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Referential Analysis of Quotation

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The Semantics and Pragmatics of Quotation

Part of the book series: Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology ((PEPRPHPS,volume 15))

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Abstract

A non-Fregean solution is offered to the problem of understanding the meaning of quotation statements. Quotations are analyzed by Frege in terms of a distinction that is judged unnecessary and counterintuitive, between customary and quoted indirect reference interpreted as customary sense. There are intuitive objections to Frege’s maneuver that are avoided in a proposed referential analysis in which quoting, like being taller than, is explained as a relation between two existent entities, a quoted subject and the exact linguistic type entity that the quoted subject is correctly quoted as articulating. The referential analysis is further extended to model four difficulties for standard neo-Fregean semantics, including (a) the use-mention distinction, (b) the intensionality-extensionality distinction, (c) the intensionality of syntax numbering contexts, and (d) criticism of Quine’s nine planets argument for the intensionality of alethic modal contexts.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The classic secondary source critical of Frege (1970) is Linsky (1967: especially 22–38). A recent useful collection of essays on indirect discourse reportage in quotation is Capone et al. (2016).

  2. 2.

    For a discussion of the non-identity and material equivalence substitution failure in connection with slingshot arguments, see Jacquette (2010: 136–140).

  3. 3.

    Frege (1970: 56–78). More detailed analysis of Frege’s theory of names and oratio obliqua contexts is offered by Jacquette (1998: 63–79, 2016: chapter 8).

  4. 4.

    Frege allows that proper names including definite descriptions and sentences expressing thoughts or propositions can have sense while lacking reference. ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is an example of the former; ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’ of the latter. Frege’s semantic compositionality thesis implies that the sentence has sense but no truth-value when its subject term proper name has sense but no reference to any existent entity in the Fregean referential semantic domain consisting of all and only existent entities.

  5. 5.

    Wittgenstein (1922) in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is more easily let off the hook than Frege. Wittgenstein in 2.172, 4.12, 6.13 and elsewhere considers the logical analysis of colloquial propositions to include their form of representation and correlation that, like their logical form in its symbolic aspect where analysis is supposed to hold in precise logical isomorphisms, transcends the perceivable sign. If logical analysis for the early Wittgenstein transcends experience, then he cannot be blamed for not presenting an instructive analysis for inspection. Neither Frege nor Wittgenstein seems to have an applicable method of analysis that can be exhibited in moments of process or end result. It is the possibility of analysis or of the structures that an analysis would reveal, if only it could, that matters to both Frege and Wittgenstein. Satisfied of that point, the structure of analysis except in the most general terms is not undertaken, because it is not supposed or expected to be capable of being carried out in practice.

  6. 6.

    Of the voluminous literature on Frege’s semantic compositionality thesis especially recommended are Partee (1984: 281–312), Pelletier (1994: 11–24), Hodges (2001: 7–28), and Janssen (2001: 115–136).

  7. 7.

    Sources to which I am indebted prominently include Christensen (1967), Bennett (1988), Washington (1992), and Saka (1998, 2006).

  8. 8.

    An early form of the substitution failure for syntax item numberings appears in Plantinga (1974: 224–229).

  9. 9.

    Quine (1976: 158–164, 1961: 139–144). The objection is not that Quine’s inference is deductively valid, reflecting substitution failure salva veritate, but that the invalidity is more reasonably attributed to the identity whereby the number of planets = 9, rather than to the modal context, □___ > 7. See Jacquette (1986: 598–608, especially 602–604).

  10. 10.

    It is with grief that I report the sudden death of Dale Jacquette on 22 August 2016. The present version of this paper has been lightly edited to incorporate clarifications that emerged in my personal communications with him, relevant updating of references, and recommendations by an anonymous reviewer. – Paul Saka.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland

    Dale Jacquette

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  1. Dale Jacquette
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Texas, Rio Grande, Edinburg, Texas, USA

    Paul Saka

  2. University of Hong Kong, Pok Fu Lam, Hong Kong

    Michael Johnson

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Jacquette, D. (2017). Referential Analysis of Quotation. In: Saka, P., Johnson, M. (eds) The Semantics and Pragmatics of Quotation. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 15. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68747-6_12

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