Abstract
Globalization, Digitalization, Forth industry revolution (interconnected cyber-physical systems), Internet of ‘Everything’ all require new method, concepts, and solutions to document, understand, analyze, operate, control, and transform critical infrastructure as a whole or in parts. It is not new that critical infrastructures are highly interconnected and collaborative and therefore susceptible to domino effects supported by their systemic dependencies. Yet, it is still often a surprise when something does not work. The reason for this is deeply embedded in the very issue governance: the often-unknown system purpose of parts of a comprehensive system of systems landscape, the dynamic driven by a volatile environment, the ongoing change, cyber events, and the impact of politic or social media. A matter of fact is in-transparency and a missing or not properly maintained dependency does not help to manage a normal as well as a complex situation—a system of system landscape under special circumstances.
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Notes
- 1.
In an economy, there are many ‘System of systems’ including individual enterprise, financial service organization, nuclear plant, public service, political system, and cross-boarder telecommunication provider.
- 2.
Performability, conformability, changeability, and riskability are an evidence, entrepreneurial and economically driven approach (concept and pattern) to document and represent generic required capabilities to manage system of systems traceable and sustainable. Performability focuses on product, market, revenue, cost, profit, and solvability. Conformability covers how all legal requirements, commitments, and liabilities can be met, how promises are managed and agreed contracts and SLAs fulfilled. Changeability manages all change requests, internal and external demands, lifecycle and innovation GAPs, incidents and maintains issues. Riskability is the balance or the intersection between the four topics with a special focus. This capability is difficult to manage, prevent, forecast, and predict because it is fuzzy and often depends on people’s behavior, attitudes, and current circumstances.
- 3.
System resilience governance profile is a comprehensive representation of a specified, validated, and assessed certain amount, part or entire system of systems landscape.
- 4.
The artifact capability in a specific system of system context (e.g., enterprise) collects and covers dependencies, and shows what is used to offer a product (what) at a specific location (where) under the valid regulations (what has to be done). The process indicates how a capability is performed, while the organization (who) performs a capability. The value chain (why) offers the value (asset, product, and service) at a place under local conditions. The application with the applied infrastructure (whereby) supports the capability. The information shows which data is used or required to perform consistently and at high quality, with maturity and trusted capability.
- 5.
Capabilities can be documented and visualized in different ways (e.g., capability risk matrix, capability visualization (i.e., heat map, sensitivity, benchmark, quality–maturity–trust, and time series), and capability control matrix) as a check to ensure that everything running as required.
- 6.
A common known complex situation is 9/11. The terror attack was unknown, unexpected before time of the event. The involved and concerned system of systems where unknown, had a complex governance, information where not available about a certain time and consequences where not all seen and managed over a period of time.
- 7.
Consequences characterized as impact or risk shift are on all systemic-related (dependent) risks. A risk shift on a systemic related risk is visible shift depends on dependency strength, -impact {vector shift} or attribute modification.
- 8.
To differentiate between a ‘normal’ and a ‘complex’ situation, think in terms of ‘time.’ In complex situations, time for actions is short and the rate of change of the environment in which the system is embedded is dynamic. Thus, there is no enough time to collect additional data or to start talking, actions are required.
- 9.
Vulnerability analyses of a living system of systems landscape can be distinguished in bright-field, dark-field or gray-field analyses. In case of all required information to support a comprehensive vulnerability analyses (attributes, function, rules, relations) are available in detail a bright-field analyses can be supported. If Information is only available on meta- or principle level or just structure are known a dark-field analyses can be developed. For all analyses where not enough or only partially information is available a grey-field can be done or is suggested.
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Gheorghe, A.V., Vamanu, D.V., Katina, P.F., Pulfer, R. (2018). System Resilience Governance. In: Critical Infrastructures, Key Resources, Key Assets. Topics in Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality, vol 34. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69224-1_10
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