitrust issues can be cast.
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Gilbert, S. (2018). Antitrust Law. In: Multi-Market Antitrust Economics. Quantitative Perspectives on Behavioral Economics and Finance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69386-6_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69386-6_1
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Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
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Online ISBN: 978-3-319-69386-6
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