Abstract
The role of the soul in generation was a subject for controversy, rooted in Aristotle’s definition of anima. The classic questions concerning the soul in generation, which we find in Fernel, his contemporaries and successors, arise from this definition of anima. Put briefly, they are: is the seed animate, or is it an instrument of an “external efficient” as Cremonini called it? If the latter, is this external cause the parents, God, Nature, the heavens? Is the anima (as form) the same thing as species? And, related to this, how are the faculties or actions of a complex living creature such as a man, composed of parts of different forms or species, integrated into a functioning whole?
These questions are discussed by Fernel in his Medicina and by others. The de principio effectivo semini insito of Joannes Bronzerius asks “what makes semen fertile?” Archangelo Piccolomini’s Anatomicae Praelectiones is much broader. Scaliger’s discusses the soul in generation in his Exotericarum Exercitationum (1557). What is clear, in this all too brief and sketchy survey of Renaissance ideas of the soul in generation, is that Aristotle’s De generatione animalium is probably the most important single authority for the Renaissance debate.
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- 1.
For the doctrines of Plato, Hippocrates, Aristotle and Galen on the subject, see Part I, above, pp. 62–64, 67–69, 87–90 and 110–115 respectively, plus references. Particularly on the natural philosophical side, much more secondary literature exists than for some other questions discussed in this thesis. My own treatment is therefore brief. For further detail, see for example Giovanni di Napoli, L’immortalità dell’anima nel Rinascimento, Turin, 1963; Walker, especially “Astral body”, op. cit. and, especially important for the medical writers, Walter Pagel, “William Harvey Revisited”, History of Science, 1969–70, 8:1–31, 9:1–41, particularly Part II. More general discussions of the soul in Renaissance philosophy can be found in the work of Kristeller, Schmitt and Nardi cited in Part II, above.
- 2.
For Cremonini, see Part II above, especially pp. 232–243 and the references in Chap. 8, Note 43.
- 3.
Thomas De Garbo, Summa Medicinalis, Lyons, 1529. Book I, question 80, “Utrum spiritus existens in corpore animalis sit formaliter animatus”, fols. lxxxi ro- lxxxvi vo; especially “Reprobationes Joannis de Pena” and “Tractatus comminantium magistri Fr. de Bonon.”, fols. lxxxi vo- lxxxiii vo. Lipenius, op. cit. p. 419, seems to have taken his references to the debate from Garbo’s account, as I have done.
- 4.
The sequence of events in this debate is complex. Santa Cruz, in his In Avicennam primam primi… of 1622, seems to have attacked two earlier works of Fortunius Licetus, De ortu animae humanae..., Genoa, 1602 and De perfecta constitutione hominis.., Padua, 1616; as well as Thomas Fienus’s De formatrice foetus liber..., Antwerp, 1620. Both Licetus and F.ienus argued for positions which were disturbing to orthodox (particularly Catholic) medical writers, and Santa Cruz was supported by the Flemish doctor Louis DuGardin whose De animatione foetus quaestio..., Douai, 1623 was aimed particularly at Fienus’s 1620 Liber. Fienus produced a detailed reply, aimed in turn at DuGardin rather than Santa Cruz. Both were attached to Catholic Belgian universities (Fienus at Louvain, DuGardin at Douai) and both dedicated their works to high-ranking medical men in Catholic courts: Du Gardin to Santa Cruz, private physician to the King of Spain, and Fienus to Francisco Paz, “Regiae Catholicae majestatis et … Belgii Archiducam Archiatro...” One suspects a certain professional rivalry. Fienus’s reply was the De formatrice foetus liber secundus of 1624, and despite his scornful opinion of the 1623 Quaestio (“videns nihil in eo solidi contineri, praeter derisiunculas, cavillationes, et inania verba..”) he still devoted 170 pages to a detailed response (pp. 1–2). The third round came in 1629, with Fienus’s ..Apologia adversus Ant. Ponce Sanctacruz, Louvain, 1629, and Du Gardin’s Anima rationalis restituta.. of 1629, also dedicated to Santa Cruz, in which he sets out the sequence of events so far (Epistola Dedicatoria, fol 2v–3r). Licetus replied to Santa Cruz directly, in his De Anima subjecto corpori..., Padua, 1631.
