Moore, Vienna Circle, and Meta-Ethics

  • Maxim Storchevoy


In this chapter we will review the development of moral philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century when the discipline was strongly influenced by Moore with much skepticism about ethics and by logical positivism with its emphasis on the language. As a result moral philosophers immersed themselves in long debates for clarification of moral language and produced a vast literature called “meta-ethics” which is of rather unclear value for the further development of moral philosophy.


Moore naturalistic fallacy Vienna Circle meta-ethics 


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© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maxim Storchevoy
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Graduate School of ManagementSt. Petersburg UniversitySt. PetersburgRussia
  2. 2.National Research University Higher School of EconomicsSt. PetersburgRussia

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