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A Stochastic Game-Theoretic Model for Smart Grid Communication Networks

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Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10575))

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Abstract

The increasing adoption of new information and communication technology assets in smart grids is making smart grids vulnerable to cyber threats, as well as raising numerous concerns about the adequacy of current security approaches. As a single act of penetration is often not sufficient for an attacker to achieve his/her goal, multistage cyber attacks may occur. This paper looks at the stochastic and dynamic nature of multistage cyber attacks in smart grid use cases and develops a stochastic game-theoretic model to capture the interactions between the attacker and the defender in multistage cyber attack scenarios. Due to the information asymmetry of the interactions between the attacker and the defender, neither of both players knows the exact current game state. This paper proposes a belief-updating mechanism for both players to form a common belief about the current game state. In order to assess threats of multistage cyber attacks, it further discusses the computation of Nash equilibria for the designed game model.

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Acknowledgments

The research leading to the results presented in this paper was supported by the European Commission’s Project No. 608090, HyRiM (Hybrid Risk Management for Utility Networks) under the 7th Framework Programme (FP7-SEC-2013-1). The authors acknowledge Stefan Rass from Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt for his invaluable discussions and comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Informatics and Mathematics, University of Passau, Innstr. 43, 94032, Passau, Germany

    Xiaobing He & Hermann de Meer

Authors
  1. Xiaobing He
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  2. Hermann de Meer
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Correspondence to Xiaobing He .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Universität Klagenfurt, Klagenfurt, Austria

    Stefan Rass

  2. Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore

    Bo An

  3. University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, Texas, USA

    Christopher Kiekintveld

  4. Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA

    Fei Fang

  5. AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH, Klagenfurt, Austria

    Stefan Schauer

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He, X., de Meer, H. (2017). A Stochastic Game-Theoretic Model for Smart Grid Communication Networks. In: Rass, S., An, B., Kiekintveld, C., Fang, F., Schauer, S. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10575. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_16

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-68710-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-68711-7

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