- 5.
Du Gardin, op. cit. 1623, pp. 56–78 esp. 62–64 for baptism issue. His arguments are mostly religious, founded on the blasphemy that ‘spilled seed’ should have a rational soul, and thus be capable of salvation or damnation. His authorities are mostly Scriptural, but on page 58 he cites Jean Fernel’s statement that mola (shapeless masses formed in the womb) did not have a rational soul or require baptism, and on p. 60 he applies the same argument to monsters.
- 6.
Licetus, op. cit. e.g. 1631, xvi p. 51: “Nostram igitur opinionem e formis in materia velut in loco existentibus, cui nullam actum exhibeant..” In his 1616 work, he divides the geniture into an active, spirituous portion, which contains within itself the active principle of generation or substantial form; and a crasser portion on which the former operates (iv, pp. 20–3, v pp. 23–25). He also argues (ch. vi, pp. 26–30) for a variety of panspermatism. For Fernel’s use of the helmsman analogy, see below. Licetus himself (1631, ibid.,) uses the analogy of a vessel or container: “Anima in corpore degens ut in vase” to explain how the soul can be in actu within as yet unformed seminal matter.
- 7.
Fienus, op. cit., 1620, Conclusio Septima, p. 91; ch. 7, 124–157, esp. Conclusio Octava, p. 128; ch. 8, 158–220 and Conclusiones Nova (p. 161) and Decima (p. 184).
- 8.
A similar example is in the De Miraculis Occultis Naturae of Levinus Lemnius, Antwerp, 1574. Lemnius argues (I xi 53–55) that the soul is not transmitted in the seed, but newly created and infused by God on about the 45th day. Earlier foetal development is directed by the formative faculty or vis vitalis of the seed, and the facultas uteri. Lemnius’s popular anthology, with subjects ranging from the geography of Zealand, sleepwalking, the basilisk, the use of lampreys as torches, the sex of plants and planets, to how to grow a beard, appeared in numerous editions, including an English translation, The Secret Miracles of Nature, in 1658. It is mentioned by Cole, op. cit.: Needham, op. cit., describes it as “without value”.
- 9.
Nicolaus Leonicenus, De virtute formativa, Venice, 1506. Generation treatises in which the soul is an important feature include those of Jourdain Guibelet, “Du Principe de la Generation del’Homme”, in Trois Discours Philosophiques, Evreux, 1603; Victor Cardelinus, De origine foetus, Vincenza, 1628; Joannes Gallego de la Serna, De principiis generationis..., Lyons, 1634. More general treatments with a medical bias appear in Chrisopher Rumbaum, De Partibus Corporibus Exercitationes, Basle, 1586 and Archangelo Piccolomini, Anatomicae Praelectiones, Rome, 1586. Rumbaum is not a doctor of medicine but of divinity, and his purposes, as he explains, is to demonstrate the works of God in the creation and the unity of truth; and, in considering the question of the generation of the soul, to reconcile Aristotle with theology (Epistola Dedicatoria, ii r–8 r). Piccolomini is considered in more detail below.
- 10.
Fernel, Physiologia V i p. 122: “..non in solius corporis, sed in hominis qui ex corpore et animo constat, meditatione versamur…inesse quippiam viventi quo sit is praestantior atque potentior demortuo, & quo ad obeunda munia se comparet.”
- 11.
Ibid. vii 123–4, xviii 160–1.
- 12.
Ibid. VII v 227–9: “Ex quo intelligi potest eum hominem qui emisso semine generat, omnes quoque corporeas facultates una producere. Caeterum animum et eam animi partem quae princeps est, quaeque mens nominatur minime is confert, quia cum animus sit a corporis natura diversus, eius substantiam non comitatur, sed extrinsecus in id illabitur ceu divinum munus.” (p. 229; cf. translation and commentary by Figard, op. cit. pp. 200–201). This statement is very similar to that of Aristotle, and almost identical with the position of Cremonini (above, Part II Chap. 11). It varies somewhat, as we shall see, from the discussion in D.A.R.C. I iv–vi.
- 13.
Ibid. V xviii 161: “Illa quasi separata & simplex, corpori non permiscetur, sed ei duntaxat ut navi gubernator assistit: haec vero in corpus penitus immergitur, a quo nunquam diiungi divellique potest. Illa denique, ut cogitet, ut contempletur, & intelligat corporis subsidio non indiget: haec vero nihil efficere potest citra idoneam corporis eiusque organici praeparationem..”
- 14.
Ibid. IV x and xi, 119–121; V ii 125 (“Est enim facultas vis illa & potestas quam anima tanquam de sinu suo promit, & ad muneram functiones profert..”); xii p. 148 for Fernel’s statement that,not calor but the anima of which it is vehicle and instrument is opifex in the functioning of the body; xiii, xiv and especially xv pp. 152–157 for the argument that each faculty has an appropriate ‘seat’ in the body.
- 15.
Ibid. xvi p. 158, xvii 159–60. As we saw in Part I (p. 88) Aristotle himself associated generation both with the nutritive soul and with the primordial heart; the confusion is not entirely of Fernel’s making.
- 16.
Ibid. xv pp. 155–6. For Argenterius, cf. De somno, p. 288. Joannes Rogerius, De sede animae, Naples, 1574, is based on this same question.
- 17.
D.A.R.C. I iii 27–37 for Eudoxus on the hierarchy of forms; iv 55–56, 58–59, v 64 (61) for the three preparations preceding the reception of the total form.
- 18.
Ibid. I v pp. 59–66, especially 65–66; the argument continues in vi (“Gignendae formae, ne minimum quidem ante in materia fuisse, neque potentiam quicquam esse formae, neque ad substantiae genus referri”), pp. 68–85: “An non cepam saepenumero vidisti, de tectis aere libero propendentem, per se nullius extrarii ope, sese diffundere, et herbescentem ex se viriditatem proferre? aut ovum solo fornacis tepore pullum excludere?…dum iam vivere ac moveri incipit ille pullus, unde suam accipit animam? unde prodit illa? aut quis eam inducit? ubi extrarius ille tuus opifex est qui ovo suam insculpat formam? …An non luce clarius est, illam ex ovi potentia existere, ut ex eodem ovo pullum universum?” (pp. 68–9). See Figard, op. cit., 203–4 for a discussion of this passage, and Aristotle, Metaphysics V, 9 and 12, and Physics, Book VII, for definitions of active and passive potestas.
- 19.
Ibid. I vi 70–1, 75.
- 20.
Ibid. I vii 97–98; Philiatros sums up the argument so far: the genitor is not cause of the species; the heavens, as higher cause, are.
- 21.
Ibid. II iii 157, 163, iv 167-170, vii pp. 191–3 for the importance of spiritus; I vi 78, II vii 186–7 (Philiatros) for suggestion that heat and spiritus are the divine substance of the soul. For Galen’s equivocal position on this point, see above, Part I, esp. pp. 111–2; and de placitis (Kühn V p. 643).
- 22.
Ibid. I viii esp. 101–2; x, esp. 120-3; xi.
- 23.
Pagel, “Harvey revisited” Part II, esp. 8–20; for Schegk, 12, 26–30: p. 27 for quote. My comments on Schegk are based on Pagel’s account and directly on Jacobus Schegkius, De plastica seminis facultate, Strasbourg, 1580, esp. fols. A2 ro – B2 vo. Among other examples by which Pagel seeks to place Harvey in an orthodox Peripatetic tradition are Albertus Magnus, Ponce de Santacruz and Cesare Cremonini; the opposition is chiefly represented by Daniel Sennert (11–20), although the ‘dualist opponents’ Harvey singles out for attack in Exercises 50 and 71 of De generatione (p. 7 e.s and note 76; 20 and note 82) are, according to Pagel, Scaliger and Fernel. For Scaliger, see below. The evident similarities between e.g. Schegk and Fernel suggest a weakness in Pagel’s thesis.
- 24.
Joannes Bronzerius, De principio effectivo semini insito, Padua, 1627 (and see Part III Chap. 15, note 53, above); I ix 49- xiii 74; xv–xviii. II iii 131 – iv 136 esp. Much of the text is concerned with answering objections raised, Conciliator-fashion.
- 25.
Piccolomini, op. cit., 1586. The broad scope of the work is suggested in its full title: Anatomicae Praelectiones..Explicantes mirificam corporis humani Fabricam: Et quae animae vires, quibus corporis partibus, tanguam instrumentis, ad suas obeundas actiones, utantur; sicuti tota anima, toto corpore. Book I, Lectio Tertia, 11–14; Quarta, 15–18; Quinta, 19–23 esp. p. 37 (Lectio Nona) for his definition: “Quae sit actio totius animae?… esse vita.” He defines plant life as “operatio, plantae conveniens” and notes that this will vary by species: “vita homini conveniens..distat a vita conveniente asino, leoni, bovi..Non enim anima est quod vivit, sed anima est id, quo compositum animatum vivit.” So for Piccolomini, as for Fernel, differences between species are the result of differences in their souls – and not, as for Sylvius, merely in their temperaments.
- 26.
Pagel, op. cit., 13–14, citing Sennert’s Hypomnemata physica, IV 6–8. Guibelet, op. cit. (note 9 above), xii pp. 180–4.
- 27.
Scaliger, op. cit. (1557), Exercitatio Sexta, ch. 5, “De generatione”, fol. 13r–14r. Pagel, op. cit. Part II, pp. 14–19, 20.
- 28.
Scaliger, Ibid.; ch. 8, 15r–v: “Non est igitur spiritus pars corporis, quae formatur… Est igitur in corpore seminis, sicut agens in patiente. Non separatus loco, qui sensu perpiciatur, sed intellectione… Movet enim anima spiritum sine instrumento… Terra nonne descendit sine instrumento? Inter formam enim, et materiam nullam corpus interesse necesse est.” This cuts across the arguments of those such as Fernel, that a medium of some sort is necessary to connect soul and body.
- 29.
Ibid., ch. 9: “Est enim canis imperfectus, carens tantum articulationibus…seminis illius anima nihil aliud habet agere, quam vivificare materiam illam, quod et facit. Fabricare autem non potest, quia extra matricem suam est: quippe extra terra sinum. Sic arboris anima nihil aedificat hyeme .”
- 30.
Ibid. 15v–16v (chs. 9–11). Chapter 6, 14v, for his attack on “Error detestandus de fortuita hominis generatione”, which recalls the commentaries on XII Metaphysics surveyed in Part II, above: e.g. Nifo, pp. 203–6.
- 31.
Pagel, op. cit., esp. Part I, pp. 10–11, 13; II, 11, 34, 36. Pagel’s attempt to divide the accounts which he discusses into genuine Aristotelian, ‘monist’ schemes (in which the formative virtue which forms the foetus is an instrument of the parents and the developing foetus is not distinguished into form and matter) and ‘dualist’ schemes, such as Sennert’s (in which the agent is a soul within the seed) is not entirely convincing. It is his attempt to distinguish the two types according to their use of formative virtue or anima which runs into most difficulty: for instance, he is forced to argue that when Schegk, who is cast as a monist, uses “soul”, he really means “formative faculty” (p. 28). Another difficulty, as I have already pointed out, is that virtually all the participants in the debate take Aristotle as a major authority. But Pagel is always illuminating, and his careful untangling of Schegk’s cryptic doctrine is particularly valuable.
- 32.
See above, pp. 209–12; 235–42; 255–60.
Bibliography
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FIENUS, Thomas. De Formatrice foetus liber in quo ostenditur animam rationalem infundi tertia die. Antwerp, 1620.
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Deer Richardson, L., Goldberg, B. (2018). The Soul in Generation and the Animation of the Foetus. In: Academic Theories of Generation in the Renaissance. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69336-1_16
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